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Despite damning probe: No action so far in KP police ghost employees scam

February 24, 2026
KP Police personnel patrol area after an attack in Swat. — AFP/File
KP Police personnel patrol area after an attack in Swat. — AFP/File

PESHAWAR: Despite the exposure of a massive ghost employee network within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police, no concrete action has so far been taken by the relevant police authorities.

The scandal, which revealed that millions of rupees were siphoned off from the public treasury through fake salary withdrawals in Peshawar, remains without accountability, recoveries, or arrests.

Investigations uncovered that in Peshawar police alone, salaries were being drawn in the names of at least 30 non-existent personnel. The network allegedly reused service codes of dismissed employees, forged official documents, opened fraudulent bank accounts, and systematically manipulated internal systems to embezzle millions of rupees over several years.

However, the inquiry report reportedly went missing from the office of the Inspector General, effectively stalling proceedings against those believed to be influential figures. The continued inaction has deepened concerns over transparency and internal oversight, raising serious questions about governance not only within the police department but across the broader provincial employee management system.

According to documents, the initial investigation in 2023 to 24 began in the Hassan Khel area of Peshawar, focusing on employees listed under DDO codes PR 8112 and PR 4093. These were personnel who were receiving regular monthly salaries, but in reality many of them were not part of the police at all. The inquiry was initiated by a committee headed by the SSP Coordination, which included DSP Tauheed Khan, DSP Inamullah, Inspector Legal, and Pay Branch Officer Naveed, among others. When the committee began examining the records, layer after layer of deceit was uncovered, revealing that a well-organised network of fraud had been operating within Peshawar Police for years.

The first case uncovered was that of a constable named Akbar Khan. The real Akbar Khan, who had been dismissed in 2008 for absenteeism, was found to be drawing a salary again under a fake identity. He was fraudulently shown as recruited as a constable at the age of 55, and a bank account was opened in his name from which monthly salaries were regularly withdrawn. He personally received only Rs30,000, while the remaining amount was pocketed by a specific group. During the investigation, a man named Haji Shahid Ali emerged, who had served as an Assistant Pay Officer in the Pay Branch. According to the report, Shahid Ali himself was drawing salaries from two different accounts, one as a senior clerk and another as a constable. Bank records revealed that hundreds of thousands of rupees were transferred into his accounts, and by slightly altering CNIC numbers he managed to manipulate records to avoid detection.

Another case that surfaced was that of Muhammad Asif. He had been dismissed in 2014 for absenteeism and was now working as a labourer in Islamabad, but someone else was receiving a salary under his personal code. Bank statements showed that hundreds of thousands of rupees were transferred into an account opened in the name of a fictitious Asif Muhammad.

Similarly, a man named Muhammad Arsalan admitted that he was never recruited into the police. He confessed to paying a bribe to have his name added to the salary list. Shockingly, Arsalan received more than Rs900,000 without performing any duty and was later even appointed as a peon at AGPR.

The inquiry into Muhammad Ismail’s case revealed even more astonishing facts. Ismail stated that he was engaged in the prize bond business and had no connection to the police, but someone had used a copy of his CNIC to open a bank account listing him as a police employee. More than Rs1.5 million in salaries were withdrawn through that account. Ismail later admitted that he had paid a Rs300,000 bribe to obtain a paper recruitment in the police and never reported to any police station.

The case of Dawood Khan was equally alarming. He was recruited as an SPO in 2013 but was dismissed after a few months. However, salaries continued to be withdrawn in his name for years. Bank records showed transactions of over Rs8 million through a fake account.

The case of Rehan Ahmad stood as proof of the system’s complete failure. He portrayed himself as a computer operator at DSP Headquarters, but when police records were checked it was found that no belt number had ever been issued to him and no official appointment order existed. Despite that, he continued to draw regular salaries from a bank account, defrauding the public treasury under a completely fake identity.

Investigations revealed that Fahad Gul had never been recruited into the police. His father had paid money in an attempt to secure his recruitment, after which a fake account was opened in his name and salaries were withdrawn for several months.

Muhammad Bilal was an illiterate and unemployed man who never reported to any police station. His name was shown as a recruit, and he received Rs44,000 monthly. Later, his brother’s name was also added to the payroll by the same group.

Daniyal Ali was found to have been completely fraudulently recruited. He neither attended training nor performed any duty but continued to receive Rs48,000 monthly. Sudees Ali posed as a police employee, but his CNIC was altered to create a fake recruitment record. He never appeared in any inquiry, yet over Rs1.2 million was withdrawn in his name.

Hamd Ali stated that his family had moved to Peshawar due to local enmities, but no service file or appointment record existed for him. Salaries totaling Rs580,000 were issued under his name.

When the committee analysed the entire fraud, a dangerous modus operandi was uncovered. The personal numbers of dismissed employees were reused, false recruitments were shown under similar names, and fake signatures and documents were used to get salaries released from the AG office. In some cases, fake recruitment orders were prepared and new bank accounts were opened to divert public funds into private pockets.

Behind this entire forgery was an organised group involving officials from the Pay Branch, OASI, CRC, OB Branch, and some elements within the AG Office. Together, they siphoned off government funds for years without detection.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the committee recommended that all fake employees’ salaries be immediately stopped, illegally obtained funds be recovered, and criminal proceedings be initiated against all individuals involved in the conspiracy. It also suggested that a comprehensive digital verification system be introduced before any future recruitment, and that payroll and personnel records be linked to a central database to eliminate the possibility of such corruption in future.

The inquiry revealed that certain officials had abused their authority to establish a systematic network of fake recruitments that had been silently operating for years. When the inquiry team examined recruitment orders, service rolls, and signatures, serious irregularities and evidence of forgery were found. Fake signatures, bogus order book numbers, and incorrect dates indicated that entire records had been fabricated afterward.

After the investigation, the committee presented its recommendations, suggesting that an independent and impartial investigation committee be formed with no connection to the accused officers so that facts could be established transparently. It was also recommended that all service rolls, signatures, and recruitment orders undergo forensic examination to clearly distinguish genuine documents from fake ones. Witness protection was also advised, as some individuals reported intimidation and threats. The report emphasised that the inquiry process must remain fully transparent and that higher authorities and the public should be kept informed of its progress. Furthermore, if guilt is proved, strict legal action should be taken against those involved to set a clear precedent.

The report also stressed the need for systemic reforms, recommending that modern verification methods, online authentication systems, and external monitoring be made mandatory for all future recruitments.

In this regard, the police spokesperson told this correspondent that action on the inquiry is underway and investigations are ongoing. He said that those found responsible will be punished and the embezzled amount will be recovered and deposited back into the national treasury. He added that investigations take time, however, proceedings in the case are continuing.