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Unstructured rule

June 04, 2026
Representational image of a economic growth. — APP/File
Representational image of a economic growth. — APP/File

In the buildup to the new budget later this month, the reported last-minute scramble for allocations under one head or another speaks volumes about a long-term decline in Pakistan.

In brief, the once-prevalent era of structured rule, with input from the planning commission at the centre and its tributaries in Pakistan’s provinces, has been replaced by unstructured rule. It is therefore hardly surprising that the focus on areas that matter the most is often bypassed in favour of those with just peripheral significance for Pakistan at large.

Ahead of the budget, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s public messaging on adapting to electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce the oil import bill left a glaring gap. Not only are EVs priced well beyond the reach of Pakistan’s mainstream consumers. The message must have been preceded by Pakistan’s top members of the ruling class pushing for a revamp of significant areas for the country’s mainstream, such as healthcare, education and employment at the grassroots. Together, such gaps in Pakistan’s economic and societal framework point towards the country’s departure from a once widely celebrated structured rule.

Accounts of ‘unstructured rule’ have advanced across Pakistan over time, as government after government has deviated from mandates given to the ruling structure, often in knee-jerk reactions.

Pakistan’s journey over the past two decades since the devolution plan was pursued remains a powerful reminder of how the country has become increasingly dysfunctional. Literally overnight, under the tenure of the late president Gen Pervez Musharraf, elected heads of district governments were installed through local elections. And literally overnight, the deputy commissioners who presided over any one of Pakistan’s 170 districts were re-designated as ‘District Coordination Officers’, all in the name of establishing a popular mandate at the grassroots. In spite of the return of deputy commissioners to the districts, the rot continues without a restoration of their authority. Historically, in Pakistan, other rulers before Gen Musharraf carried out similar experiments with self-serving motives.

For Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the idea of seeking Pakistan’s salvation lay in the creation of the system of ‘Basic Democracies’ – led by up to 80,000 ‘Basic Democrats’ elected at different tiers across the country. They were principally responsible for electing the head of state and granting him much-needed legitimacy. That experiment clearly failed eventually, under the weight of widespread public protests.

Similarly, General Ziaul Haq, during his eleven-year tenure from 1977 onwards, brought in a system of rule without association of elected representatives to any political party. That was widely dubbed as the era of ‘party-less’ politics. But beyond Gen Zia’s rule, political parties have returned in Pakistan over time.

Throughout this journey before Musharraf’s tenure, Pakistan’s civil service held the threads of authority together, providing consistency of rule where it mattered most. But what placed Musharraf apart from his predecessors was the systematic dismantling of the civil service in the name of progress. Ironically, however, the very fabric that kept the machinery of government intact was dismantled with consequences still felt today.

One of the biggest drivers of unwelcome change at the grassroots has flown from the removal of the judicial authority of deputy commissioners. Instead, many of the functions previously performed by the executive magistracy at the district level were redistributed among local governments and district administrations. Arguably, in today’s Pakistan, after this redistribution of authority, grassroots governments have been weakened in their ability to perform their duties.

In Pakistan’s yesteryears, administrations at the grassroots assumed responsibility for a variety of functions, including judicial ones. The existence of an executive magistracy as argued by some, was not just a remnant of the colonial era. More importantly, their performance of judicial functions enabled them to relieve the pressure that eventually mounted on the courts at the grassroots.

Meanwhile, irrespective of how error-free the coming budgets are at the centre and the provinces, their ability to deliver the intended targets for the public across the board will remain in doubt in the absence of efficient local administrations. For a long time, Pakistan has witnessed recurring financial crises that have forced the country to seek international rescue packages, notably from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this unfortunate journey, Pakistan’s ability to conclusively emerge from one challenge after another has been badly hampered by the toxic mix of political choices driving economic policies.

Today, once again, Pakistan’s economy is faced with the economic fallout from the US-Israeli war on neighbouring Iran. The surging global energy prices have hit importers like Pakistan hard. The choices that Pakistan must make are both potentially painful and unpopular.

At the very least, the captains of Pakistan’s ruling structure must turn to the country’s own history of state weakening in the name of progressive change. Unstructured rule must not be the way forward at any cost.


The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist who writes on political and economic affairs. He can be reached at: [email protected]