Within a single week, voters in Israel and the US passed judgment on the same war. Israelis went to the polls on October 27 in their first general election since Israel first went to war with Iran in June 2025. The Americans followed on November 3 in midterm elections that US President Donald Trump had openly asked them to treat as a referendum on himself.
Neither electorate voted directly on Iran, yet the conflict that began with US and Israeli strikes early in the year, and has since dragged through fragile ceasefires, stalled talks and soaring fuel prices, sat beneath both results – and both point in the same direction.
Democrats took both chambers of Congress, securing at least 55 Senate seats and their largest House majority in nearly two decades. The cost of living decided most races, but the war was never separable from it. Petrol prices had stayed above four dollars a gallon since June, and pre-election polling by Fox News and AP-NORC placed the Iran war among voters’ four leading concerns, ahead of immigration and crime, the very issues that carried Trump to victory in 2024.
Six in ten voters opposed military action against Iran, and those voters favoured Democratic candidates by 56 points. Trump himself admitted on Fox News that the war had made for an unpleasant election night, an unusual concession from a president elected on a promise to keep America out of foreign wars.
Israel’s verdict was quieter in form but no less pointed. Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud remained the largest party, yet his bloc finished with 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, eight short of a majority. When President Isaac Herzog consulted the new parliament, factions representing 67 members recommended Gadi Eisenkot, the former army chief, against 46 for Netanyahu, and Herzog handed Eisenkot the first mandate to form a government. Netanyahu had built his campaign around the military operations against Iran and Hezbollah, presenting himself as the only leader capable of seeing them through. Israel’s lawmakers declined the offer, their verdict reflecting it.
For more than a decade, the US-Israel relationship under Netanyahu rested on the assumption that American support was bipartisan, unconditional and insulated from domestic politics. In July, more than half of House Democrats voted to strip $3.3 billion in aid to Israel, and in Michigan a Senate candidate who called for ending unconditional military assistance defeated an establishment rival backed by millions in AIPAC spending. The new Congress will show whether such positions survive contact with legislation, but the direction of travel is clear, and the next Israeli government, whoever leads it, will deal with a Washington far less willing to underwrite open-ended war.
The Michigan candidate, Abdul El-Sayed, brings the most striking thread of these elections into view. A physician born to an Egyptian immigrant father, El-Sayed defeated former congressman Mike Rogers to become the first Muslim ever elected to the US Senate, in a state Trump carried in 2024. He won after a campaign in which opponents linked him to the Muslim Brotherhood without evidence, and in which anti-Muslim rhetoric had, according to The New York Times, become a central element of Republican midterm strategy. At least seven Muslims won seats in Congress, and Zohran Mamdani already serves as New York City’s first Muslim mayor.
These victories came against the backdrop of the most hostile climate for American Muslims in a generation. The Council on American-Islamic Relations recorded 8,683 discrimination complaints in 2025, the highest figure since it began tracking in 1996, and documented a 183 per cent rise in incidents targeting mosques over the summer compared with the same period a year earlier. Its annual report traced much of the increase to rhetoric from public officials rather than isolated individuals. Muslims make up roughly two per cent of Michigan’s electorate, which means El-Sayed’s victory rested overwhelmingly on voters who share neither his faith nor his heritage.
For Pakistani readers, the lesson is to hold both realities at once. Islamophobia in the US is real, measurable and at times stoked by elected officials, and Pakistan’s government and diaspora are right to call it out. A political system that can absorb that hostility and still send a Muslim doctor to the Senate, however, bears little resemblance to the monolith so often portrayed in Pakistan’s public discourse. American institutions remain open to those who organise within them, and Pakistani-Americans, among the most educated and prosperous immigrant communities in the country, have every reason to read the 2026 results as an invitation rather than an exception.
The results also strengthen Islamabad’s hand in a more immediate sense. Pakistan brokered the April ceasefire, hosted direct talks between American and Iranian officials, and continues alongside Qatar to carry proposals between Washington and Tehran. Within days of the American vote, Trump declared the war militarily ‘effectively over’ and played down the prospect of new strikes, while a fresh Pakistan-Qatar proposal reportedly brought both sides back to serious negotiations.
A Congress elected on the costs of the war, an Israeli prime minister reduced to caretaker status, and a White House facing a hostile legislature for its final two years together create the most favourable conditions for a negotiated settlement since the fighting began. Pakistan’s diplomats and military leadership have earned their place in that process, and the ballots cast in both countries have left them with far more willing interlocutors than they had a year ago.
The writer is a non-resident fellow at the Consortium for Asia Pacific & Eurasian Studies. He tweets/posts @umarwrites