Debates among political scientists and policy thinkers over whether dictatorship can be more effective than democracy in ethnically and linguistically diverse societies are longstanding and deeply contested. Proponents of authoritarian governance argue that strong, centralised rule can impose order, accelerate economic development and suppress divisive identity politics, especially in fragile or post-colonial states. Critics counter that such stability is often superficial and unsustainable and that democratic systems — however imperfect — are better equipped to manage diversity because they institutionalise political inclusion, peaceful conflict resolution and accountability. The experiences of South Korea and Singapore are frequently cited by advocates of benevolent authoritarianism. The political trajectories of Turkey and Malaysia, along with ongoing debates in Pakistan, suggest on the other hand that democratic dispensation, when allowed to function, offers a more durable framework for governing plural societies.

Political theory has long emphasised that ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse societies face higher risks of conflict if political systems fail to provide legitimate avenues for participation and power sharing. Democracy’s significance in such contexts lies not merely in the holding of elections but in its broader architecture of pluralism — parliaments, parties, courts, free media and civil society — which allows competing identities and interests to coexist within a regulated political arena. Adam Przeworski famously described democracy as a system in which conflict is institutionalised as regulated competition, where political actors accept electoral outcomes because they know future contests remain possible. This ability to convert potentially violent struggles into procedural rivalry is particularly vital in heterogeneous societies.

Authoritarian systems, by contrast, may impose order in the short run, but they lack mechanisms to continuously absorb and legitimize the demands of diverse groups. Concentrated power tends to privilege certain regions, ethnicities, or classes, even if such favoritism is obscured by nationalist rhetoric or developmental success. Beneath the surface, grievances often accumulate without institutional outlets, making authoritarian stability brittle rather than resilient. As Hannah Arendt warned, “The most radical revolutionary will become a conservative the day after the revolution,” highlighting how unchecked power ultimately prioritizes regime survival over social inclusion.

Advocates of dictatorship often point to developmental successes under authoritarian rule, arguing that strong states can bypass the “inefficiencies” of democratic bargaining. South Korea under Park Chung-hee and Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew are frequently invoked as evidence that disciplined authoritarian governance can deliver economic transformation in divided societies. There is no denying that South Korea’s military-led regimes in the 1960s and 1970s achieved rapid industrialisation, nor that Singapore’s dominant-party system produced impressive growth, administrative efficiency and social order in a multi-ethnic city-state.

Yet these cases are often misread. South Korea’s authoritarian period did not resolve demands for political inclusion; it merely postponed them. Mass mobilisation in the 1980s forced democratic reforms and it was under democracy that South Korea developed a more accountable, innovative and socially responsive state. The legitimacy and durability of South Korea’s success today rests not on its authoritarian past but on its democratic consolidation. The lesson is not that dictatorship was sufficient, but that it was incomplete and ultimately untenable in a complex society.

Singapore presents a more ambiguous case. Its system is neither a classic dictatorship nor a fully liberal democracy. Competitive elections exist, but political opposition, media freedom and civil liberties are tightly constrained. Some argue that Singapore demonstrates how political restrictions can be traded for harmony in a multi-ethnic society. Others caution that its success is rooted in highly specific conditions: a small population, strategic geography, exceptional bureaucratic capacity and leadership continuity. Even sympathetic scholars acknowledge that Singapore’s model is difficult to replicate and that its emphasis on technocratic governance comes at the cost of robust political pluralism. As Amartya Sen has argued, development should not be reduced to income and efficiency alone, but must include “the expansion of substantive freedoms.”

The contrast becomes sharper when examining Muslim-majority countries often excluded from narratives of democratic success. Turkey and Malaysia complicate the claim that cultural or religious factors make democracy unworkable in such societies. Turkey’s long, if uneven, experience with multi-party politics created institutional mechanisms for political competition and representation that authoritarian systems lack. Although recent democratic backsliding has raised serious concerns, Turkey’s earlier democratic phases fostered civic participation and negotiated coexistence among diverse ideological and social groups in ways military rule never achieved.

Malaysia offers another instructive example. Its formally democratic system, structured around coalition politics, has managed deep ethnic and linguistic diversity by ensuring that major communities — Malay, Chinese and Indian — retain stakes in governance. While far from egalitarian and often criticised for majoritarian biases, Malaysia’s electoral politics have nonetheless functioned as a pressure-release mechanism, preventing large-scale ethnic violence and allowing peaceful political change. As Arend Lijphart observed, consociational and power-sharing arrangements, though imperfect, are often better suited to plural societies than centralised authoritarian rule.

These comparative insights resonate strongly with ongoing debates in Pakistan, where democratic experience is frequently viewed with scepticism. Pakistan’s history of military interventions has produced a narrative popular among some elites that democracy is inherently chaotic, corrupt and ill-suited to a diverse society marked by ethnic, linguistic and regional cleavages. Military regimes are often credited with discipline, stability and development and civilian governments blamed for political disorder.

Yet empirical evidence challenges this perception. Pakistan’s periods of authoritarian rule have not resolved its core problems of national integration, governance or economic sustainability. On the contrary, centralised military rule has often exacerbated regional alienation, most dramatically in the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. Democratic periods, though turbulent, have provided space for political expression, provincial autonomy and negotiated compromises — mechanisms essential for holding together a diverse federation. As political scientist Hamza Alavi noted, Pakistan’s crisis has stemmed less from democracy than from its repeated interruption and distortion.

In Pakistan’s case, democracy has often been judged for failing to deliver results it was never allowed sufficient time or autonomy to achieve. Authoritarian regimes benefit from the illusion of order, while democracy bears the visible costs of contestation. Yet, as Przeworski reminds us, the miracle of democracy lies precisely in the fact that losers accept outcomes because they trust the process and anticipate future opportunities; dictatorship offers no such assurance.

Thomas Paine’s assertion that “the right of voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected” remains particularly salient in diverse societies. Political inclusion is not a luxury to be postponed until after development; it is a precondition for sustainable peace and legitimacy. Without it, economic gains rest on coercion rather than consent.

In sum, the experiences of South Korea, Singapore, Turkey, Malaysia, and Pakistan suggest that while authoritarian regimes may deliver short-term stability or growth, they are structurally ill-equipped to manage the enduring complexities of ethnically and linguistically diverse societies. Democratic systems, though imperfect and often messy, provide institutionalised mechanisms for inclusion, conflict regulation and self-correction. They allow societies to adapt, renegotiate social contracts, and change leadership without rupture. The more enduring political success stories — particularly in Muslim-majority and plural societies — have tended to emerge not where dictatorship was entrenched and unquestioned, but where democratic dispensation, however constrained, was permitted to exist, evolve and function.

The writer is a professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.