he year 2025 saw the South Asian region at a critical juncture. In May, Pakistan and India, the two nuclear-armed neighbours with a long history of rivalry and recurring tensions, once again engaged in direct military confrontation. The region drew immediate global attention after India blatantly accused Pakistan of an attack in Pahalgam, a town in Indian-occupied Kashmir, which had left 26 dead. Despite Pakistan’s repeated calls for a neutral and transparent investigation, the Modi-led Indian government waged war on Pakistan. On May 6-7, India launched Operation Sindoor, carrying out attacks at various locations in Pakistan. The latter responded by launching Operation Bunyan-un Marsoos, targeting a range of military sites in India. After four days of hostile engagement, the United States intervened and brokered a ceasefire between the two countries. Post-ceasefire, the Modi regime was quick to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty and has maintained a harsh tone westward, to Pakistan.

As a tribute to its armed forces, Pakistan announced the observation of Youm-i-Tashakkur (Day of Gratitude). Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif noted that the victory had elevated Pakistan’s global prestige. More recently, a report by United Nations, released on December 15, has further strengthened Pakistan’s position on the conflict. The report not only described India’s use of force against Pakistan during the conflict as ‘unlawful’ but also deemed it a violation of people’s right to life and security.

As the conflict abates, though relations between the two countries remain strained, some crucial questions arise—specifically: how will Pakistan utilise its bolstered global image to strengthen its position in South Asia, vis-à-vis India?

In South Asia, Pakistan has clearly held very close ties with an emerging global player, China. There is little doubt that this close association between the two countries has had a crucial role in the politics of the region. This association became particularly visible during the recent India-Pakistan war. As the conflict started gaining momentum, China was expeditious in coming forward in support of Pakistan. The Chinese foreign minister issued a statement, asserting that China supports Pakistan in “safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests.”

New Delhi, which has long eyed China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan with scepticism, alleged that China supported Pakistan with logistical and intelligence assistance during the May war. India’s deputy army chief, in a statement in June, asserted that China had provided Pakistan with ‘live inputs’ during the conflict.

It is important to note that the recent war with India has once again reinforced Pakistan’s belief that it needs to foster its strategic and military cooperation with China. For this purpose, the two countries had been enhancing their diplomatic exchanges. Little wonder, soon after a US-brokered ceasefire was achieved, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar landed in Beijing for “discussions on the evolving regional situation in South Asia,” as reported by the Foreign Office. A few months later, in August, the visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Pakistan to hold the sixth round of the Pakistan-China Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue was another attempt to enhance mutual cooperation by focusing on crucial sectors such as agriculture and mining. In September, President Asif Ali Zardari embarked on a 10-day official visit to China, where he discussed a range of issues, including CPEC and the evolving regional situation with the Chinese leadership. This visit was later termed by the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan as a “new chapter in the Pakistan-China friendship.”

It is important to acknowledge that China has remained Pakistan’s major arms supplier. The latter’s reliance on Chinese weapons is also increasing. According to a report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, over the last five years 81 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports were from China. More recently, there have also been reports that Pakistan is willing to acquire the fifth-generation J-35 fighter jets from China, a move that could provide Pakistan with a considerable strategic edge over India.

Pakistan has also been trying to position itself as a prominent partner with its other, once long-standing partner, the US. Pakistan’s relations with the US had frayed over the past few years, specifically in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s persistent strategic alignment with China had also been a key concern for the US. However, in July, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, during a visit to New York, affirmed that Pakistan’s relations with the US must not be viewed through the lens of its relationship with China, adding that the country aspires to maintain cordial relations with both China and the US.

This shift in approach has been propelled by a range of factors, including the straining of US-India relations after the Trump administration imposed 50 percent tariffs on India. This, combined with the US’s role in the India-Pakistan war, provided Pakistan with an opportunity not only to mend its ties with the US, but also to secure the latter’s support in case of any future conflict with India. During his visit to the US, alongside Field Marshal Asim Munir, the Pakistani premier not only hailed Trump’s role in securing a ceasefire, but also referred to him as a “man of peace.”

Currently, the two countries appear to be trying to leverage their interests in the region together. It was reported in December that the US had approved a deal worth $686 million for technology to upgrade Pakistan’s F-16 fighter jets. Clearly, by maintaining a careful balance between both—the US and China—Pakistan seeks to enhance and modernise its military capabilities. This appears to be part of Pakistan’s broader, prudent approach vis-à-vis India in the years to come. Pakistan’s approach stems from the assessment that, as general elections draw near in India, the RSS-BJP nexus in India may propel the incumbent Indian government to reiterate a strategy of aggression against Pakistan as a means of consolidating political power at home.

Nonetheless, dialogue and diplomacy should always be preferred over coercion and repression in contemporary international relations. As tensions persist between these two nuclear-armed countries in South Asia, it is a shared responsibility for major powers, especially the US and China, to ensure that India and Pakistan address their points of contestation through dialogue to avoid endangering global peace and security.

Ejaz Hussain has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and post-doc experience at University of California, Berkeley. He is a DAAD and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor. He can be reached at [email protected].

Malik Mashhood is a graduate teaching associate at the Lahore School of Economics.