Punjab’s reliance on anti-smog guns reflects a preference for visible action over evidence-based policy. International experience and Lahore’s own air-quality data indicate that without an understanding of PM2.5 chemistry and sources, clean-air interventions risk becoming policy symbolism rather than public-health solutions.
Each winter, as Lahore descends into hazardous smog, anti-smog guns once again become a prominent feature of the city’s response. Mounted on trucks, rooftops and construction sites, these devices are deployed with urgency and public visibility, often accompanied by official assurances that action is underway. Yet the persistence -- and worsening -- of Lahore’s air-quality crisis raises a fundamental question: are anti-smog guns addressing the problem, or merely signaling activity in the absence of evidence-based solutions?
At their core, anti-smog guns are mechanical dust-suppression tools. They spray fine water droplets into the air, temporarily settling coarse particulate matter (PM10) in highly localised environments. In limited contexts -- such as unpaved construction sites or exposed soil -- they may reduce visible dust for short periods. However, Lahore’s smog is not primarily a dust problem. It is a fine-particle crisis dominated by PM2.5, particles small enough to penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream, driving cardiovascular disease, respiratory illness and premature mortality.
International experience offers a cautionary tale. China briefly experimented with mist cannons around 2016-17 in cities such as Beijing and Xian. Evaluations showed marginal suppression of visible dust but no meaningful reduction in ambient PM2.5. China’s subsequent air-quality gains came from coal-to-gas transitions, industrial emission standards and enforcement. In India, anti-smog guns gained prominence in Delhi after 2018. Despite widespread deployment, PM2.5 levels remained largely unchanged, and by 2021-22 even judicial authorities questioned their efficacy. The pattern is clear: smog guns create visibility, not clean air.
The deeper problem in Punjab’s approach is the limited engagement with PM2.5 chemical composition. PM2.5 is not a single pollutant but a complex mixture of secondary inorganic aerosols formed from sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, black carbon from diesel vehicles and brick kilns, organic aerosols from biomass burning, and trace metals from industrial processes. Anti-smog guns cannot neutralise these components, nor can they prevent secondary particle formation driven by gaseous precursors. In high-humidity winter conditions, excessive misting may even exacerbate smog formation.
Lahore-specific source-apportionment studies, though episodic, already indicate where policy attention should be directed. Indicative findings indicate that vehicular emissions and coal combustion together account for roughly a quarter of PM2.5, biomass burning accounts for around 23–26 per cent (especially in winter), and dust accounts for about one-fifth. A significant share remains unidentified, reflecting the absence of continuous chemical speciation.
By contrast, PM10 is dominated by road dust and traffic-related resuspension -- the fraction smog guns can temporarily suppress. The distinction matters: Lahore’s health burden is driven overwhelmingly by PM2.5, not PM10. These estimates vary by season and location and should be read as indicative ranges, but their policy implications are unambiguous.
At the ASIC Pakistan Mitigation Series, Professor Anthony Stein Wexler of the UC Davis Air Quality Research Center captured the issue succinctly: “If you do not understand what your PM2.5 is made of, you cannot design effective control strategies. Without chemical composition, policy becomes guesswork”. Budgetary decisions taken without this evidence risk prioritising optics over outcomes.
Anti-smog guns have thus acquired a political function. They are tangible and media-friendly, signaling action during crisis moments. Yet air pollution is a systemic problem rooted in energy choices, transport fleets, industrial processes and regulatory enforcement. Treating it with ad-hoc tools imposes an opportunity cost, diverting resources from emission inventories, continuous monitoring, industrial retrofits and cleaner fuels.
From an outcomes perspective, the case is straightforward. Smog guns do not deliver sustained reductions in population-weighted PM2.5 exposure, nor do they improve public-health indicators. Clean air cannot be engineered through surface-level suppression; it must be achieved through source control informed by chemistry.
Through the ASIC platform, Fair Finance Pakistan has consistently advocated for industrial emission solutions -- fuel switching, process upgrades, and transition finance -- because countries that have reduced PM2.5 emissions have done so by confronting combustion sources directly, not by masking their effects.
Anti-smog guns may clear sightlines briefly, but they cannot clear Lahore’s air. Punjab faces a choice: continue investing in visibility or invest in science, industrial transition and public health. Only one path leads to breathable air.
The writer is the country program lead at Fair Finance Pakistan and an Asia-Pacific Council Member of TISFD. He tweets/posts @jaffry05
