The regime change gambit

The US has had an irresistible predilection for regime change in ‘rogue states’. Regimes in Iraq, Libya and Syria were toppled through direct or indirect military intervention. Only recently, American troops barged into the residence of Venezuelan President Maduro and flew him to New York, where he’s on trial. And now Iran is getting a taste of Washington’s stupendous firepower.

The idea of regime change in Iran predated the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In 1953, Mohammad Mossadegh was Iran’s prime minister serving under Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was no more than a titular head, much like the English monarch. Mossadegh’s decision to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the first company to explore petroleum in Iran, struck at British interests in the country. London responded with an oil embargo and other sanctions on Iran. The sanctions hit the Iranian economy hard and increased the West’s fear that an oil-rich, unstable Iran may encourage Soviet intervention. Iran, it may be recalled, shared borders with two Soviet republics, namely Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

Washington’s answer to the likely Soviet intervention was regime change in Iran: forcing Mossadegh to step down and shoring up the Shah’s powers. The mission was accomplished through political manipulations rather than military strikes. The presence of an alternative leader in Iran, the Shah, who represented one of the world’s oldest monarchies, made the CIA’s job easier.

Post-revolution Iran has also seen US covert attempts at regime change, notably when George Bush Junior was at the helm (2001-2009). Though in his first term, Donald Trump pulled the US out of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, he categorically stated that, unlike his predecessors, he was against regime change or national ‘reconstruction’ anywhere in the world. But in his second term, Trump has confronted Iran far more clandestinely than any of his predecessors did.

Last year in July, the US seriously diminished, if not annihilated, Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability, while Israel did much damage to the country’s air defences. Earlier, Israel eliminated the leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah, which the West regards as Tehran’s proxies. Meanwhile, the Iranian people continued reeling under the menacing Western sanctions, making the clergy-led government’s authoritarian rule even harder to put up with. In December and January, Iran saw the most widespread protests against the government since the revolution began.

Although the Iranian government put down the protests, many saw in the nationwide public outcry an unprecedented opportunity to pull down the regime if sufficient pressure was exerted from outside. The targeting of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader and the most potent living symbol of the Islamic revolution, was based on the premise that his death would either encourage the frustrated people to take to the streets in tens of thousands and pull the regime down, or his successor would be forced to negotiate peace with Washington on the latter’s terms. That’s the reason the US-Israeli strikes on Iran didn’t come to a halt after Khamenei’s assassination.

The first part of the premise didn’t turn out to be correct and the second remains an open question. At any rate, there are arguments both for and against the likelihood of regime change in Iran. The pro-regime-change argument rests on the poor state of the Iranian economy, particularly the indicator that hits people hardest: inflation. Over the last five years, average consumer price inflation has exceeded 40 per cent, mainly due to international sanctions and a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency. In terms of one American dollar, the Iranian riyal depreciated from 0.82 million at the start of 2025 to 1.47 million towards the close of the year by 80 per cent.

International sanctions are the single largest contributor to Iran’s ever-dwindling economic indicators, making its political system vulnerable to shocks.

The other, and related, pro-regime argument is rooted in Iran’s demographics. Like Pakistan, Iran is one of the youngest nations demographically, with some 60 per cent of Iranians being under the age of 29. The youth unemployment rate is close to 25 per cent. As the Islamic republic is 47 years old, the young generation doesn’t feel ideologically or emotionally connected with the revolution. As elsewhere, the youth want political and social openness and a government that caters to their needs – jobs and a better standard of living. The regime has faltered on both accounts.

On balance, a multiethnic society is more liable to political upheavals than a homogenous one. Iran is a multiethnic society. Persians are the largest ethnic group (61 per cent) followed by Azeris (16 per cent) and Kurds (10 per cent). However, Iran hasn’t seen any popular ethnic movement, at least not in recent years. The late Khamenei was ethnically an Azeri, which shows that high offices aren’t the monopoly of the majority Persians.

As for the Kurds, they are clustered mainly in western Iran, which borders Turkey and Iraq. The Trump administration has been trying to encourage Iranian Kurds to raise arms against the government with the help of the Kurds in northern Iraq. On no account can the Kurds topple the Iranian regime, though they can divert its military resources and thus serve Washington’s interests. A Kurdish state in Iran will not be acceptable to any of Iran’s neighbours, particularly Turkiye.

If in Washington’s book regime change means simply a change of leadership in Iran, this has already been done, as it has earlier in Venezuela. However, if the regime change means a counterrevolution in Iran, the goal isn’t likely to be achieved anytime soon. Yes, the late Khamenei, as the Rahbar or Supreme Leader, presided over Iran’s political system. Yet, unlike his predecessor Khomeini, he did so not because of his personality but because of his constitutional position.

The Iranian constitution makes the Rahbar the guardian of the revolution and the arbiter of last resort in the event of a conflict among national institutions. He sets national policy direction and declares war and peace as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Khamenei’s successor inherits his authority, though he will take time to settle. Below the supreme leader are other powerful constitutional institutions, such as the Guardian Council (the apex constitutional court of Iran), the Assembly of Experts (which appoints and deposes the Rahbar) and the Expediency Council (an advisory body to the Rahbar). Then there are the Revolutionary Guards, the elite corps of Iran’s armed forces. These four institutions together constitute much of the Iranian establishment. People come and go, but the institutions survive.

The Iranian government or establishment may have lost its popular appeal long ago but pulling it down from within will require a nationwide, sustained movement, which is too strong to be quelled. That happened when the Shah was deposed in 1979. The opposition to the current regime lacks a leader who can be a rallying cry for the people.

Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of the late Shah and his crown prince, who styles himself as the saviour of the people, is least suited to play that role. Living in exile in the US, he has no contribution to contemporary Iran, except for calling for protests against the current regime from time to time. Trump has already expressed his lack of confidence in his ability to lead Iran should the Islamic regime fall apart.

Regime change in Iran, in the full sense of the phrase, thus looks highly unlikely.

The writer is an Islamabad-based columnist. He tweets/posts @hussainhzaidi and can be reached at: [email protected]