The year 2025 was not just another year for Pakistan. It was a year in which the country, in several unprecedented ways, made its mark on the regional and global stage – signalling its emergence as a consequential middle power in matters of security, diplomacy and strategic relevance.
As the year closes, the more important question is not whether Pakistan can manage the pressures it faces, but whether it is prepared to convert the opportunity created by this moment in the sun into a lasting and permanent national advantage.
Globally, and within Pakistan as well, familiar templates around power, governance, political control, policy durability, growth models, alliances, trade and security are dissolving. Volatility and disruption dominate the context in which states must now operate.
Within this global flux, Pakistan’s most pressing challenge today is no longer primarily external pressure or geopolitical constraint. Post-May 2025 developments amply demonstrated Pakistan’s calibre on the security and diplomatic fronts. The challenge now is internal capacity: how the state manages itself: how decisions are made, how political competition is conducted, how commitments are honoured and how professionalism and constitutionalism are valued as national assets.
There is growing recognition, both within official and unofficial circles, that Pakistan is no longer frozen in inertia. Across sectors, signs of a different story are struggling to emerge: one of resilience, recalibration and latent competence. The heightened debate across professional and academic platforms reflects this shift. Yet potential, without disciplined execution and coherent frameworks, remains only potential.
The decisive question, therefore, is whether Pakistan can finally align its ambitions with the standards of professional management, political maturity and institutional restraint demanded by the contemporary world.
The global order itself is fragmenting. Power today flows less through rigid ideological blocs and more through networks of trade, technology, energy, supply chains, finance, data and narrative influence. Multi-alignment has become the dominant mode of statecraft. In this reordered world, Pakistan – located at the intersection of economic corridors, energy routes, mineral supply chains, climate vulnerability and nuclear responsibility – retains strategic geographic advantage, provided that advantage is not burdened by weak institutions, erratic policy or broken commitments.
Pakistan’s external engagement increasingly reflects this reality of multi-alignment. While the architecture of its relationship with China has produced multi-sectoral structural ties, Pakistan pursues a policy of strategic hedging. Not a camp follower, it has relations with China, Russia, the US, GCC states, Turkey, Iran and Central Asia, and these relations are rarely framed as binary choices; rather, they are overlapping engagements. Even where disputes persist, Pakistan’s diplomacy has often shown restraint, opting for creative bridge-building, coherence and strategic calculation.
For decades, Pakistan’s national story – shaped by trauma, tragedies, conflict, conditionalities, polarising national-subnational narratives and perpetual crisis management – has dominated its trajectory. While some recalibration is underway, a mature governance system capable of translating opportunity into sustained performance has yet to fully emerge.
Pakistan does not suffer from a shortage of ideas, talent or ambition. It suffers from an inability to insulate institutions from political interference, patronage networks and short-term power calculations. This deficit cuts across sectors – investment, aviation, energy, infrastructure, regulation and technology.
The proposed privatisation of PIA is not merely a commercial transaction but an institutional admission. Critics rightly note that some of the world’s finest airlines are government-owned. The obvious question follows: if other states can run world-class public enterprises, why can’t Pakistan? The answer lies in governance. Those states protect professional management from political intrusion. Pakistan has not. Privatisation, therefore, is not ideological; it is corrective.
Pakistan’s management deficit extends well beyond aviation, nowhere more starkly than in the energy sector. Repeated reversals in solar and renewable energy policies – signals issued, withdrawn, revised and reversed – have damaged confidence. The handling of IPPs exposed a deeper governance failure: erosion of trust in sovereign commitments. While disputes and even arbitration can sometimes be unavoidable, Pakistan’s primary responsibility is to ensure that contracts are competently drafted at the outset – protecting national interests, anticipating contingencies and minimising the need for disruptive post-hoc reviews. Investors may raise concerns or slow execution, but a state that negotiates professionally, honours its commitments and manages disputes predictably preserves both credibility and leverage. This is not a partisan issue; it is a test of state capacity.
In a world where capital is mobile and competition relentless, credibility is decisive. States that are unable to guarantee continuity, predictability and professional decision-making are quietly bypassed, regardless of their potential.
This governance failure is particularly tragic given Pakistan’s human capital. Pakistani professionals excel globally across technology, medicine, engineering, finance, academia and entrepreneurship. The youth population is large, digitally aware, energetic and ambitious. But talent alone does not transform nations; ecosystems do.
Pakistan has begun attracting prominent global names in artificial intelligence, fintech and emerging technologies – an encouraging development. Yet without regulatory clarity, policy stability, digital infrastructure, legal protection and professional regulation, talent cannot fully realise its potential. The same applies to cryptocurrency and digital finance: engagement without ecosystem design leads to fragmentation and speculation. Serious innovation requires institutional seriousness.
Pakistan, however, has some impressive success stories too. Several sectors demonstrate what is possible when professionalism is protected. The surgical instruments industry, sports goods manufacturing, defence production, selective aerospace exports and ordnance systems show that when institutions are insulated from patronage and allowed to operate on commercial and professional logic, Pakistan competes globally. Multi-million- and billion-dollar contracts are being executed successfully, often amid intense international competition. The lesson is clear: Pakistan does not lack capability; capability flourishes where governance allows it to.
In Pakistan’s post–May 2025 environment, where its security, diplomatic and defence-export relevance has visibly expanded, good governance becomes the decisive determinant of internal resilience and reconciliation and the foundation of trust required for durable external partnerships.
No discussion of governance can avoid the political question. Political competition and political difference are natural in any society. The problem lies in the absence of a stable, sustained constitutional framework that enables fair political competition. Over decades, political managers and some political actors have chosen to operate outside constitutional boundaries – selecting favourites, accepting favouritism, and, inevitably, falling out and being discarded. Consensus against this practice remains weak, constrained by immediate political interests. Meanwhile, contestation over democratic deficits persists. This contradiction has hollowed institutions, weakened legitimacy and normalised instability.
Revisiting past grievances will not rescue Pakistan. But all stakeholders must recognise a basic truth: without political reconciliation and constitutional adherence, instability – and potentially destructive discontent – will persist. Today’s environment compounds this risk. Information flows are uncontrollable; lethal weapons proliferate; cyber tools are widely accessible; hate and hero narratives can rapidly hijack public emotion; and a discontented citizenry in an age of rising expectations can be mobilised constructively – or destructively. Authority has limits. Stability cannot be coerced indefinitely; it must be consented to.
Pakistan has spoken of ‘course correction’ for nearly two decades. Partial steps notwithstanding, what is now required is disciplined execution: governance as enabler rather than controller; policy as commitment to implementation rather than announcement; institutions shielded from patronage; political competition firmly contained within constitutional boundaries; accountability without vendetta; continuity without disruption. Above all, trust between citizens and institutions must be rebuilt – the most valuable capital of all.
Pakistan’s national aspirations demand merit-based institutional expression and stakeholder convergence. Since May 2025, Pakistan’s regional and global profile has sharpened across security, diplomacy and defence engagement. This expanded external footprint places a premium on good governance – not as an abstract ideal, but as an indispensable strategic foundation for internal well-being and the credibility required for sustained engagement across trade, joint ventures and diplomatic partnerships.
Clearly, for 2026 Pakistan’s deliverables on the regional and global stage must be to convey to the world, with greater clarity and competence and through action, that it can match its widening global engagements with demonstrable capacity in domains central to human security: technology, climate resilience, energy, economic transformation, agriculture, connectivity and security.
This alone can secure for Pakistan the durable standing it seeks.
The writer is a senior journalist. She tweets at @nasimzehra and can be reached at: [email protected]
