From Jammu & Kashmir to water disputes, Sir Creek, Siachen, and other flashpoints, India-Pakistan relations have remained fraught with unresolved issues since August 1947. Under the Modi regime, tensions deepened with New Delhi's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and the passage of the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act on August 5, 2019. Through this Act, the Indian Parliament absorbed J&K into the Indian Union by creating the union territories of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir. Decades of hostility-marked by wars in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999-have been compounded by recent crises such as Uri and Balakot in 2019 and Pahalgam in April 2025, underscoring the fragility of bilateral ties. India's role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, persistent terrorism allegations, suspended trade, severed transport links, and downgraded diplomatic missions since 2019 paint a picture of a relationship in steady and sustained decline.
In the immediate aftermath of partition, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah expressed hope that the bitterness caused by partition's bloodshed would be temporary, envisioning peaceful coexistence akin to Canada-U.S. relations. Until 1965, trade and travel between the two nations were relatively normal. However, the September 1965 war marked a turning point, partially repaired by the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966. The 1971 war again derailed ties, but the Simla Agreement restored a degree of normalisation. Relative stability persisted until the 1999 Kargil conflict, after which relations entered a prolonged period of distrust.
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960-once the lone example of functional cooperation-survived decades of tension until its suspension in April 2025. Perhaps the most stable period post-1971 was during President General Zia-ul-Haq's tenure, when travel, consular operations, and people-to-people exchanges were largely unrestricted. This changed with the outbreak of violence in Indian-occupied J&K in 1990, followed by crises including the Kargil episode, the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and incidents in Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam (2025). Accusations of Indian involvement in Balochistan unrest, the revocation of Article 370, and the Indus Waters Treaty suspension have since eroded the last vestiges of trust.
The deterioration of ties can be examined through three lenses.
First, the Modi government's rigid stance that no dialogue is possible until Pakistan addresses terrorism has closed diplomatic space. Islamabad rejects these allegations and accuses India of sponsoring terrorism inside Pakistan. Following the 2016 Uri attack, Modi, alongside Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, boycotted the SAARC summit in Islamabad, vowing to isolate Pakistan. India's Defence Minister Rajnath Singh went so far as to declare that India would annex Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Modi's electoral victories in 2014, 2019, and 2024 have been accompanied by rising Hindutva-driven rhetoric and anti-Pakistan sentiment for domestic political mobilisation. While India positions itself as the world's fifth-largest economy-projected to be third by 2027—with the fourth-largest military and over $700 billion in foreign reserves, its persistent hostility toward Pakistan risks undermining regional stability essential for sustained growth. India could draw lessons from China's post-1979 approach of pursuing economic expansion alongside stable neighbourly relations.
Second, India's narrative that Pakistan alone is responsible for strained ties is historically incomplete. From partition's outset, New Delhi withheld Pakistan's share of assets until Mahatma Gandhi's hunger strike forced payment. It reneged on a commitment to a UN-supervised plebiscite in J&K and cut off water supplies until the Indus Waters Treaty was signed. In January 1971, India used the hijacking of the Ganga aircraft as a pretext to ban Pakistani overflights, severing East-West Pakistan air links. More recently, the revocation of J&K's special status and the unilateral suspension of the Indus Treaty continue this pattern of unilateral action.
A mutually hurting stalemate benefits neither side. Prolonged deadlock entrenches hardliners, reduces trade opportunities, and increases the risk of military miscalculation. The absence of dialogue has allowed mistrust to harden into structural hostility.
Finally, both sides should draw lessons from past successes and failures. The Liaquat-Nehru Pact, the Indus Waters Treaty, the Tashkent Declaration, the Simla Agreement, the Salal Dam Accord, and multiple military and non-military confidence-building measures-including nuclear non-attack pledges, hotlines, and advance troop movement notifications-prove that cooperation is possible even in adversarial conditions. The 1999 Lahore Declaration, though short-lived, demonstrated that top-level engagement can reduce tensions.
The setbacks are numerous, but the path forward is not closed. Political will, determination, and a win-win mindset-supported by Track 1 (official), Track 2 (unofficial), and Track 3 (people-to-people) diplomacy-could help rebuild a minimum level of trust. Both countries must acknowledge that peace is not a concession but a strategic necessity in a region facing shared challenges: climate change, water scarcity, economic pressures, and the need for regional connectivity.
For now, India-Pakistan relations stand at their lowest point in decades, with diplomatic, economic, and social ties severed. Whether the next decade repeats the hostility of the past or opens space for pragmatic engagement will depend on the political leadership's ability to look beyond short-term electoral gains toward long-term regional stability.
—The writer is Meritorious Professor of International Relations and former Dean Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Karachi. He can reached at: [email protected]).
