t recent forums, including the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (late 2025-early 2026), US Ambassador and Syria Envoy Tom Barrack argued that Western attempts to impose democratic models in the Middle East have largely failed, often undermining stability by prioritising human rights over security. He advocated for alternative governance rooted in regional realities, emphasising that ‘benevolent monarchies’ or strong centralised systems have proven more effective. The remarks reflect a broad shift in US policy toward engaging existing strong leadership structures to pursue stability and prosperity over ideological democratisation.

This column centres on these remarks. Rather than taking them at face value, it is perhaps better to view them as part of an enduring debate about the meaning, scope and universality of democracy. Barrack’s claim—that prioritising democracy and human rights over stability has led to state failure in the Middle East—rests on a narrow reading of recent history and reflects a familiar realist scepticism toward normative politics. Such framing risks overlooking a more fundamental point: democracy is not merely a policy instrument to be exported, suspended or recalibrated at will. It is a universal principle through which public will, accountability and political legitimacy are expressed. In the particular case of Middle East, while externally imposed models of democratisation—especially in the aftermath of the Iraq War—have failed, these failures do not invalidate the democratic ideal. Rather, they expose the limits of coercive imposition and underscore the necessity of organic, internally driven political development. Barrack’s emphasis on ‘strong leadership’ and authoritarian stability therefore appears less as a viable alternative and more as a retreat from the challenge of aligning governance structures with the aspirations and agency of various societies.

Viewed through the perspective of John Mearsheimer, Barrack’s stance is consistent with the logic of offensive realism, which posits that states prioritise power, survival and regional dominance over ideological commitments. Mearsheimer would argue that great powers inevitably support regimes—democratic or otherwise—that serve their strategic interests and that attempts to universalize liberal democracy are likely to falter in diverse cultural and geopolitical contexts. Yet realism, for all its explanatory power, remains normatively thin; it describes what states do but offers little guidance on what they ought to do.

It is precisely here that the contributions of Francis Fukuyama become salient. Even after revising his earlier optimism, Fukuyama continues to emphasise that accountable institutions, rule of law and participatory governance are indispensable for long-term stability. His critique is not of democracy itself, but of the hubris that assumed it could be rapidly engineered from outside. Barrack’s position, by contrast, risks conflating flawed implementation with conceptual failure, thereby legitimising authoritarian arrangements that may secure short-term order but lack enduring legitimacy.

The work of Robert Pape further complicates this narrative by shifting attention away from regime type and toward the dynamics of intervention and resistance. Pape’s research demonstrates that instability and political violence in regions like the Middle East often stem less from an excess of democratic aspiration than from reactions to foreign military presence and coercive intervention. This insight challenges the premise that authoritarian governance inherently produces stability, suggesting instead that legitimacy—rooted in public consent—is a more reliable foundation for order. In this sense, both imposed democratisation and externally supported authoritarianism can prove destabilising when they fail to reflect the will of the governed.

Additional insights from pro-democracy theorists, particularly within British academia, reinforce the normative centrality of democratic governance. David Held, associated with the London School of Economics, argued for “cosmopolitan democracy,” emphasising that democratic accountability must extend beyond national borders in an inter-connected world. For Held, democracy is not culturally bounded but a universalisable framework grounded in participation and rights. Similarly, John Keane has highlighted the evolution of “monitory democracy,” in which power is continuously scrutinised by civil society and institutions, underscoring that accountability—not mere stability—is the cornerstone of legitimate governance. These perspectives challenge Barrack’s implicit assumption that certain regions are inherently unsuited to democratic forms, instead affirming that the demand for representation and accountability is globally resonant.

The intellectual legacy of the Frankfurt School adds a deeper philosophical dimension to this critique. Thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas have argued that legitimacy in modern societies arises from communicative rationality—free and equal participation in public discourse—rather than from imposed authority or coercive power. Habermas’s concept of deliberative democracy directly challenges the notion that stability can be sustainably achieved through authoritarian means, emphasising instead that enduring political order depends on inclusive dialogue and the consent of the governed. Earlier Frankfurt School theorists like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer warned of the dangers of instrumental rationality, where efficiency and control override ethical considerations—a critique that resonates strongly with policies that prioritise strategic stability over democratic values.

The suggestion that Barrack’s remarks signal a broader Western abandonment of democracy is therefore misleading. While US policy has undoubtedly become more pragmatic—particularly amid strategic competition with China and Russia—this shift reflects an adjustment in methods rather than a rejection of foundational principles. The persistence of partnerships with states such as Saudi Arabia does expose enduring double standards, but these contradictions have long been embedded in the tension between ideals and interests. What Barrack’s remarks reveal is not a novel doctrine but a more explicit articulation of an old dilemma: how to reconcile geopolitical strategy with normative commitments without undermining either.

At the same time, claims of a coherent ‘imperialist design’ directing the region oversimplify a far more complex reality. While initiatives like the Abraham Accords demonstrate efforts to reshape regional alignments, the Middle East remains a contested and pluralistic space shaped by multiple actors, including Iran, local political movements and diverse social forces. Reducing this complexity to a singular strategic blueprint risks erasing the agency of regional populations—the very agency that democratic theory seeks to foreground.

Historically, Barrack’s views align with a long lineage of US policymakers who have privileged stability over democratic transformation. Figures such as Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick justified support for authoritarian regimes in strategic terms. Leaders like George W Bush and Barack Obama grappled with the practical limits of democracy promotion. In this continuum, Barrack’s words represent less a departure than a more candid articulation of an enduring realist impulse. Yet the persistence of this impulse does not diminish the normative force of democracy; rather, it highlights the ongoing struggle to realise it in practice.

Ultimately, the debate is not about whether democracy has failed, but about how it has been misunderstood, instrumentalised, and, at times, undermined by the very powers that claim to champion it. Barrack’s remarks risk legitimising a reactionary turn that equates stability with authoritarianism and sidelines the central role of public will in political legitimacy. Against this, the insights of thinkers from Mearsheimer to Fukuyama, from Held to Habermas, point toward a more nuanced conclusion: that while the pathways to democracy are complex and context-dependent, its core principles—participation, accountability and legitimacy—remain universally relevant.

Democracy endures not because it is easily imposed, but because it reflects a fundamental human aspiration to shape one’s own political destiny. The real challenge is to foster the conditions under which democratic institutions can emerge organically and take root on their own, rather than abandoning democracy in favour of ‘strong leaders.’ In this light, Barrack’s remarks do not signal the obsolescence of democracy, but rather underscore the urgency of reaffirming its foundational role in constructing legitimate and enduring political order.

The writer is a professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.