Will Pakistan contribute to an International Stabilisation Force (ISF)) in Gaza? This question has rapidly become one of the most consequential questions and a critical foreign and security policy dilemma facing Islamabad today.
It sits at the intersection of alliance dynamics, humanitarian catastrophe, Israel’s intransigence, major-power pressure, Palestinian resistance and Pakistan’s own long-standing moral and political commitments. Labeling Pakistan’s stance as mere ambiguity or demanding a blunt yes-or-no answer just misses the bigger picture. In reality, it’s about understanding the complex strategic and moral context that Pakistan is navigating. Pakistan is not opting out of the process. It is seeking to painstakingly influence the process without even implicitly becoming complicit in Israel’s aggression.
Pakistan’s engagement with the Trump peace plan began early. Islamabad was present when the plan was announced and supported it at a moment when Gaza was witnessing one of the most devastating military campaigns of this century. This was a hard, unsentimental calculation made in the shadow of what many international observers and rights organisations have described as genocidal violence.
At the time, Pakistan assessed – correctly – that this was the only plan in circulation capable of imposing even minimal restraint on Israel’s military onslaught. Over 80,000 Palestinians had been killed, starvation was being weaponised, humanitarian access was being throttled, and violence in the West Bank was escalating through both Israeli military action and settler vigilantism.
Three elements of the plan compelled Pakistan to engage despite its flaws. First, it offered a mechanism – however weak – for restraining Israel’s use of force. Second, it promised an immediate ceasefire that could halt mass killing and allow for prisoner exchanges. Third, it committed to humanitarian access at scale. In a region where the Arab and Muslim world appeared paralysed, Pakistan chose engagement over moral posturing from the sidelines.
This approach culminated in Pakistan’s support for UNSC Resolution 2803, which endorsed the ceasefire framework and floated the idea of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF). Pakistan supported the resolution, but with explicit explanations and reservations. Islamabad made clear that while it backed ceasefire enforcement, humanitarian relief, Israeli withdrawal and the path to Palestinian statehood with Jerusalem as its capital, it would not participate in coercive disarmament of Palestinian resistance groups.
This distinction matters. The resolution’s language implicitly signalled towards disarming Hamas. Pakistan stated unequivocally that this was neither realistic nor legitimate under conditions of ongoing occupation. Hamas itself has publicly declared that it would consider voluntary disarmament only after Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of Palestinian self-rule. Demanding disarmament while occupation remains intact is just enforced surrender to which Pakistan cannot be a party.
Pakistan’s position has since been reiterated by Deputy Prime Minister/ Foreign Minister Dar in parliament and public interviews: Pakistan will not engage in any military or kinetic action against Palestinians. Nor will its troops serve as an oppressive force under a peacekeeping label.
All these reservations notwithstanding, Pakistan has not disengaged. On the contrary, its security officials have attended successive consultations convened by the Trump administration. These forums aim to operationalise the ISF and place a visible international footprint in Gaza. Pakistan’s participation signals engagement but with red lines.
Those red lines are clear. First, Pakistan will not participate in combat operations or forced disarmament. Second, any peacekeeping role must be genuinely overseeing existing, not peace enforcement of an occupying power or a setup that is facilitating Israel’s occupation. Third, participation is impossible in an environment where Israeli violations continue unabated.
Since the so-called ceasefire, hundreds of Palestinians have still been killed. Humanitarian access remains obstructed. Israeli cabinet ministers continue to openly justify violence, advocate ethnic cleansing and expand military operations in the West Bank. There has been no meaningful reprimand from Washington, no penalties for serial violations and no decisive pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to strictly comply with the plan he nominally accepted.
This context matters profoundly for the ISF debate. Peacekeeping cannot function amid active, asymmetric violence by one side that enjoys near-total impunity. Even traditionally supportive European states have expressed unease. Spain, Ireland, Belgium and Sweden have all voiced reservations about stabilisation mechanisms that precede Israeli withdrawal or sideline Palestinian political agency.
Pakistan’s diplomatic posture, therefore, reflects neither retreat nor contradiction but strategic patience anchored in principle. Islamabad has remained one of the most consistent advocates for Palestinian self-determination at the UN Security Council and across multilateral and bilateral engagements – from Riyadh to Doha.
Pakistan policymakers have a complex regional landscape, which only sharpens Pakistan’s dilemma. Egypt maintains security coordination and has expanded energy cooperation with Israel. Jordan has long recognised Israel. The UAE has built deep economic and security ties under the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia, however, in publicly articulated policy decisions, shares Pakistan’s perspective. Israel’s recognition will not come from Riyadh without Palestinian statehood. Equally, KSA is mindful of the dicey policy web on the Israel question within the GCC. Qatar too has recognition reservations.
In this environment, Pakistan’s refusal to abandon principle while remaining inside the diplomatic tent is not a weakness; it is leverage. By staying engaged, Pakistan seeks to influence the mandate, scope and sequencing of any ISF deployment – pressing Washington to recognise that stabilisation without justice is unsustainable.
Notably, criticism of Israel’s conduct is no longer confined to Hamas or resistance groups. The Palestinian Authority itself, headquartered in the West Bank and often portrayed as a ‘moderate alternative’, has repeatedly condemned Israeli killings and demanded restraint. This exposes the hypocrisy of treating Palestinian resistance as the sole obstacle to peace while ignoring the structural violence of occupation.
Pakistan understands that its room for manoeuvre is inherently limited. Without recognising Israel, Islamabad cannot really serve as an operational partner in the Trump plan. Nor should it. These limits are not a failure of diplomacy; they are the consequence of moral consistency.
History offers a useful parallel. In the 1950s, despite alliance membership under Cento, Pakistan refused US requests to send troops to the Korean War. The costs outweighed any benefits. That decision, controversial at the time, proved prudent. Today, Pakistan stands at a similarly consequential juncture. The theatres differ, but the calculus – principle versus pressure – remains familiar.
There is discussion in Washington about alternative Pakistani contributions: medical units, engineering corps and humanitarian logistics. These options merit consideration. But even non-combat roles require a positive environment. Without an enforced ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal and unimpeded aid access, even humanitarian deployments risk becoming fig leaves for continued violence.
Ultimately, responsibility rests with the US. Meetings and task forces are not enough. If the Trump administration wants the ISF to succeed, it must decisively rein in Israel, enforce compliance with the ceasefire and ensure the full implementation of its own plan. Stabilisation cannot precede firm implementation of ceasefire, withdrawal and Palestinian participation; it must follow all these steps.
Pakistan’s approach reflects maturity, not ambivalence. It is an attempt to navigate a deeply paradoxical situation without surrendering moral clarity or strategic sense. By remaining part of the process while refusing to legitimise oppression, Pakistan is not abandoning Palestine. It is standing with it – wisely.
The writer is a foreign policy & international security expert. She tweets/posts @nasimzehra and can be reached at: [email protected]
