The universal truth that you cannot choose your neighbours represents an immutable reality for Pakistan and Afghanistan, two countries bound historically, linguistically, and culturally. Yet shared geography cannot become an excuse for Islamabad to tolerate Kabul’s unfulfilled commitments, allowing India to foment unrest within Pakistan through terrorism by using its soil.
Afghanistan does not realise that it is a pawn in India’s strategy guided by the Indian strategist Chanakya’s maxim of befriending an enemy’s neighbour and exploiting them to their advantage.
Acting on India’s behalf by supporting and providing sanctuaries to Fitna al-Khawarij and Fitna al-Hindustan has not done Afghanistan any favours, as neither its sovereignty nor its regional standing has been strengthened. Afghanistan and India also cannot establish a robust relationship due to their divergent ideologies and values. Kabul’s behaviour, working against Islamabad’s interests, strikingly contrasts with Pakistan’s historical approach of strategic restraint and accommodation, exemplified by hosting millions of Afghan refugees, facilitating trade and transit and providing humanitarian and developmental aid.
Exasperated by the Taliban’s hollow reassurances that Afghan territory is not used for terrorism against any country and after exhausting incentives and economic pressure with no tangible results, Pakistan’s patience reached its limit. In the aftermath, a ceasefire was agreed upon through mediation by Turkiye and Qatar. However, the negotiating process laid bare the Afghan Taliban’s capriciousness and intransigence as they consistently hesitated to take verifiable action against militant safe havens, despite Pakistan presenting photographic and documentary evidence.
Even though relations between Pakistan and its western neighbour have soured, Islamabad is repeatedly invested in reducing tensions through dialogue. The Afghan Taliban rejected dialogue in mid-December 2025, when Tehran hosted regional envoys to discuss developments in Afghanistan. This is another demonstration of the Afghan Taliban’s unmet reciprocity, contrary to Pakistan’s eagerness for brotherly relations sans the terrorist bonhomie. Such prudence is essential for regional stability, as the net effect of these strained relations will be economic instability, discouraging investment and disrupting trade corridors. The repercussions will be felt by both states, but more severely by Afghanistan, which is already confronted with severe multidimensional poverty.
Distress and lost livelihood will increase manifold after Taliban’s First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar, issued a strongly-worded directive against maintaining trading relationships with Pakistan in mid-November 2025. It should be noted that alternatives, such as Iranian trade routes, warrant consideration of their feasibility. Tehran will not tolerate the Taliban’s present attitude, as Iran has nothing to gain from such engagement. This contrasts with Pakistan, where established trade corridors and CPEC offer tangible economic and connectivity dividends.
It should not be forgotten that Pakistan has paid, and is still paying, a steep price for helping Afghanistan. The decades of conflict have had a spillover effect in Pakistan as illicit and informal economies became further entrenched, and unbridled smuggling, pernicious Kalashnikov culture and proliferation of drug usage distorted social norms.
Pakistan has always demonstrated restraint in its engagement with Afghanistan. It was the first time Pakistan adopted a stern approach towards Kabul, making clear that concrete corrective actions are required to normalise bilateral relations, rather than following India’s playbook dictated by Chanakya. It is high time that the Afghan Taliban understand that the suspension of trade by Pakistan is not a temporary pressure tactic but a measure likely to endure – unless Afghanistan puts its own house in order, provides Pakistan with the assurances it rightfully demands, and shows tangible progress on Pakistan’s security concerns.
The writer is the president of the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore. He can be reached at: [email protected]
