Everybody is speaking about the changing nature of the war and deterrence in the backdrop of the India-Pakistan standoff in May 2025, without understanding that the nature of war remains the same – the interplay of primordial human passion for violence, chance and politics.
In contrast, the dynamics of deterrence keep evolving with technology. Humans wage war because of the violent urge to dominate and achieve some political objectives through chance or military strategies. This Clausewitzian trinity of war is played out in the full glare of context, both shaped as well as shaping the politics and technology.
According to Clausewitz, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” India, in our neighbourhood, has desperately tried to adapt the characteristics of conventional war to its advantage in pursuit of its political objectives of attaining regional hegemony – but has so far miserably failed. The cause celebre of its latest attempt – a terrorist incident in Indian-occupied Kashmir, could not be converted into a
‘new normal’, despite the histrionics and braggadocio of the war-soused sensibilities of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Instead, what India received was a sobering rejoinder of its powerlessness vis-a-vis a technologically superior Pakistan, which outmaneuvered India in a conventional
showdown that New Delhi had planned as a first step on the ladder to hegemony.
The father of nuclear strategy, Bernard Brodie, had envisaged nuclear warfare as a deterrent through the fear of mutually assured destruction brought about by massive retaliation. Later-day scholars toyed with the idea of flexible response theories, giving leeway to the warfighting role of nuclear weapons, originally conceived by Brodie as tools of deterrence.
Nuclear strategists like Herman Kahn flirted with the notion of a ‘fightable’ nuclear war, with the use of thermonuclear weapons as its climactic denouement. To lend credence to the possibility of a scaled-up nuclear war scenario, Kahn postulated an “escalation ladder” theory with 44 rungs, starting with posturing and ending with the use of thermonuclear bombs.
Instead of morphing into a warfighting doctrine, this rung-by-rung escalation theory actually reinforced deterrence theory by offering steps such as nuclear signalling and posturing – measures that could dissuade an adversary from taking steps that might lead to a nuclear exchange. Israeli scholars like Martin van Creveld went so far as to remark that “nuclear strategy was no strategy but a mutual suicide”.
The theory of nuclear deterrence has essentially negated the concept of conventional war, especially between two nuclear-armed nations – except through proxy warfare conducted via non-state actors employing terrorism and guerrilla tactics.
The role of nuclear weapons as deterrents, and the conduct of the nuclear-armed and veto-wielding P5 countries, has also come under criticism from political scientists and historians. Many view the current global order as a rules-based disorder, where the P5 have failed to ensure stability while doing everything necessary to deny nuclear capability to other powers.
Retaining nuclear weapons as a currency of power while promoting non-proliferation and negating disarmament remains a central failure of the UN-based global order.
In parallel, there exists another global system – established by the great powers – that entrenches power asymmetries and promotes realpolitik.
A recent article by Sadanand Dhume in ‘The Wall Street Journal’ reflects this mindset, arguing that it is kosher for certain countries to keep nuclear weapons while denying the same to others – as an existential necessity for the civilised world.
The article supports the forced disarmament of Iran, yet remains silent on the continued opposition of global powers to the third pillar of global non-proliferation efforts: nuclear disarmament. Efforts towards nuclear disarmament, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017), are gaining no traction, while initiatives like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty lie abandoned.
Nuclear aspirants like Iran are being attacked and punished for their nuclear ambitions, while nations like India – which are attempting to upend the entire notion of nuclear deterrence through grotesque ‘new normal’ strategies involving missile attacks on nuclear-armed states – are ignored by the international community. India has no qualms about launching missiles and drones at a nuclear-armed neighbour and choking off its water lifeline.
Pakistan possesses both conventional and nuclear deterrents, which are well-integrated and mutually reinforcing. Pakistan’s conventional triad enhances the credibility of its full-spectrum nuclear capability – and this was on full display during the four-day standoff, when India attempted to undermine that deterrence through air and missile warfare.
Pakistan’s superior systems integration, training and network-centric capabilities defeated the Indian Air Force’s designs – downing six high-performance jets, including Rafales – while effectively defending its airspace. Pakistan has premised its war doctrine on the defence of its territory, and its tactical nuclear weapons also serve that purpose: dissuading conventional attacks before the nuclear Rubicon is crossed.
Meanwhile, India dabbles in maverick notions of launching missile attacks on a nuclear neighbour based on spurious suspicions. Writers like Sadanand Dhume, instead of calling out Indian bellicosity – which is the fundamental cause of deterrence instability – choose instead to point fingers at Pakistan to muddy the waters.
India has even repudiated US President Trump’s claims of averting a nuclear showdown in the subcontinent, all while playing a dubious role through its intelligence agencies inside Iran, against both Pakistan and Iran. Ignoring the evolving nature of warfare, where primordial passions must be tempered by stable deterrence for the sake of humanity’s survival, India continues to stoke instability through random missile strikes and by choking river waters to lower riparians
In dancing this minuet of dangerous tango, India risks making one final, fatal miscalculation
about deterrence stability – potentially dragging the region into a nuclear Armageddon.
The writer is a security and
defence analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]
