Pakistan’s youth have long been described as the country’s greatest strength – a demographic dividend capable of driving growth, innovation, and social progress.
Yet evidence from the latest Labour Force Survey (LFS 2024–25) suggests that this dividend is at serious risk. Among Gen Z youth aged 15–24, a substantial share is not in education, employment or training (known as: NEET), signalling a deepening structural failure in how Pakistan prepares and absorbs its young population. What is emerging is not merely a labour market problem, but the early contours of a demographic debt.
The scale of disengagement is striking. LFS 2024–25 estimates indicate that more than 12 million Gen Z youth are NEET, representing approximately 29 per cent of the age group. This is not a marginal or transitional phenomenon; it reflects systemic gaps between education systems, labour markets and social institutions.
Gender disparities remain one of the most persistent features of the NEET crisis. Survey data indicate that young women account for a disproportionately large share of NEETs, despite constituting about half of the Gen Z population.
While male youth are more likely to be unemployed or informally employed, female youth are far more likely to be completely disengaged from both education and work. This pattern reflects a combination of early school dropout, unpaid domestic responsibilities, early marriage, and restricted mobility – challenges that cut across provinces, though with varying intensity.
Migration, often assumed to be an escape from economic inactivity, plays only a limited role in altering NEET outcomes. Nearly 95 per cent of Gen Z youth are non-migrants, while internal migrants constitute about 4.0 per cent, and international migrants less than 0.2 per cent of the cohort. Internal migrant youth are more likely to be NEET than non-migrants. This suggests that migration is not a large-scale solution to youth disengagement; for most young Pakistanis, the struggle unfolds within their place of origin.
Importantly, reasons for migration matter. LFS data show that youth migration is driven not only by employment but also by marriage, family movement, and displacement due to shocks such as floods. For young men, migration can sometimes facilitate entry into work. For young women, however, migration – particularly marriage-related – often coincides with permanent withdrawal from education and employment, reinforcing NEET status rather than reducing it. This distinction has major implications for how policymakers interpret mobility statistics.
Household structure adds another layer of complexity. Female-headed households, often assumed to be more economically vulnerable, display mixed outcomes. In some contexts, the absence of adult males drives youth into employment, reducing NEET prevalence. In other contexts, particularly where social protection is weak and informal work predominates, these households face compounded disadvantages, limiting young people’s access to education and decent employment. The LFS evidence suggests that household headship alone does not determine NEET outcomes; access to local labour markets, education facilities and social norms plays a decisive role.
Provincial comparisons further underline uneven progress. Punjab continues to exhibit relatively strong youth engagement, supported by broader labour markets, vocational initiatives and greater educational access. Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa occupy a middle position, with comparable NEET levels despite very different social and economic contexts.
Balochistan remains the most disadvantaged, reflecting chronic underinvestment and limited institutional reach. These differences highlight that youth disengagement is not inevitable; it is shaped by policy choices, infrastructure and institutional capacity.
What makes the NEET crisis especially alarming is its long-term trajectory. International evidence shows that prolonged disengagement during early adulthood leads to lasting “scarring effects”: lower lifetime earnings, weaker skills, poorer health outcomes, and reduced civic participation.
If current trends persist, Pakistan risks entering the 2030s with millions of under-skilled and economically inactive adults, undermining productivity and increasing pressure on already strained social systems. In a region where neighbouring countries are aggressively investing in digital skills, technical education and youth entrepreneurship, this gap could translate into declining competitiveness.
Addressing the NEET challenge requires more than short-term employment schemes or headline announcements. It demands a coordinated national strategy that strengthens school-to-work transitions, expands technical and vocational training, supports young women’s participation and aligns education with labour market demand. Equally critical is the need for province-specific approaches that acknowledge social realities without allowing them to justify inaction.
Pakistan’s Gen Z stands at a crossroads. With timely and targeted investment, this generation can still deliver the long-promised demographic dividend. Without it, the country risks carrying a demographic debt for decades – one measured not only in lost output, but in wasted lives and unrealised potential. The warning from LFS 2024–25 is clear: the NEET crisis is no longer a future risk. It is a present reality – and the window to act is rapidly closing.
The writer is a lecturer at the University of Peshawar.
