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A hidden adversary

February 08, 2026
A model of Airbus A350-1000 jetliner is displayed at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, or Airshow China, in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, China, September 28, 2021.— Reuters
A model of Airbus A350-1000 jetliner is displayed at the China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, or Airshow China, in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, China, September 28, 2021.— Reuters

In October 2025, a JetBlue Airbus A320, flying from Cancun to Newark, experienced an inadvertent pitch-down, resulting in panic and injuries on board.

The crew regained control of the aircraft and made a safe emergency landing in Tampa, Florida. Initial investigations attributed the incident to a malfunction of the aircraft's ELAC flight computer software, which controls the primary flight controls (elevator and aileron surfaces). The incident occurred following a recent software update and was attributed to intense solar radiation that affected the flight control data.

Consequently, Airbus issued a major proactive recall for its A320 aircraft worldwide and implemented immediate remedial measures. The incident resulted in disrupting the Airbus flight operations around the globe. Almost two-thirds of A320 aircraft were grounded, affecting millions of passengers. Under Airbus's guidance, operators responded promptly and the issue was resolved.

Modern aviation software tools form the backbone of the aviation industry across flight planning, flight operations, maintenance, passenger handling and commercial activities. These systems ensure expeditious and safe operations, with reduced risk of error and greater efficiency. Such tools assume many of the routine operational tasks and emergency conditions. The systems can implement corrective measures even before operators begin monitoring a developing condition. The software ensures the critical task of routine monitoring and prompts the crew in the event of any impending situation.

Some modern systems can take control of the aircraft in the event of crew mishandling beyond the normal operational regime. While these tools enhance the system efficiency, a single malfunction can jeopardise the reliability, safety and resilience of the entire aviation network.

Unlike physical systems, the malfunction of software-based systems may be difficult to identify using traditional risk analysis mechanisms at the operator level. Such detections may remain unnoticed for extended periods and yield catastrophic consequences. A software fault isolation mechanism needs a comprehensive understanding of system design and specific maintenance protocols. While some predicted system misbehaviours may be addressed during the design phase, a few issues may go undetected until the system is in actual operation.

A specific mitigation approach must be identified and integrated into the system, from the concept to operations. The system must qualify against the predefined engineering objectives, prevailing industry standards, and the regulatory framework. It must also be evaluated for the envisaged operational environment and possible failures. A comprehensive design philosophy, along with a stringent design and evaluation process, is likely to prevent all operational failures before the system is deployed.

These systems are prone to failure despite precautionary measures; therefore, they require regular analysis and an update mechanism. During operations, the system must be continuously monitored, subjected to fault analysis, and modified as required. To ascertain the operational failures, the system must be regularly subjected to system integrity, updates, system limitations and regulatory compliance.

In addition, system understanding and training are key to optimal system utilisation. A sound training framework will enhance the operator’s confidence and enable optimal operational performance while identifying impending malfunctions. Operational personnel must be adequately trained and qualified for system maintenance and operations. The aircrew require rigorous training in system handling during flight. A simple input error may lead to system misbehaviour and catastrophic outcomes, jeopardising the safety of equipment and personnel and potentially degrading the mission.

System protection from malicious actors is another challenge, requiring greater attention. These actors may exploit system vulnerabilities, causing it to malfunction. Typically, malware, worms, service denial, phishing and bot attacks may be used for software attacks. Such elements can hack the software system both in the commercial and defence aviation sectors. The hackers may either deny the system data to the operator or present manipulated data (spoofing) to misguide the operator or the pilot.

Critical aircraft systems, datalinks, communication systems, networking tools, flight computers, and navigation data servers must be protected against intrusion. Hacking penalties may range from simple data loss to mission-operations degradation to loss or destruction of the system or platform, in extreme cases. Attacks on flight control systems, navigation data systems, flight computers and safety systems may result in even greater consequences. Regular updates, access control, data integrity checks and secure development modules are key tools for averting cyberattacks on aviation systems.

Aviation software systems are leading the global aviation industry today. These systems allow swift operations while ensuring safety in aviation. They are key components of the modern aviation ecosystem, ensuring safety in operational, maintenance and commercial activities.

Complex aviation systems necessitate the use of software tools in everyday operations. Latest aviation technologies, autonomous flight operations, artificial intelligence and software are major contributors to today's aviation. Despite all the limitations, the contemporary aviation system is heavily dependent on these technologies. Robust system designs, improved training, system updates and enhanced safety protocols are crucial for safer skies today and in the future.


The writer is a veteran PAF pilot, currently working as director of research, aviation and aerospace at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad.