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Politics of pageantry

February 21, 2026
Indian Armys Infantry Combat Vehicles are displayed during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi, India. — Reuters
Indian Army's Infantry Combat Vehicles are displayed during the Republic Day parade in New Delhi, India. — Reuters

On January 26, 2026, India commemorated its 77th Republic Day, the day when New Delhi officially became a republic through the adoption of the constitution.

The Republic Day parade was projected as the celebration of India’s progress and national pride. Yet, beyond the spectacle, the parade intended to convey a calibrated strategic and political signal by manufacturing an image of self-reliant and confident India amid regional uncertainty.

The institutionalisation of Operation Sindoor was the primary focus of the parade, which was manifested through tri-services tableaux on ‘Victory through Jointness’ and specialised formations involving Rafales and Su-30 MKIs. The parade, under the theme of ‘150 years of Vande Mataram’ claimed to feature the display of advanced weapon systems. However, ‘scaled models or replicas of key platforms’ were showcased, including S-400 air defence units, Akash air defence system, BrahMos cruise missile, T-90 Bhisma and Arjun main battle tanks, which weakened the overall impression.

In addition, robotic dogs, unmanned warhead systems, the Armoured Light Specialist Vehicle (ALSV), and loitering munitions were displayed, which were intended to showcase India’s efforts at technological modernisation and operational sophistication. Nevertheless, the absence of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which has always been celebrated as an indigenous feat, was noticeable. Although the officials explained the omission of Tejas by citing safety concerns associated with single-engine aircraft, its absence was indicative of deeper problems within India’s aerospace programme.

Defense Express, a Ukrainian defence news agency, linked the ‘absence of Tejas’ with the safety and reliability issues. It shows the waning confidence of the authorities in the Tejas programme, especially given the recent crashes, production bottlenecks, and long development timelines. Tejas’ exclusion raised doubts about its performance, its uncertainty, and the effect it might have on India’s export ambitions. To fill the gap, India had to resort to the induction of 114 Rafale aircraft, indicating the stagnation of its indigenisation efforts.

Throughout the parade, the rhetoric of Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliance) and technological independence was promoted as many defence systems were labelled as indigenous platforms. However, this argument is in sharp contrast with the reality because most of the key defence assets are imported. As an example, French Rafale fighter jets, the S-400 air defence systems, American Apache helicopters and Russian tanks (T-90s) were the order of the day, starkly contrasting with the official narrative of New Delhi. Although India claims many of its weapon platforms to be indigenous, execution remains a major challenge for the Indian armed forces.

On the domestic front, the timing of the parade converged well with Modi’s electoral considerations. With the looming elections in West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Assam, the BJP took advantage of the occasion to market itself as a defender of national security and deter dissent and democratic space. The process of militarising ceremonial display raises concerns about the normalisation of unquestioned loyalty and centralised power, undermining institutional accountability.

Compared to the Chinese military parade, which displayed its determination against international competitors, the Indian parade failed to convey its vision strategically by integrating military power with cultural shows. In the Chinese parade, high-tech weapons were displayed, including unmanned underwater vehicles (AJX002 and HSU100), Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (DF-5C), laser weapon systems, hypersonic missiles, unmanned submarines and anti-ship missiles. The parade was much more than pageantry, demonstrating China’s inter-domain cohesion and intelligenceisation of warfare. Conversely, the Republic Day parade of India, 2026, at Kartavya Path was meant to show the world that India is a serious contender to China. However, it did not succeed in converting this vision into a coherent, convincing and strategically integrated narrative.

Apart from that, while the ceremony did not include overt hostility towards Pakistan, the forces on display reflected India’s aggressive posture. The Lieutenant Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Manoj Sinha said that ‘”with Operation Sindoor ongoing and the Indus Water Treaty suspended, India’s water resources will now be utilised for its own requirements”.

The statement highlights the politicisation of natural resources under international agreements, demonstrating the risk of escalation. At the same time, India also unveiled the Suryastra rocket launcher that will be used in conjunction with ‘Shaktiban’ and ‘Divyastra’ to enhance and communicate Indian kinetic deterrence.

The parade overall resembled a Bollywood-style narrative, where grand stages and emotional music tried to create an illusion of unbeatable military strength. However, training standards, institutional stability and strategic coherence define the effectiveness of military power rather than an overemphasis on image-building.

Ultimately, the Republic Day parade, an illustration of the politics of pageantry, was very carefully choreographed to project India’s image as a global and self-sustaining power. Yet the underlying vulnerabilities and the preference for appearance over substance only revealed insecurity rather than readiness.


The writer is a research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at: [email protected]