he surge in terrorist attacks in Pakistan has tested Islamabad’s patience. Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, seen by many as Tehreek-i-Taliban Afghanistan’s affiliate, is considered the primary militant group behind most attacks in Pakistan. Despite many requests by Islamabad, the Taliban administration in Kabul has not taken meaningful action against the TTP and other terrorist groups having havens in Afghanistan that pose security threats to Pakistan.

Islamabad has thus decided to move from diplomacy to kinetic military operations inside Afghanistan. This has resulted in strikes in Afghanistan in October 2025 and more strikes in February. There have been reports that more than 400 Taliban have been killed and almost 500 injured. Pakistani security forces have captured 27 posts on the Afghan side of the border and seized arms including 171 tanks and armoured vehicles. Government sources say 41 locations across Afghanistan have been targeted so far.

The fighting continues.

This brings us to the question: what kind of retaliation can the Taliban launch? In terms of conventional warfare, Pakistan is simply streets ahead. However, the Taliban are not to be underestimated. Having been the target of some of the most advanced military hardware brought to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the United States, they have honed the art of asymmetric warfare.

Pakistan has, for the first time, targeted not just militant hideouts but also the Afghan state when it bombed Kabul and Kandahar. The government has made no secret of its intention to punish the Afghan state for aiding and abetting terrorist groups operating in Pakistan.

As a country, Pakistan espouses a geo economic model based on regional connectivity. The country wants to connect to Central Asia through Afghanistan. To that end, Islamabad has been supporting Kabul on many fronts. For four decades, it hosted millions of Afghan refugees. The current crisis therefore should be seen as an indictment of its foreign policy conduct towards Afghanistan. The working assumption clearly was that if the Taliban commanded Kabul, it would be good for Pakistan. The Taliban, it was thought, could be relied upon to resist Indian influence. Recent overtures made by the Taliban administration towards India have caused consternation in Islamabad. There has been evidence of Taliban’s logistical and financial support to militants and terrorist groups in Pakistan.

A key component of Pakistan’s strategy to counter terrorism is targeting the TTP shelters and training facilities in Afghanistan. Recently Pakistani officials have claimed significant success in this regard. Government statements indicate that hundreds of Taliban and their allies have been killed and captured through kinetic operations. This has resulted in the disruption of overall strategies pursued by command and control networks and organisational structures of these terrorist groups. Pakistan is also working on eliminating logistical support these groups receive. This will increase the tangible cost of their operations and likely reduce their capacity to launch attacks in Pakistan. This approach combines military pressure with the broader goal of disrupting not only financial but also logistical support that fuels cross-border terrorism and long-term regional instability.

When faced with sustained pressure and significant increase in the overall operational costs, the intensity of terrorist activities often experiences a gradual decline but rarely total elimination. This is largely due to the continuous degradation in the leadership of terrorist groups. As key figures are eliminated, access to weapon and funding sources also diminish and the safe heavens become less secure. Thus, terrorist groups find it difficult to plan and execute large-scale attacks. Still, they can recruit and train new fighters. The constraints result in a reduction in frequency and sophistication of terrorist activities.

Terrorism is rarely limited to a single country. It is vital to understand that the policy currently pursued by Kabul poses problem not just for Pakistan but also other countries. Türkiye and Qatar recently tried to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Kabul remained dismissive of Islamabad’s concerns. For its part, Pakistan was open to talks and mediation.

There is substantial evidence of militant hideouts in Afghanistan. However, military operations are seldom an exclusive option to eliminate terrorism. Pakistan’s political leaders must establish contact with the Afghan Taliban for sustained dialogue and diplomatic engagement. The leadership in both countries must cooperate through intelligence sharing and collaborated- actions against militants. Third-party mediation should also be welcomed.

The writer is an assistant professor at NUML, Islamabad. He can be reached at [email protected].