Hezbollah: resistance, politics and power — II

Hezbollah: resistance, politics and power — II


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he movement’s reputation was further enhanced during the 2006 Lebanon War. Following Hezbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers near the border, Israel launched a massive air and ground campaign. Given Israel’s overwhelming conventional superiority, Hezbollah adopted an innovative strategy based on decentralised command structures, fortified underground tunnel systems, anti-tank missile units, mobile rocket-launching teams and intimate familiarity with the terrain of southern Lebanon.

Military scholar Stephen Biddle described Hezbollah’s performance as a sophisticated form of hybrid warfare combining guerrilla tactics with modern military technology. Israeli forces encountered fierce resistance in Bint Jbeil and Maroun al-Ras and Hezbollah continued launching rockets into northern Israel until the final stages of the conflict. Although Lebanon suffered immense destruction and civilian casualties, Hezbollah’s ability to remain operational despite sustained bombardment was widely interpreted by supporters as a strategic victory. Nasrallah’s characterisation of the outcome as a “divine victory” subsequently became central to the organisation’s political narrative.

Supporters consequently regard Hezbollah as a bulwark against Israeli expansionism and recurring military intervention in Lebanon. They point to Israeli operations in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996 and 2006 as evidence that Lebanon required a credible deterrent independent of the often weak and fragmented state. From that perspective, Hezbollah represents not simply an armed organisation but a broader project of resistance, communal empowerment and national defence.

Edward Said repeatedly warned against analyses of the Middle East that reduce political actors to simplistic stereotypes while ignoring the lived experiences of occupation, displacement and foreign intervention. Applying this insight to Hezbollah suggests the importance of understanding the movement not merely through the lens of militancy but also through the social, historical and political conditions that enabled its rise. Amal Saad similarly argues that Hezbollah’s legitimacy among its supporters rests upon a synthesis of resistance, political representation and social welfare.

The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah constitutes one of the most enduring conflicts in the modern Middle East. Since Hezbollah’s emergence in 1982, the relationship between the two actors has been defined by cycles of military confrontation, deterrence and strategic competition. Hezbollah views itself as a resistance movement born from opposition to Israeli occupation. Israel regards it as a heavily armed organisation posing a major security threat. The conflict has evolved from localised guerrilla warfare in southern Lebanon into a broader regional struggle involving deterrence, sovereignty and geopolitical influence.

For Hezbollah and its supporters, the Palestinian cause occupies a central place in the organisation’s identity. Hezbollah’s leadership has consistently portrayed the struggle against Israel as inseparable from the Palestinian quest for self-determination and statehood. Nasrallah frequently argued that the Palestinian issue is not merely a territorial dispute but a question of justice, dispossession and resistance against occupation. Over the years, Hezbollah developed close relations with Hamas despite the theological differences separating the Shiite Lebanese movement from the Sunni Palestinian organisation. Their cooperation rested primarily on a shared opposition to Israel rather than sectarian affinity. Hezbollah provided political backing, military expertise, training and strategic coordination to Hamas and other Palestinian groups, reinforcing its image among supporters as a central pillar of the so-called Axis of Resistance.

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Hezbollah’s performance during the 2006 war significantly enhanced its standing throughout the Arab world, where many viewed the organisation as proof that armed resistance could challenge Israeli military power. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, Hezbollah intensified its engagement along the Lebanese-Israeli border, describing its actions as a “support front” intended to relieve pressure on Palestinians in Gaza and demonstrate solidarity with Hamas and the broader Palestinian resistance. For supporters, these actions underscored Hezbollah’s role as a defender of Palestinian rights; for critics, they risked drawing Lebanon into a wider regional conflict and further weakening an already fragile state.

Hezbollah’s standing in the Arab world has undergone a significant transformation over the past two decades. If the years following 2000 and 2006 marked the high point of its popularity, the Syrian civil war represented a major turning point. Hezbollah’s intervention on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s government alienated many Sunni Arab audiences and intensified perceptions of regional sectarian polarisation. Today, Saudi Arabia views Hezbollah largely as an instrument of Iranian regional influence and has repeatedly criticised it for undermining Lebanese sovereignty, destabilising Arab states and advancing Tehran’s strategic agenda. The United Arab Emirates shares a similar perspective, regarding Hezbollah primarily through a security lens as a destabilising non-state actor aligned with Iran.

Qatar has generally adopted a more nuanced position. While maintaining relations with a broad range of regional actors and often acting as a mediator in Lebanese affairs, Doha has stopped short of embracing Hezbollah in the manner of Iran or Syria and has focused instead on preserving Lebanese political stability. Consequently, Arab perceptions of Hezbollah are deeply divided. Among supporters, it remains a resistance movement that confronted Israeli occupation and championed the Palestinian cause. Among critics, particularly in several Gulf states, it is viewed as an armed organisation closely aligned with Iran whose regional activities have contributed to instability and sectarian tensions.

Among Shiite communities outside Lebanon, Hezbollah has generally enjoyed a degree of sympathy and admiration, though the intensity of support has varied according to local political circumstances. In Iraq, particularly among segments of the Shiite population and parties aligned with Iran, Hezbollah has often been viewed as a successful model of resistance against Israel and foreign intervention. Figures associated with Iraqi Shiite militias have frequently praised Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s organisational discipline. Public demonstrations of solidarity have been witnessed during major confrontations with Israel, especially in 2006 and after the Gaza war of 2023.

In Bahrain, some sections of the Shiite opposition have historically expressed admiration for Hezbollah as a symbol of resistance and Shiite political empowerment. However, the Bahraini state has strongly opposed the organisation and accused it of interfering in Gulf affairs. In Kuwait, where Shiites are politically integrated to a greater extent than in many other Gulf states, expressions of support have been more restrained but have nevertheless surfaced among some clerics, activists and parliamentarians, particularly during the 2006 Lebanon War when Hezbollah’s confrontation with Israel generated widespread Arab sympathy. It would be misleading, however, to speak of a unified Shiite Arab view. While many Shiites have admired Hezbollah’s resistance credentials and support for the Palestinian cause, others have become more critical since its intervention in Syria after 2011, seeing that involvement as evidence that the movement had shifted from a primarily anti-Israel resistance organisation to a participant in broader regional power struggles aligned with Iran.

Hezbollah’s trajectory is marked by profound contradictions. It participates in Lebanon’s democratic institutions while maintaining an autonomous military apparatus. It presents itself as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty while sustaining close strategic ties with Iran. It commands substantial support among Lebanese Shiites while facing criticism from those who believe its military role undermines state authority and entangles Lebanon in regional conflicts. Regardless of one’s political perspective, Hezbollah cannot be understood as a mere militant organisation, an Iranian proxy or a political party. It is a product of Lebanon’s fractured history, sectarian landscape, experience of occupation, recurring crises of state legitimacy and enduring struggle over sovereignty and identity. Its evolution from a resistance movement into one of the Middle East’s most influential actors reflects the broader dynamics of power, nationalism and conflict that continue to shape the modern region.

(Concluded)


The writer is a professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.

Hezbollah: resistance, politics and power — II