Marka-e-Haq transformed the May 2025 battlefield into a testing ground, where integrated doctrine and advanced technology redefined the future of aerial warfare.
The war provided a paradigmatic example, where a well-integrated air-defence architecture and offensive-defence strategy could successfully counter even the most advanced threats. The unified air-defence architecture of Pakistan transformed numerical disadvantage into strategic superiority, providing crucial lessons on the need to integrate systems and employ multi-domain synergy in the twenty-first century.
The May war was more than a fight in the air; it demonstrated that comprehensive planning, innovative technology, and a multi-layered defence can turn the tide in modern war.
The air defence architectures of both Pakistan and India before the May 2025 Crisis, were vastly divergent. On the one hand, Pakistan not only employed an offensive-defence strategy but also a fully integrated network under a unified command, fusing Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), the Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system, fighter jets and radars. India, on the other hand, had a formidable and advanced defence arsenal. Under the Modi regime, it relied heavily on sophisticated, costly imported defence platforms, including the S-400 air defence system and an expansive array of modern fighter jets such as Rafales, Su-30MKIs, and MiG-29s. Despite having a numerical and technological edge, the Indian Air Force (IAF) lacked a fully integrated architecture.
It is a certainty that IAF was well prepared for Operation Sindoor, with targets identified, mission profiles simulated and pilots assigned to deliver precision-guided munitions at stand-off ranges. India deployed its state-of-the-art air defence, weaponry and frontline resources to maximise operational effectiveness. However, what was supposed to be a strategic surprise turned out to be a counter-surprise of much greater intensity.
In contrast to India’s expectations, the PAF demonstrated doctrinal clarity and operational readiness. Pakistan’s Multi-domain Operations (MDOs) successfully integrated manned aircraft, radars, drones, ground-based air defences, satellites, electronic warfare and Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapons in an impregnable air defence architecture. An ‘indigenous data link’ provided exceptional situational awareness and enabled integration among all assets, resulting in a highly responsive, agile kill chain. It enabled greater interoperability and nullified New Delhi’s numerical advantage.
To counter a larger Indian strike package of 72 aircraft, Pakistan’s air defence efficiently employed approximately 40 fighter jets. The J-10C, as the frontline defender, provided the PAF with rapid engagement ability and compressed the opponent’s response window. Moreover, the PL-15 missiles employed on the J-10C fighter jet provided Pakistan’s air defence with enhanced operational reach and extended engagement range beyond visual capacity. Its radar-guided design and capability to withstand electronic countermeasures provided a tactical edge to the PAF.
The results were unequivocal as PAF, while defending its airspace, managed to shoot down four Rafales, one MiG-29, one Su-30 and a Mirage-2000. The downing of the Rafales was not merely a tactical success for Pakistan but also a major embarrassment for India.
The May conflict also exposed vulnerabilities of the top-notch Russian S-400 air defence system, which was debuted during this crisis. Although the system was claimed to be reliable, a Chinese-made CM-400AKG deployed by JF-17 Thunder successfully targeted S-400 batteries in Poonch and Adampur. Apart from that, Pakistan’s coordinated strikes targeted 26 Indian installations, including BrahMos Storage site, airbases, command nodes and logistic depots.
After facing unprecedented setbacks from the aerial combat, India resorted to a new phase of escalation through drones. However, even during this phase, Pakistan’s air defence proved decisive and highly calibrated. Pakistan not only effectively intercepted 77 drones through a combination of hard kill and soft kill tactics but also launched its own salvo of drones against India. Therefore, India’s attempt to overwhelm Pakistan’s air defences ultimately revealed susceptibilities in its own defence network.
The success of Pakistan did not depend on any single platform, missile, or aircraft, but on a combination of doctrine, organisation, training and technology within a coherent air-defence structure. The MDO operations enabled Pakistan to outpace the IAF in the conflict, which showed that firepower and numbers alone are no longer decisive.
Marka-e-Haq is not merely a case study about the past, but a template for future war. Network-centric supremacy and the smooth integration of airpower, drones, missiles, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and intelligence systems are increasingly determining strategic preeminence. Ultimately, in modern-day warfare, the skies are no longer with the more powerful force, but with the side that plans better and acts more swiftly.
The writer is a research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at: [email protected]
