akistan’s political system has to deal with not only the crises of politics but also that of governance. While politics provide a mechanism for the distribution of power and resources, ensuring representation of all sections of a nation, governance is how a country is run: how decisions are made; power exercised; and public affairs handled. Simply put, governance is about how authority is used to manage resources and serve people.

Unfortunately, most governments in Pakistan have failed to introduce and consistently pursue governance and public policy reforms. Government leaders have confined themselves to rhetoric rather than presenting solid policy alternatives. Political parties, meanwhile, whether on the treasury benches or the opposition, have only sought popularity.

Resultantly, people have witnessed short-term and ad hoc policies in the name of governance. This has raised, for instance, the energy cost of doing business so much so that this factor alone can deter foreign investment in the country. Another example is the state’s policy to contain and fight terrorism: the outcomes have been mixed. Dealing with the Afghan issue has been a hot topic for decades but there has been no broad consensus on it among institutional and political stakeholders.

Various governments have claimed economic up-turns and presented ‘game-changers,’ ranging from gold and copper mining to internationally funded projects, such as the CPEC. There have been cycles of improvement and decline in the economic development indicators. Ayub Khan’s industrialisation model, helped by the famous Harvard Advisory Group; ZA Bhutto’s socialist policies, including nationalisation of key industries and corporations; and later, liberalisation and privatisation efforts by successive regimes in the 1980s and 1990s onwards make the point plain.

The opposition parties consistently opposed the industrialisation drive as well as the privatisation of the SOEs. The Pakistan Peoples Party later distanced itself from socialist policies of the 1970s but continued to oppose the privatisation of SOEs. Lately, the privatisation of the national flag carrier, PIA, has been a matter of intense political gamesmanship across the ideological spectrum. Most major parties have shifted their positions from one policy option to another. While agreeing in principle with the privatisation of state-owned business entities, all major parliamentary parties have subsequently shifted their stance when in power.

Poverty alleviation efforts by various political parties have manifested lack of clarity of vision and sound governance strategies. The PPP’s Benazir Income Support Programme was criticised for being a failed strategy—doling out money from government coffers by introducing cosmetic measures of poverty alleviation instead of addressing durable systemic changes. However, the PTI-led government pursued the same policy with new labels—the Ehsaas programme, Sehat Card and Ration Card. These policy options – adopted because they are popular and not because they are well thought out—damage the state and the society in the long run. They fail to help increase the economic output and instead put greater pressure on the already resource-strapped state.

The Centre-province relations are another important arena of conflict between the political elite, centred around district and province, and the state elite with overwhelming centripetal tendencies. Mohammad Waseem argues that the state elite has been typically recruited from the middle class and its institutional ethos has been geared to securitisation of the national vison; monopoly over policy; centralisation of power and resources; and manipulation of the public sphere through education and media. According to Hamza Alvi, the dominant institutions of the state elite i.e. civil and military bureaucracy were over-developed when politics started to take shape in the country.

The political class, though divided in terms of ideology and identity, has strong roots in the locality (district) and region (province). The political elites champion constitutional tradition—the British common law, court system, election system, rule of law and governance by public representatives. The much debated about goals of good governance, public policy, elimination of corruption and maintenance of moral uprightness are manifest ambitions of the middle class. Thus, politicians and political parties are held accountable even to policies they are not allowed to frame.

While Waseem’s analysis explains politics of the early decades when Daultana and Mamdot in the Punjab, Khuhro in Sindh and provincial political elite in Bengal were interested mostly in prevailing in provincial arenas, it needs to be understood that the state has gradually co-opted this provincial political elite in the Centre. As a result, the public representatives operating the locality and the province are no longer ready to share power with the local government tier. They fear creating additional power centres. Major political parties are keen on preserving development planning, governance and policy making in the familiar domain of Provincial and National Assemblies.

The tug of war between the civil and military organs of the state has been going on primarily over the resources and power turf. The establishment has been keen on keeping control of resource-rich departments—from mines and minerals, petroleum companies, airlines, fertilizers and cement to real-estate development. Retired as well as serving officers from civil and military bureaucracy are routinely appointed as managers of key enterprises in these sectors. The ever-expanding business footprint of the establishment thus squeezes the room for diversification in the investor/ entrepreneur class. This is particularly important for the country’s huge young population.

The writer heads the History Department at University of Sargodha. He has worked as a research fellow at Royal Holloway College, University of London. He can be reached at [email protected] His X handle: @AbrarZahoor1.