ISLAMABAD: The Iran war has reshaped the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, giving rise to a new Saudi-led bloc that includes Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Qatar—while conspicuously excluding the United Arab Emirates—as regional powers realign over how to deal with Iran and Israel, according to a column published in Foreign Policy.
The new grouping, described by some as an expanding “Islamic Nato,” has emerged outside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) framework, driven by two key goals: containing the Iranian threat and pushing back against Israel’s military adventurism.
The war inflicted substantial pain on Persian Gulf states, as their exports and sense of safety declined. Yet some have emerged more resolute about cooperating together on regional politics.
From the states from the new grouping, some have emerged as clear winners from the war, while others are content with having built new resilience. There is a veneer of camaraderie among them, but deep divisions lie underneath regarding how best to deal with Iran and whether to pursue normalisation with Israel or brace for its feared hegemonic expansion. Either way, it is clear that the war in Iran has produced a new order in the Gulf that extends beyond to the larger Islamic world. The new bloc is defined by two goals: containing the Iranian threat while also regaining influence in countries dominated by Iranian proxies or allies such as Syria and Lebanon; and pushing back against Israel to define limits to its military adventurism. One regional observer said Israel’s strike on Doha last year—to hunt Hamas members—spooked Gulf nations into thinking that they could be next. It brought rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey closer together.
While there is no official name for the grouping it signals a realignment built on deepening mistrust between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. As both wean away from an oil-based economy, Saudis are competing with Emiratis to win over the same foreign investments. The grouping of five is also a Saudi bid to claim regional leadership. The UAE’s exit from Opec questioned the Saudi position as the unofficial leader of the pack. Riyadh has now decided to host a regional summit between Arab states and Iran, but it is unclear when it will take place and whether the UAE will attend—but it will be circumspect of any assurance.
Saudi Arabia came under relatively fewer attacks than many of its neighbours, but its sense of security was no less shaken. Reuters reported that it even carried out numerous strikes against Iran in response. Riyadh said whatever little trust had been built with Iran as a result of the 2023 Beijing-led rapprochement was quashed.
On the economic front, Saudi Arabia benefited from higher oil prices and demand during the conflict. According to Hesham Alghannam of the Carnegie Middle East Centre, Aramco’s first-quarter net profit rose 26 per cent as oil prices climbed from $74 to more than $119 a barrel, while the East-West Pipeline enabled exports to continue via the Red Sea at full capacity. Although Saudi GDP growth slowed from 3.7 per cent to 2.8 per cent due to temporary well closures, the conflict accelerated investment in Red Sea infrastructure.
Qatar also emerged as a key player in the new regional alignment. Once isolated by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2017, Doha has strengthened its diplomatic standing. During the war with Iran, its leadership concluded that engagement with Tehran offered the most viable path, given its geographical constraints and relatively warm pre-war ties. Although Iran targeted the Ras Laffan LNG facility, reducing export capacity by an estimated 17 per cent, Qatar experienced fewer strikes than other Gulf states. It then jumped full throttle into mediation efforts in mid-May.
Other members of the Saudi-led grouping also intend to gain from the war. Egypt hopes to benefit from a Saudi rush to expand its infrastructure. Riyadh has formalised plans to build a bridge to Sinai, aiming to turn Egypt’s Mediterranean coast into a gateway to Europe. Turkey hopes to boost arms sales, as apprehensions over security are unlikely to subside anytime soon.Human organs sale case.
