LAHORE: Pakistan’s oil consumption — including crude oil and refined petroleum products — remains significantly larger than its domestic production. Yet over the past two years, there has been a modest but notable improvement in local output.
Domestic production, which stood at around 70,500 barrels per day in 2023, increased to nearly 80,000 barrels per day in 2024 and has now reportedly crossed 90,000 barrels per day in 2025. This addition of roughly 10,000-20,000 barrels per day has pushed the domestic share of total oil consumption close to 19 per cent.
Even so, Pakistan’s daily oil requirement in 2025 hovers around 440,000 barrels per day. The country still relies on imports for more than 80 per cent of its petroleum needs. While recent exploration successes and improved output offer some breathing space, the overall energy structure remains vulnerable to global disruptions.
The distribution of oil consumption across sectors highlights the challenge. The transport sector alone consumes between 55 per cent and 60 per cent of total petroleum products. Power generation accounts for around 22 per cent, while the remaining 18 per cent is shared among industry, agriculture, the military and other essential services.
Although precise military fuel consumption figures are not publicly available, global patterns offer a reasonable benchmark. In most countries, armed forces consume between 2.0 per cent and 5.0 per cent of national fuel demand during peacetime. This share can rise substantially during active conflict. In Pakistan’s case, domestic production — if fully directed towards strategic use — could likely sustain core military operations in the short term, along with critical healthcare infrastructure and essential emergency services.
However, domestic output would not be sufficient to sustain full economic activity, nor would it support prolonged, high-intensity warfare. In the event of a severe supply disruption, large segments of civilian transport and industrial activity would face mandatory curtailment. The transport sector, being the largest consumer, would bear the brunt of rationing measures.
Pakistan currently maintains roughly four weeks of strategic oil reserves. If domestic production is factored in, the cushion may extend by an additional week under strict rationing. Many analysts believe that any regional conflict scenario would likely not extend beyond five weeks. However, such assumptions are risky. Damage to oil infrastructure, shipping routes, or refining capacity could both slow domestic production and push international crude prices sharply upward. Even without a physical supply halt, price spikes alone could severely strain Pakistan’s fragile economy.
Preparing for contingencies is therefore not optional — it is essential. Immediate structural measures can reduce vulnerability. Goods transport should, on an emergency basis, be shifted as much as possible from road to rail. Even if this requires temporary curtailment of passenger train services, the reduction in diesel consumption from heavy trucking would significantly ease pressure on fuel supplies.
Additionally, non-essential fuel consumption must be curbed. Official protocols involving multiple VIP convoys should be rationalized. Coordinated scheduling of official movements along the same routes could substantially reduce unnecessary fuel burn.
Pakistan’s modest gains in domestic oil production provide a thin but valuable cushion. Yet energy security is not achieved merely by discovering new wells. It demands disciplined consumption, strategic planning, and decisive policy action before a crisis strikes — not after.
