The question of whether the Afghan Taliban’s Islamic Emirate represents an authentic system of governance or an illegitimate seizure of power goes to the heart of political legitimacy, religious authority and the lived reality of millions of Afghans.
Since the Afghan Taliban returned to power in August 2021, their leadership has portrayed their rule as divine, which automatically qualifies for political legitimacy. Yet a closer examination reveals a system that aligns far more closely with coercive control than with either Islamic governance principles or democratic statehood on Western patterns.
Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada as Amir al-Momineen lacks legitimacy. After the seizure of power in 2021 by force, no steps were taken to secure public allegiance, such as holding an election or even convening the traditional Loya Jirga. Even within the Afghan Taliban rank and file, there are doubts about the supreme leadership role and the way of his governance. Decision-making is strictly concentrated in Kandahar within a closed circle of a few loyalists of Mullah Akhundzada, which starkly contradicts the international demand for inclusive governance. There is no parliament, no independent judiciary and no free media. Afghanistan ranks among the most restricted environments for press freedom globally.
Ironically, the Afghan Taliban portray the current situation as peace and security, but this silence is maintained not through consent, but through fear, repression and absence of space for dissent.
The Afghan Taliban rule stands in stark contrast to the foundational principles of Islamic governance, which require consultation, consent and accountability. For instance, the case of Abbas Stanakzai, a senior Taliban commander, highlights internal repression. After advocating for women’s education and consultation in 2023-2025, he faced restrictions, marginalisation and reported threats of detention. Even senior leadership figures are denied an independent voice. He has reportedly faced arrest orders and travel restrictions, was removed from his position, and subsequently left Afghanistan. He is widely reported to be living in de-facto exile.
The Afghan Taliban regime has constructed a system that relies heavily on the use of force. Dissent and criticism are not tolerated but rather criminalised. Legal frameworks introduced under Mullah Akhundzada’s leadership have institutionalised fear. In January 2026, he signed the Penal Principles of Taliban Courts, a document spanning 119 articles that took effect immediately without public announcement or consultation. Under the code, any criticism of Afghan Taliban officials is a crime and failure to report criticism is considered opposition activity. Even ordinary social interactions, like speaking to an unrelated woman or questioning authority, are treated as criminal acts.
The legal framework also introduces class-based punishment, where the same offence carries different consequences depending on social status. Public punishments, including flogging, have re-emerged as instruments of control. The Afghan Taliban frequently detain people for violating their rigid laws.
All this reflects the use of political coercion and repression as tools of systematic control of Afghan society and consolidating power in the absence of political legitimacy that is earned through political and social inclusivity and public service delivery by the state.
In practice, religious freedom has been significantly eroded. Minority communities, especially Hazaras, face systematic marginalisation and sectarian pressure. Their communities, mosques and educational institutions have been repeatedly targeted in attacks, with limited state protection. In December 2022, the UN secretary-general called on the Afghan Taliban to implement adequate protection measures due to the IED attacks against civilian targets and in civilian areas, and specifically mentioned places of worship and education facilities and the Hazaras as a community, facing heightened risk.
Since 2021, hundreds of Hazaras have been killed in attacks by either ISKP or by the Afghan Taliban, and thousands are forcefully displaced. Hazaras have been forcefully dismissed from government employment. The Hazara community lacks representation in the Taliban government, and international aid has been diverted away from their region.
The Taliban governance structure is not inclusive, contrary to the international community’s key requirement for recognition. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country with approximately 40 per cent Pashtuns, 25-30 per cent Tajiks, 10 per cent Hazaras, 10 per cent Uzbeks and Turkmen. After five years, no mechanism has been provided to ensure due representation for these different ethnicities.
The Taliban leadership is overwhelmingly Pashtun. The Rahbari Shura, comprising approximately 20-25 members, is estimated to be 90 per cent Pashtun. The 49-member cabinet includes only two Tajiks, two Uzbeks, two Baloch and one Nuristani, with zero Hazara and zero female representation. Non-Pashtun
officials hold symbolic roles, while security institutions of over 200,000 personnel remain dominated by one group. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkmen are effectively excluded from meaningful authority.
Another aspect of this exclusion is gender based. Over 100 decrees have been issued restricting women’s rights, including bans on secondary and higher education and most employment sectors. Women are excluded from public life, while dissent and modern governance frameworks are rejected, which are primarily gender inclusive.
Such absolute control runs contrary to foundational Islamic governance principles or Western democratic values, where rulers are not beyond accountability, and citizens retain the right to question policies and decisions. Restrictions on dissent and consultation undermine the Islamic tradition of consultation and responsible leadership.
The writer is an associate professor at the Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
