akistan’s retaliatory strikes on Afghanistan have reaffirmed its stance against cross-border terrorism that continues to menace parts of the country. By declaring an ‘open war’ and extending strikes to Kabul, Kandahar and Paktia, Pakistan has dispelled the once-celebrated idea of the Taliban being a ‘friendly’ regime on its western front. The latest strikes followed Taliban attacks targeting military positions across several border regions in Pakistan. The death toll remains disputed as both sides claim to have inflicted heavier losses on the other. Although the international community, including several neighbouring countries, has called for de-escalation, Pakistan has, for now, ruled out the possibility of a dialogue with the Taliban regime.

The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan following the US withdrawal was viewed by Pakistan’s then civil-military leadership as a watershed moment for the region. The development was expected to significantly reshape regional balances, primarily in favour of Pakistan and its major regional ally, China. In both countries, Taliban’s return was seen as an opportunity to foster strategic alignment against a common adversary, India.

This perception was reinforced when, soon after assuming power, the Taliban signalled their intention to raise their ‘voice’ for Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. For India, the Taliban’s historical support for nationalist groups in Kashmir had long been a point of contention shaping its approach toward the group. Pakistan interpreted this as an opportunity to intensify pressure on India. It also believed that the Taliban’s resurgence provided an opening to enhance regional connectivity and expand infrastructure under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly toward Central Asia.

However, despite Pakistan’s optimism, many observers—recalling the earlier Taliban rule (1996-2001)—had already begun raising alarm about the potential threats to human rights and regional security. It did not take long for these concerns to materialise. Pakistan’s expectations were dashed and relations between the two countries deteriorated fast.

Pakistan’s primary concern vis-à-vis the Taliban regime has been its alleged support for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. Since its creation in 2007, the TTP has conducted frequent terrorist attacks across Pakistan, targeting hundreds of civilians and security personnel.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan witnessed a rapid surge in the group’s activities. According to a report by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, the country experienced 699 terrorist attacks in 2025 alone. The deteriorating security situation has been underscored by some high-profile incidents: in September, a raid by Pakistani forces on TTP hideouts near the Afghan border resulted in the deaths of 19 soldiers; shortly thereafter, a blast in Quetta killed 10 people; and in November, there were two major attacks—one at Cadet College, Wana, in South Waziristan and the other at Islamabad’s District Court.

The security landscape has further deteriorated in 2026 as TTP-linked terrorism continues to wreak havoc across Pakistan. In mid-February, a high-profile assault in Bajaur district killed 11 Pakistani security personnel and a civilian in a suicide bombing and gun attack claimed by the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan suffered one of the deadliest terrorist incidents in its capital when a suicide bombing struck an imambargah in Islamabad, killing over 30 worshippers and injuring many more. Additionally, sporadic attacks on security forces, including firing and bombings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and surrounding areas, have underscored the intensifying militant threat.

Although the Taliban regime has consistently denied supporting the group, Pakistan’s claims have been validated by various national and international institutions. In July 2023, a report by the United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said that the TTP had benefited from Taliban control in Afghanistan, using the territory as an enabling base for cross-border operations into Pakistan. The report noted that the group had been focusing on high-value border targets as well as softer urban targets and that some elements were only recently relocated under pressure from the government of Pakistan.

Pakistan has repeatedly raised this issue with the Taliban authorities and at international forums, including the United Nations. In October 2025, following a week of clashes along the Durand Line, Qatar and Türkiye attempted to mediate a ceasefire between the two countries. Both sides met to discuss border management and the resurgence of the TTP. However, the talks collapsed after Afghanistan refused to comply with Pakistan’s demand to decisively crack down on the group.

It is not inaccurate to argue that the deterioration in Pak-Afghan ties was exacerbated by the Taliban’s gradual tilt toward India—the very neighbor whose influence Pakistan had once sought to curtail by supporting the Taliban. Over time, India and Afghanistan have steadily strengthened relations. In October, Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi, where he met Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar. The visit signalled a significant shift in diplomatic posture. Soon afterward, India officially reopened its embassy in Kabul, which had been closed following the Taliban’s return in 2021.

Particularly striking was Muttaqi’s joint statement with Jaishankar, in which Kashmir was referred to as part of India. The statement drew strong condemnation from Pakistan’s Foreign Office. Thus, in a dramatic reversal, the Taliban—once perceived in Pakistan as a strategic ally—are now described by Pakistan’s defence minister as a “colony of New Delhi.”

While border tensions and disagreements over the TTP laid the foundation for this unexpected strategic shift, several additional factors appear to be at play. Many analysts suggest that the Taliban are attempting to shed the long-standing perception that they are a movement sustained by Islamabad’s support. At the same time, it is argued that, having functioned primarily as a non-state armed movement engaged in prolonged conflict, the Taliban have struggled to transition into conventional statecraft. Consequently, instead of moving toward stabilisation, they appear to be sustaining a confrontational posture—this time in an emerging alignment with New Delhi.

Nevertheless, given the transformed regional environment compared to the 1990s, it has become imperative for the Taliban regime to decisively curb terrorist groups operating from Afghan soil, including the TTP. Only then can they hope to be accepted in the international community as responsible actors.

For Pakistan, meanwhile, two major challenges persist. First, it must ensure that its legitimate security concerns arising from the TTP’s continued presence in Afghanistan are addressed without escalating into prolonged confrontation. This is particularly critical in light of recent attacks on Iran, with which Pakistan shares a 909-kilometre border. Strategic vigilance is essential to avoid the risk of a two-front strain.

Second, Pakistan must carefully balance its diplomatic engagements with domestic political considerations, especially concerning the United States. While official relations with Washington appear to be stabilising—evidenced by the recent US acknowledgment of Pakistan’s right to defend itself against cross-border terrorism—growing anti-US sentiment within the country, particularly in the aftermath of the attacks in Iran, presents a delicate domestic political challenge that Islamabad will need to manage prudently.

Ejaz Hussain has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and post-doc experience at University of California, Berkeley. He is a DAAD and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor. He can be reached at [email protected].

Malik Mashhood is a graduate teaching associate at the Lahore School of Economics.