In an era when the world seems to be drifting back into blocs and rivalries reminiscent of the cold war, China’s decision to host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin is an unmistakable assertion of multipolar diplomacy.
Scheduled for August 31 to September 1, this will be one of the most ambitious gatherings in the SCO’s 24-year history, bringing together over 20 heads of state and dignitaries under the auspices of President Xi Jinping. Among them will be Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
The symbolism of the timing is powerful. Just days before Beijing’s grand military parade commemorating the end of the Second World War, China is orchestrating an international event that highlights its role as both a regional convener and a global stakeholder. The SCO summit shows Beijing’s desire to present itself as the anchor of Eurasian stability, offering an alternative to the exclusionary, military-heavy alliances favoured by the West.
The SCO began in 2001 as a pragmatic forum to address border issues among China, Russia and the Central Asian States, and to coordinate efforts against the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Over the years, it has expanded both in membership and ambition. Today, it encompasses nearly half the world’s population, stretching across a vast swath of territory from the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean.
For much of its existence, Western analysts have dismissed the SCO as a loose association without real influence – certainly no match for Nato’s military might. Yet such characterisations miss the broader picture. Unlike Nato, which has a singularly military orientation, the SCO has evolved into a more eclectic platform, one that blends security discussions with economic cooperation, energy initiatives and cultural exchanges. Its purpose is not to replicate Western institutions but to provide an alternative framework for Eurasia – one that privileges dialogue over confrontation and emphasises inclusivity ratherthan exclusivity.
The Tianjin summit is designed to drive home this message. By inviting not only core members but also observer states such as Malaysia and Indonesia, Beijing is signaling its intent to broaden the SCO’s reach and relevance. In a time when global politics is fragmenting into competing camps, the SCO is presenting itself as an arena where different nations, with different ideologies and historical experiences, can still come together under a shared banner of cooperation.
At the heart of this initiative lies China’s role as a mediator and convener. Putin’s attendance, his first visit to China since tentative efforts at dialogue with Washington over the Ukraine conflict, highlights the deepening of the Sino-Russian partnership. The ‘no-limits’ partnership, often derided in Western commentary, has in fact provided both Moscow and Beijing with crucial diplomatic and economic leverage. For Russia, isolated from much of the Western world, the SCO offers a platform where it is not a pariah but a central player. For China, it reinforces its role as the indispensable hub around which Eurasia turns.
The presence of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is equally telling. In recent years, the UN has struggled to assert relevance on some of the world’s most pressing crises – from Gaza to climate change. Guterres’s participation in Tianjin underscores the possibility of complementarity: the SCO, though regional in origin, can align with global multilateral frameworks, lending legitimacy to China’s push for what it calls ‘inclusive multilateralism’.
India’s participation is perhaps the most intriguing. Modi’s visit, his first to China in seven years, comes against the backdrop of unresolved border tensions. Yet India’s engagement reflects a recognition that outright confrontation with China is unsustainable, and that the SCO provides a forum for dialogue, however limited. Similarly, Pakistan’s presence, alongside Iran’s newly formalised role, points to the SCO’s ability to convene rivals under one roof – a feature rare in today’s polarised international environment.
Sceptics may view Tianjin as a symbolic spectacle. But the agenda suggests otherwise. Building on the accords reached at the Astana summit in 2024, discussions are expected to focus on enhancing political and security cooperation, renewable energy projects, digital economy integration and supply chain resilience. The Tianjin Declaration, to be released at the summit’s conclusion, is likely to lay out tangible steps for countering terrorism and promoting economic stability at a time when protectionist policies elsewhere are disrupting global flows.
In this respect, the SCO reflects a deeper Chinese strategy. By aligning its priorities with infrastructure investment and connectivity through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is embedding the SCO into its broader vision of a Eurasian economic network. The emphasis is not just on security, but on building resilience against external shocks – whether from sanctions, tariffs or sudden geopolitical disruptions.
Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the SCO lies in its potential to reshape Eurasia’s security architecture. For centuries, Eurasia has been the world’s most contested geopolitical space – from the Great Game of the 19th century to the cold war of the 20th. Today, it faces new pressures, including Nato’s eastward expansion and Washington’s containment strategies against China.
Beijing’s orchestration of this summit offers a counter-vision. Rather than zero-sum confrontation, China emphasises ‘shared security’. The inclusion of India and Pakistan, despite their fraught relationship, suggests that the SCO can serve as a confidence-building mechanism. It will not erase deep-seated disputes, but it can at least ensure that dialogue continues in a multilateral framework. Similarly, Iran’s participation reflects the organisation’s openness to actors marginalised by the West, underscoring its anti-hegemonic ethos.
Critics in Western capitals often dismiss such efforts as an ‘axis of autocracies’. But such rhetoric reveals more about anxieties over waning dominance than about the SCO’s actual nature. Nato, AUKUS and the Quad are all framed as defensive alliances, yet their activities frequently escalate military competition. By contrast, the SCO stresses dialogue and development – objectives that resonate with the aspirations of the Global South, which seeks alternatives to dependency on Western institutions.
None of this is to suggest that the SCO’s future is free of obstacles. Its consensus-driven model makes decisive action difficult and divergent interests among members often dilute outcomes. India’s scepticism about deepening Sino-Russian ties remains a complicating factor, while Central Asian States guard their sovereignty carefully, wary of over-dependence on Beijing.
External uncertainties loom large as well. The US, under President Donald Trump, has pursued an erratic foreign policy: imposing tariffs one day, calling for negotiations the next. This unpredictability has in some ways pushed countries toward Beijing, but it also introduces volatility that could disrupt the SCO’s momentum.
Yet the timing of the Tianjin summit is strategic. Amid this global flux, China is positioning itself as the architect of an alternative order – one that blends stability with inclusivity. Xi Jinping’s leadership here is both domestic and international: he enhances his standing at home while projecting China as a responsible global power abroad.
In many ways, Tianjin carries echoes of Bandung in 1955, when leaders from across Asia and Africa sought to chart an independent path between cold-war camps. Then, as now, the effort was to create space for nations unwilling to be trapped in binary choices. The SCO, under Beijing’s stewardship, offers a 21st-century version of that spirit adapted to a world where the threats are as much economic and environmental as they are military.
The Tianjin summit will not transform global politics overnight. But it signals an important shift. At a time when wars continue, climate crises intensify and inequality widens, the SCO’s call for cooperation and multipolarity provides a counterweight to fragmentation. The sight of leaders from disparate ideologies and rival capitals meeting under one roof may not resolve their differences, but it does remind the world that diplomacy is still possible – and necessary.
The true measure of Tianjin’s success will not be in the headlines it generates or the communiques it issues. It will be in the quiet work of building trust, fostering resilience and laying the foundation for a more inclusive world order. In that respect, the SCO is less a bloc and more a blueprint – one that points to the realities of a multipolar century in which China is determined to play a central role.
The writer is a freelance contributor.
