Labour migration is one of Pakistan’s most consistent economic outputs. Figures from the Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment (BE&OE) show that over 700,000 Pakistanis left the country for employment overseas in 2025, and projections indicate that this figure will cross one million in a few years, which it was already close to in 2015. The only downturn in the last decade has been due to Covid-19 and this year’s Iran-US-Israel war.
These figures reflect a simple structural condition. Pakistan’s stagnating economy has meant that there are not enough jobs. However, having workers overseas to support families here has meant that remittances today are nearly a tenth of Pakistan’s GDP.
In January 2026, Pakistan received $3.46 billion from remittances. For comparison, the debt that Pakistan is returning to the UAE this month is $3.5 billion. In FY2025, Pakistan received $38.3 billion in remittances.
This is an incredible story, because state investment in our human capital has remained embarrasingly low. There is also a distinct lack of policy to effectively train our population which is geared towards working abroad. There is an opportunity to leverage our networks for greater national financial gain.
Uzbekistan has recently embarked on a new policy shift for its migrant workers. It has previously sent workers primarily to Russia and its neighbouring countries. However, it has now established a Migration Agency that aims to reposition its workers to higher-income markets in the West, and affluent countries in Asia such as Japan and South Korea.
Remittances in Uzbekistan have accounted for nearly a fifth of their GDP. A radical shift towards exporting labour that requires tertiary education and certifications means that the Central Asian state can potentially boost its remittance figure higher.
The emerging Uzbek model attempts to shift the equation of ‘cheap’ labour. Rather than expanding departures, the focus is on improving migrant positioning in global labour markets. That includes vocational alignment with external demand, standardised certification and bilateral labour agreements that formalise wages and working conditions. Migration is embedded within economic planning rather than treated as an external pressure valve.
Pakistan has so far lacked this integration. Workers leave mainly for Gulf economies, concentrated in hard labour. The Pakistani system is efficient-enough at moving labour across borders, but not at upgrading its position within global labour hierarchies. Recruitment itself is heavily intermediated through private agents, where people are also routinely scammed of hard-earned money. The BE&OE website lists jobs abroad, but the majority are all within the categories of lower-paid work.
Uzbekistan also had another issue. Depending on one country for its migrant workers means that if that country were to economically falter, it would send shockwaves back home. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has done exactly that, where the Russian economy has shrunk after intially being propped up by combat expenditure.
Similarly, Pakistan relies massively on Saudi Arabia and the UAE for its emigrant workers, the two countries far outstripping any other labour market. BE&OE data shows that over 530,000 Pakistani workers registered for work in Saudi Arabia in 2025 alone.
Then there is also the question of what happens when migrants return. Pakistani workers enter low-wage sectors abroad, accumulate limited transferable skills, and return with savings that are heavily consumptive rather than productive.
Return migration is weakly structured. There is no consistent mechanism linking returnees to industrial upgrading, entrepreneurship pipelines, or targeted reintegration into productive sectors. Reintegration is left to market absorption and individual capacity. As a result, migration does not compound into domestic capability.
However, Pakistan already has the raw inputs for a much more robust system. It has the scale, diaspora networks and sustained external demand. What it lacks is institutional integration across the migration lifecycle: training, placement, diplomacy and reintegration.
Without a deliberate shift in how Pakistan manages its work emigration system, the country will only continue to send more people abroad each year, but do little to fundamentally change its economic position back home.
The writer is the managing editor of Folio Books.
