he year 2025 redefined democracy in Pakistan. The politics unfolded not primarily through the parliament, but often in courtrooms, embattled streets and security briefings. The year, marked by intense conflict, ended with hope for a political dialogue to reduce polarisation.

The year had begun with politics centred around superior courts. Former prime minister Imran Khan and his spouse, Bushra Bibi’s conviction in the Toshakhana case in January and a second Toshakhana case in December dominated the headlines. Other cases against Khan saw repeated adjournments.

At the beginning of the year, the legal proceedings had a direct impact on the parliamentary politics. The opposition politics remained engaged in public discourse but were paralysed institutionally. The parliament, instead of becoming the principal arena for accountability and debate, mostly remained peripheral. While democracy survived in form, the most visible political contests shifted from the legislature to the courtroom, reinforcing a long-standing imbalance in the separation of powers and institutional roles.

A brief Pakistan-India war in May 2025 markedly shifted the balance in favour of the establishment and the ruling coalition. This helped the ruling groups consolidate their position locally, regionally and internationally.

The war provided the opportunity for the government to further extend the military’s role through a constitutional amendment.

Predictably, the security imperative further abridged democratic tolerance. Calls for stability, discipline and unity overshadowed demands for political openness and plurality. While the push for greater commitment to counter-terrorism was unavoidable, its political consequence was familiar: dissent increasingly risked being framed as destabilisation, a pattern that shrinks democratic space without doing away with democratic form.

By mid-year, political pressure had resurfaced on the streets. The opposition convened All Parties Conferences and announced plans for nationwide street protests, rejecting what it called “engineered politics.”

These events highlighted a structural failure. As parliament offered little meaningful leverage, opposition politics migrated to rallies and declarations. Street politics thus became a substitute for parliamentary debate, deepening polarisation and normalising confrontation rather than the pursuit of consensus.

One of the most consequential democratic moments of 2025 unfolded when mass protests erupted across Azad Jammu and Kashmir. These were driven by demands related to electricity prices, taxation, elite privilege and governance failures. After several days of protest, the Pakistan Peoples Party managed to replace the Azad Kashmir prime minister, who quit after a no-confidence motion was tabled against him. Faisal Rathore, a PPP ideologue, became the prime minister with the support of PML-N legislators.

In October, Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan, launched a march on Islamabad, ostensibly to protest against Israeli aggression in Gaza. The government denied permission for the rallies which soon turned violent. The authorities intensified action against the TLP, curbing its street power and eventually banned the group. Hundreds of its activists and leaders were arrested. The mosques previously controlled by managements sympathetic to its leaders got new prayer leaders. However, the whereabouts of its chief Saad Rizvi and his younger brother, Anas Rizvi, who could not be arrested, remained a mystery.

November marked the defining institutional moment of the year with a heated debate around the 27 Constitutional Amendment. Its supporters argued that it would ensure continuity and stability; its critics warned that it would tilt the balance further towards Executive and weaken judicial oversight. Through this amendment, the ruling coalition established a new constitutional court that will hear all constitutional petitions.

At the same time, a new military title and office—chief of defence forces—was created for Field Marshal Asim Munir, the chief of army staff. President Asif Ali Zardari and Field Marshal Asim Munir were provided lifetime immunity from prosecution. The opposition saw a clear indication in this of the hybrid nature of Pakistan’s democracy.

The year has come to a close with Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s offer for talks about legitimate issues; former federal minister Fawad Chaudhry’s efforts to persuade the Opposition PTI to agree to a dialogue with the powers that be and the Movement to Protect the Constitution’s call for a national dialogue. Former prime minster Imran Khan, however, continues to refuse to talk to the government leaders. A conference of religious parties—chaired by Maulana Fazl-ur Rehman and attended by representatives of all mainstream religious groups—has warned the government against joining the International Stabilisation Force for Gaza. With renewed efforts for political dialogue, the PTI’s protest mode, and religious parties’ warnings, the beginning of 2026 is likely to witness either political dialogue or fresh protests.

In 2025, Pakistan’s democracy appeared increasingly controlled. The institutions remained functional, but popular trust was thin. The parliament existed, but its influence was limited. The opposition survived, but under constraints. Pakistan did not abandon democracy; instead, it evolved into a model where elections coexist with managed dissent, and democratic institutions operate without full public confidence.

The writer is a journalist, teacher of journalism, writer and analyst. He tweets at @BukhariMubasher.