ISLAMABAD: What will the 27th Amendment actually deliver to the people of Pakistan? That, right now, is the mother of all questions. At its core, the amendment isn’t just legal fine print — it’s a power reset. It touches three fault lines that define the state itself: who controls the purse, who commands the gavel, and who holds the gun — fiscal, judicial, and civil-military.
Budget 2025–26 projects Rs19 trillion in gross revenue receipts. Here’s where it goes: Rs8 trillion to the provinces under the NFC Award, Rs8 trillion in interest payments, Rs2 trillion in grants and transfers to provinces, and Rs1 trillion in pensions. After meeting these four obligations, the federal government is left with nothing — zero fiscal space. After the four payments the federal government has no fiscal space left, yet it still must find Rs2.6 trillion for defence, Rs1.2 trillion for subsidies, Rs1.0 trillion to run the government, and Rs1.3 trillion for development — an unfunded gap of more than Rs6 trillion.
This is not a budgeting error. It is a strategic faultline — unsustainable and extremely dangerous. A federal government that cannot pay cannot protect its people or their future. Social unrest follows where expectations meet empty coffers. If the 27th Amendment offers a credible fix for this extremely dangerous fiscal faultline, it will be doing Pakistan—and its citizens—a historic service. If the 27th Amendment offers a credible fix for this extremely dangerous fiscal faultline, it would not just be constitutional housekeeping; it would be an act of national survival. If the 27th Amendment plugs the Rs6 trillion gap it will mark the first real step toward rescuing Pakistan from fiscal paralysis. More than 80 countries now maintain both a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court — among them Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Colombia, South Africa, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Austria.
Question: Why two courts? Answer: Because no single court can carry both burdens — day-to-day justice and constitutional guardianship. The Constitutional Court exists to interpret and defend the constitution — the Supreme Court ensures that civil, criminal, and administrative laws are applied uniformly across the nation.
This division of labour matters deeply for Pakistan. The Supreme Court today faces a backlog of nearly 60,000 cases. Most are appeals from ordinary citizens — property disputes, service matters, and bail petitions — waiting years for closure. If constitutional questions are routed to a separate Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court can finally focus on these everyday cases.
If the 27th Amendment can deliver faster justice to the common Pakistani, it will be worth every effort. If the 27th Amendment can clear the mountain of 60,000 pending cases, it will be worth every effort. If the 27th Amendment can unclog the courts, it will be worth every debate. And If the 27th Amendment can create a judiciary that serves both the Constitution and the citizen, it will be worth every amendment to the book.
Article 243 of the Constitution of Pakistan defines the command, control, and appointment of the Armed Forces. The truth is that Article 243 has always been less about constitutional principle and more about power — a bargain between the military elite and the civilian elite. Each amendment, from Zia to Musharraf to the 18th, merely shifted leverage from one side of the table to the other. For the common Pakistani, it has changed little. The contest is not about service to the citizens; it is about power.
In the end, the 27th Amendment will be judged not by how it redistributes power among elites but by whether it restores trust in the state, justice in the courts, and solvency in the system.
