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SC rules remand is a judicial tool, not a routine

November 13, 2025
An outside view of the Supreme Courts building. — Supreme Court/File
An outside view of the Supreme Court's building. — Supreme Court/File

ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court has ruled that remand is not an automatic judicial reflex but an instrument to be employed only when justice demands it, not as a matter of routine.

A two-member bench of the apex court, comprising Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, issued this ruling while deciding appeals filed by the Ministry of Railways and Finance Division against a Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore, order dated October 26, 2022.

The court accepted the appeals and set aside the Tribunal’s order, which had granted the benefit of advanced increments to the respondents under a 1966 scheme. In a five-page judgment authored by Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, the court stated, “A case may properly be remanded to a lower forum where material facts remain undetermined, procedural fairness has been compromised, or essential evidence has not been duly examined.” The court held that the purpose of remand is corrective, not dilatory; it serves to secure a just adjudication, not to prolong litigation.

In the underlying case, the Federal Service Tribunal in Lahore had granted the relief of two advanced increments under the 1966 Scheme to the respondent, Tariq Mansoor, an Accounts Officer in the Audit Department of Pakistan Railways. This was for enhancing his qualifications by obtaining an LLB degree in 1992. He had approached the Tribunal after his department rejected his application on the grounds that the 1966 Scheme was abolished on December 1, 2001.

The Supreme Court’s judgment noted, “We find that no benefit under the Scheme, 1966 has been extended to officers of the Audit Department, and that an LLB qualification is not recognised under the General Scheme, 1996.” It added that the respondent’s case did not fall within the scope of either scheme. “The benefit extended by the Tribunal under the Scheme, 1966 is thus unsustainable and stands set aside,” the court declared.

The court observed that while the respondent had made an alternate plea under the General Scheme of 1996, the Tribunal did not address it. The court considered remanding the matter for this purpose but decided against it.

“However, since the record before us is complete and enables us to finally determine the issue, there is no occasion to remand the case,” the judgment stated.

The court noted the submissions of the learned Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, who argued that the respondent, as an Accounts Officer in the Audit Department, was not entitled to any incentive under the 1966 Scheme. The law officer referred to the scheme to demonstrate that while it extended benefits to various departments of Pakistan Railways, the Audit Department was not included.

Similarly, the respondent’s counsel argued that several Tribunal judgments and letters from Pakistan Railways and the Finance Division had extended similar benefits to officers with LLB degrees. However, the court found that these references related to departments already covered under the 1966 Scheme and none pertained to an Accounts Officer in the Audit Department. Regarding the General Scheme of 1996, the judgment stated, “It was submitted that the said scheme requires a person to possess an M.A. or M.Sc. degree to qualify for two advance increments. As the respondent’s qualification is LLB, he does not fall within its ambit.”

The court held that when a scheme or departmental policy does not expressly provide for a particular benefit, it is not the court’s function to read that benefit into the scheme. “Doing so would amount to judicial legislation and would erode the institutional autonomy that underpins administrative efficacy,” the judgment said.

“Accordingly, we see no reason to remand the matter to the Tribunal and hold that the respondent is not entitled to advance increments under either of the Schemes,” the judgment concluded.