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Devolution over division

November 22, 2026
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari addresses the National Assemblys budget session on June 18, 2026. — Facebook/@Bilawalhouse
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari addresses the National Assembly's budget session on June 18, 2026. — Facebook/@Bilawalhouse

Pakistan’s rulers have discovered a familiar remedy for an unfamiliar assortment of failures: redraw the map. With the economy struggling, democratic institutions weakened, courts increasingly vulnerable to political interference and ordinary citizens battling inflation and unemployment, the ruling establishment has found an apparently irresistible distraction.

The controversy has exposed growing tensions within the ruling coalition. Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, chairman of the PPP, has opposed any attempt to divide Sindh through political coercion or a referendum. Meanwhile, federal ministers and leaders of the MQM-P have enthusiastically promoted new administrative units. Their argument is deceptively simple: smaller provinces will improve governance. Unfortunately, neither Pakistan’s history nor its constitutional experience supports such an uncomplicated proposition.

Bilawal deserves support for resisting this latest constitutional adventure. His warning that a forced division of Sindh could provoke bloodshed should be understood as an expression of concern, not an invitation to violence. The province has already paid an appalling price for ethnic and political confrontation. It does not need another experiment in social engineering. The proposed referendum is particularly troubling. Pakistan’s experience with plebiscitary democracy offers three cautionary examples.

In 1960, General Ayub Khan organised a referendum through his carefully constructed system of Basic Democracies. Rather than permitting the population to choose freely between competing political alternatives, he sought endorsement from an electoral college of 80,000 local representatives. The exercise furnished a civilian-looking mandate for military rule. It did little to establish genuine democratic accountability. General Ziaul Haq improved upon this formula in December 1984. His referendum effectively conflated support for Islamisation with approval of his continuation as president for another five years. Official figures claimed almost 98 per cent support, despite widespread allegations of manipulation and opposition boycotts. Religious sentiment became the instrument through which an unelected ruler extended his authority.

General Pervez Musharraf repeated the performance in April 2002. Official results credited him with approximately 97.5 per cent support on a reported turnout of 71 per cent. Opposition parties and independent observers challenged the credibility of those figures, citing extensive irregularities and implausible participation claims. These episodes do not establish that every referendum everywhere is illegitimate. They establish something more pertinent: in Pakistan, referendums have repeatedly served those already exercising extraordinary power. Their apparent simplicity makes them attractive to rulers seeking to bypass the untidy business of parliamentary deliberation, federal consent and political compromise.

That history makes the current enthusiasm difficult to understand. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi has promoted a referendum as a democratic way to determine Pakistan’s administrative future. MQM-P leader Farooq Sattar wants one before the beginning of 2027. Yet Article 239(4) of the constitution is unambiguous: changing a province’s boundaries requires approval by two-thirds of the total membership of the assembly of the province concerned, alongside the prescribed federal constitutional-amendment process.

Article 48(6), which permits a referendum on matters of national importance, cannot simply extinguish these safeguards. A nationwide majority must not be used to override the constitutional rights of a federating unit. Democracy is not merely the counting of votes; it also requires respect for institutions, federal agreements and protections against majoritarian coercion. The MQM-P leadership should reflect particularly carefully on these principles. Karachi’s grievances are real. Its deteriorating infrastructure, unreliable water supply, inadequate public transport, weak municipal institutions and unequal access to public resources deserve urgent attention. So do the frustrations of Hyderabad and other urban centres.

Yet separating Karachi from Sindh is not the only conceivable remedy, let alone the most sensible. The party’s insistence on territorial division is politically myopic. It risks reopening ethnic fault lines that have caused enormous suffering. Karachi’s history of violence between linguistic communities, political organisations and competing armed groups should inspire caution rather than constitutional adventurism. Sindh belongs to all its residents, whatever their language, ancestry or place of birth. Its Sindhi-speaking and Urdu-speaking populations have shared cities, educational institutions, workplaces, markets and neighbourhoods for generations. Their future lies in strengthening that coexistence, not converting administrative grievances into competing territorial claims.

Nor should anyone forget the human cost of past confrontations. From the linguistic disturbances of the early 1970s to the ethnic and political violence of the 1980s and 1990s, Sindh has endured too many funerals, shattered families and divided neighbourhoods. Pakistan has witnessed enough bloodshed elsewhere as well. Politicians should resist rhetoric that could encourage another generation to inherit those animosities. This does not absolve the PPP of responsibility for Sindh’s governance failures. Nearly two decades of continuous provincial rule have given it ample opportunity to improve municipal administration, strengthen public services and distribute resources more equitably.

Bilawal’s defence of Sindh’s territorial integrity will carry greater credibility if accompanied by a serious programme of institutional reform. The solution is meaningful devolution. Article 140-A already requires provinces to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial authority. Instead of manufacturing new provincial capitals, governments should empower existing cities, districts and towns. Elected councils need predictable funding, substantial control over municipal services, transparent financial arrangements and protection against arbitrary dissolution. Karachi needs an empowered metropolitan government. Hyderabad, Sukkur, Larkana, Mirpurkhas and smaller municipalities need accountable local institutions. Rural Sindh requires better schools, hospitals, irrigation systems and roads.

These reforms would address grievances directly without turning linguistic identities into territorial battlegrounds. The debate is also diverting attention from more immediate emergencies. Farmers in Punjab complain of costly inputs, shortages of wheat seed, delayed sugarcane crushing and uncertain crop prices. Across Pakistan, households struggle with electricity bills, inadequate healthcare, unemployment and the escalating cost of living. Young people face diminishing opportunities while public institutions fail to deliver basic services. A farmer waiting for affordable seed gains nothing from a referendum on provincial boundaries. An unemployed graduate cannot survive on promises of constitutional restructuring.

Nor will another provincial secretariat automatically provide drinking water to a neglected settlement or restore electricity to an indebted household. The proposed constitutional adventure becomes still more disturbing when considered alongside the 27th Amendment. In its November 2026 report, the International Commission of Jurists concluded that the enactment had produced systemic judicial capture, seriously weakening the independence of Pakistan’s superior courts and their ability to provide remedies against human-rights violations. The 27th Amendment represents a grave setback for constitutional democracy. Combined with the earlier amendment, it has weakened judicial safeguards while expanding political influence over institutions expected to restrain executive power.

Pakistan now faces the prospect of a 28th Amendment before the consequences of the previous have even been properly addressed. Bilawal’s criticism of how the 27th Amendment was enacted is welcome, although his party cannot escape responsibility for supporting the constitutional changes it now questions. Political credibility requires acknowledging past mistakes, not merely resisting the next proposed mistake. Pakistan needs no further amendment designed to consolidate power or circumvent federal consent. It needs parliamentary accountability, an independent judiciary, credible elections and functioning local governments.

The 18th Amendment showed that difficult constitutional questions can be negotiated through sustained multiparty deliberation. Its spirit of federal accommodation should be protected, not undermined through hurried legislation or manufactured popular mandates. The choice is therefore not between maintaining every defect of the present provincial system and dividing Sindh but between democratic reform and another potentially destabilising exercise in constitutional manipulation. Bilawal is right to insist that Sindh cannot be divided by coercion. But defending its boundaries must go hand in hand with delivering justice, public services and genuine local autonomy to everyone living within them.

The writer is dean of the faculty of liberal arts at a private university in Karachi. He tweets/posts @NaazirMahmood and can be reached at: [email protected]