The acts of terror by entities like the TTP and now their equally virulent variants like Ittehad-e-Mujahideen-e-Pakistan (IMP) have continued in a sinusoidal wave ever since the launch of Operation Ghazab Lil Haq.
The latest attacks are a grisly reminder of the terror that still stalks the newly merged as well as the settled districts of KP. The impunity and persistence of the attackers reflect their resolve and sinister desire to attain their objectives despite incurring heavy losses at the hands of Pakistani LEAs.
Operation Ghazab Lil Haq was the right decision, after a long delay, demonstrating the state’s clarity and resolve to take on terrorism head-on, without any ambivalence or equivocation. The reality of the battle against terrorism, which has both internal and external abettors, however, needs to be understood through an honest appraisal of the underlying causes and enabling factors that sustain terrorism. Afghanistan, being the main source of terrorism, is being governed by a clique that captured Kabul through the power of the gun and is not beholden to public opinion or political settlement.
The upshot of this reality is the smug and uncompromising attitude of the Taliban leadership. Multiple factions within them continually jockey for influence, seeing eye to eye on only one thing: amassing more power. The leaven that binds these disparate militant factions is a shared religio-political outlook and a history of fighting together against foreign intruders.
It is for this reason that the Afghan Taliban regime cannot bring itself to confront the farraginous blend of terrorist outfits operating in Afghanistan, each peddling its own agenda. The Afghan Taliban government, meanwhile, is fragmented into multiple power centres. The ‘Kandahari’ faction, led by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, which combines spiritual as well as temporal power, occupies the traditional seat of governance in Afghanistan in Kandahar, and is the most retrogressive in outlook.
The next faction is the Haqqani group, which comprises the Zadran tribal leadership and has influence in eastern and northern regions, including Kabul. The group has greater muscle power and is creating its own proxies, such as the IMP, to expand its reach and effectiveness outside Afghanistan. The third main faction is the National Resistance Front (NRF), comprising the erstwhile Northern Alliance, including Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, besides a few disgruntled anti-Taliban Pashtuns.
Another power faction, the TTP (Fitna tul Khawarij), is operating in eastern Afghanistan, in Paktika, Paktia, Khost and Nangarhar. The reach of the faction and its new rival IMP, with active help from the Haqqani faction, has now extended towards Kunar as well. Terrorist entities like Al Qaeda and ISKP are also active in Afghanistan, with the latter having a sizeable presence in Nangarhar and Kunar. Of late, all these terror outfits have started sharing intelligence and training expertise with one another and are acting as feeders for each other. The American arms and ammunition abandoned in Afghanistan are being used by these terror networks, which are not short of cash due to an illicit war economy.
Due to pervasive malgovernance and an illegal economy, Afghanistan is getting poorer while the rulers are getting richer. The individual factions are getting stronger and amassing wealth and military muscle. Completely bereft of diplomatic sense and international obligations, the regime is ignoring UN resolutions demanding the denial of sanctuaries and support to terror networks. Under international isolation, the Taliban regime is lapping up illegal covert aid from countries like India for proxy warfare against Pakistan.
As the TTP and its leader, Nur Wali Mehsud, got closer to the Kandahari faction, the Haqqanis created the IMP as a countervailing force, which now has more suicide bombers than the TTP. Odds and ends like Lashkar-e-Islam and Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s factions are also part of the IMP now.
There are certain external and internal realities that Pakistani policymakers must recognise. On the external front, it should be understood that the present Afghan rulers are inspired both by their warped ideology and Afghan irredentism.
Pakistan has lost space in Afghanistan that needs to be regained, especially in the shape of an effective counterterror network. Pakistan’s kinetic response has created some impact, but due to the non-elimination of the top leadership of the TTP, the overall capacity to foment terror remains intact. The TTP and IMP are becoming more active on social media and using cellphone technology to the utmost effect for recruitment, planning and propaganda. This is an area in which Pakistan’s cyber response needs considerable improvement.
While the LEAs continue pressure on terrorists and their sponsors, the political and diplomatic arms of the state should engage with elements wielding influence in the Afghan regime to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. All these efforts must continue while keeping regional countries like China, Iran and the Central Asian states in the loop. There is a possibility of an internecine conflict pitting the Haqqanis (including IMP) and NRF against the Kandahari faction.
Internally, it appears that the TTP and now IMP retain the capacity to launch attacks against civilian as well as LEA targets. There are areas where the terrorists find refuge due to their coercive tactics and tribal affiliations, as the population is still fearful of them. Pakistan needs a unified national response in which the KP government lends a willing and effective hand to the federal government’s counterterrorism efforts.
David Galula, the doyen of counterinsurgency, recommends, among other things, strengthening an “active minority” among the people who could fight on behalf of the state and win over more people.
Most importantly, the people of the merged districts deserve the governance and development dividends that were promised when these areas were merged with KP.
The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]
