‘If we don’t figure out a way to fight far more cheaply, we won’t be able to afford to win a single battle.’ This warning from Peter W Singer, an American strategist, reflects a reality that the arithmetic of warfare has inverted.
The economic equation of conflict has changed so rapidly that a $500 drone can now target billion-dollar assets of state-of-the-art militaries. Meanwhile, the cost of counter-drone technology has risen to an absurd level. This cost curve has become the greatest vulnerability and a critical weakness for major powers. Consequently, states are engaging in a race not only to build cheaper, expendable drones but also to develop affordable counter-drone capabilities, because the economic cost of the conflict is now as decisive as the firepower itself.
States, worldwide, are revamping their operational framework, producing and acquiring advanced and AI-enabled drone fleets for surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance, strike and swarming missions. Russia and Ukraine produce approximately four million drones annually through local manufacturing facilities. Simultaneously, China is emerging as a drone manufacturing base, producing approximately 12 million Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) per year.
On the other hand, the US, which has historically relied on sophisticated and expensive platforms, produces only 100,000 drones annually. However, it plans to address this gap by increasing its annual production to one million by 2028. This evident surge in production introduces new challenges, including the risk that UAVs could destroy high-value assets.
Operation Spider Web, launched by Ukraine against Russia, is a clear manifestation of how inexpensive unmanned drones with a first-person view can be weaponised to hit strategic nerve centres. In the operation, Ukraine destroyed Moscow’s $7 billion defence-related assets, including early warning and control aircraft and strategic bombers, damaging Russia’s second-strike capability. The disruption and destruction of Russia’s top-tier defence systems by adapting low-cost drones boosted Ukraine’s warfighting potential.
Meanwhile, Iran’s Shahed 131 and Shahed-136 have proven effective to the extent that the US has reverse-engineered them. Recently, Tehran announced its inexpensive, radar-evading, jet-powered Hadid-110 suicide drones, which can travel at 510 km/h, prompting other states to invest in such technologies. Apart from that, the low-cost drones also enabled weaker entities like Hamas and Hezbollah to bypass advanced Israeli air defences. By incorporating cheaper, more adaptable battlefield frameworks, UAVs can counter the technological advantage of highly sophisticated militaries.
Yet, the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems has prompted states to develop anti-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities. Ironically, many countries, including the US, continued to rely on expensive platforms to counter aerial threats. However, this approach is strategically flawed, unsustainable, and ineffective, as spending billions on missiles and interceptors to counter unmanned aircraft is counterproductive. In the contemporary era, battlefield victories depend not only on superior weapon systems but also on how effectively pervasive aerial threats are neutralised through affordable tactics.
By internalising this strategic reality, the US and the UK have launched Project Flytrap in Germany, highlighting a transformation in Nato's counter-drone posture. In this exercise, a flexible layered counter-drone network was created by using both Nato and non-Nato technologies. Wingman detection systems and portable jammers were employed to detect and disrupt incoming projectiles at the front lines.
US soldiers tested advanced and innovative ways to counter drones. For instance, net shooting, hunter drones, 0.50 calibre machine guns and modified 5.56 rifles have been presented as cheaper and faster options to shoot drones. The US Army accepted that they are shifting towards more affordable and efficient tactics, from shooting $4 million missiles at $20,000 drones.’
Globally, states are moving towards acquiring layered and responsive air defence systems, considering the proliferation of low-cost drones. Israel, for instance, has developed 100 KW combat laser system, called laser beam, at a fraction of the cost. Israeli defence officials claim that this system can intercept rockets, mortars and other aerial threats with high precision and reliability by spending only a few cents of electricity. What further distinguishes this system is its ability to intercept low-flying aircraft and UAVs, an area of vulnerability for traditional radar-guided interceptors.
The UK's deployment of the Dragon Fire laser demonstrates this cost calculus. This Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) is capable of hitting the target at a cost of GBP10 per shot. London has also recently tested a DEW that disables enemy drones using radio frequencies. These cost-effective and advanced drone neutralisation systems are bringing a paradigm shift in the overall economics of warfare.
The drone revolution offers profound strategic lessons. Border security and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) can be enhanced through the development of cheaper and expendable drones. Nevertheless, the large-scale production of UAVs alone is insufficient. States should strategically invest in adaptive battlefield architectures by producing low-cost anti-UAS systems, such as laser weapons, electronic jammers and radio frequency DEWs, to achieve tactical superiority at a substantially lower cost.
Ultimately, drone and counter-drone technologies are altering the economic calculus of warfare. In future wars, victories will be achieved not by deploying expensive platforms but through inexpensive defence and offence at the operational level. Adaptability and affordability are not only pertinent elements but the ultimate weapons in modern warfare.
The writer is a research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. She can be reached at: [email protected]
