Unfortunately, at a time when Pakistan should be closing ranks against terrorism, it is instead mired in accusation, defensiveness and institutional friction. The recent reports of a Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Ayeen-e-Pakistan (TTAP) delegation heading to Lahore for a street mobilisation drive, and the subsequent detentions and political uproar, show exactly this: the line between political agitation, militant exploitation and security breakdown is being dangerously blurred. The government’s assertion that diplomatic channels are active and contacts with Afghanistan are ongoing is welcome in principle. Islamabad is right to keep lines open with Kabul. But diplomacy without results offers little comfort to the families burying their dead. The consensus among domestic and international security assessments is clear: Afghan soil continues to be used by the TTP and allied groups to plan, train and launch attacks into Pakistan. Denials from Kabul have worn thin. There is little strategic value in maintaining ‘contacts’ if they do not translate into verifiable action against militant sanctuaries.
At home, the political response has been deeply troubling. The PTI’s rejection of allegations that it is not cooperating against terrorism in KP and its anger at being labelled as facilitators are understandable at a human level. No political party should be casually branded as complicit in terror. That is a serious charge and should be backed by evidence, not rhetoric. But there is a difference between rejecting unfair labelling and refusing to confront uncomfortable truths. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa accounts for the overwhelming share of terror incidents in the country. It is governed by the PTI. That makes counterterrorism not just a federal responsibility, but an inescapable provincial one. This is where the party’s current posture becomes problematic. The PTI is, rightly, furious about the way it is being persecuted. But victimhood does not absolve responsibility. The KP government and its chief minister cannot afford to treat governance as a secondary concern or counterterrorism as a political talking point. Running a province that is bleeding from militancy requires focus, clarity in naming the enemy and consistency in policy. Equally, the centre must resist the temptation to turn KP into a political battleground. Public sparring between institutions, thinly veiled accusations and media point-scoring may serve short-term narratives but they corrode trust and weaken the very coordination that counterterrorism depends on. Terrorism is not a PML-N problem, a PTI problem or an establishment problem. It is a Pakistani problem. The idea that any one stakeholder can handle it alone is a dangerous illusion. And let’s not forget another thing: political bickering only distracts from the core issue: a resurgent militant threat that is exploiting institutional discord and political fragmentation. Pakistan has been here before. The years of confusion over ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban all fed into the monster that now stalks KP and beyond. The state has, belatedly, acknowledged those mistakes. But learning the right lessons also means avoiding new ones. One of those lessons is that counterterrorism cannot be outsourced to the military alone. Nor can it be managed through press conferences and blame games. It requires political ownership, administrative capacity and sustained coordination between the federation and the provinces.
The KP government needs to step up – not in slogans, but in action. Policing reforms, intelligence coordination, protection of vulnerable communities, disruption of financing and recruitment networks, and a clear public narrative that leaves no room for militant apologism are all essential. At the same time, the federal government must engage the province as a partner, not a rival. Above all, political stakeholders across the spectrum need to recognise that terrorism is the one issue on which differences must be set aside. Pakistan’s politics is polarised enough. Adding counterterrorism to the list of partisan battlegrounds is reckless. The country has paid too high a price in blood to allow ego, grievance and point-scoring to dictate security policy. This does not mean silencing debate. The people of KP, in particular, have earned the right to ask hard questions about past strategies and future plans. But debate must be grounded in honesty, not denial. If the centre and KP continue to pull in opposite directions, if political parties continue to treat security as a narrative weapon, and if institutional distrust continues to deepen, the only winners will be those who want to see the state bleed.
