The subject of the US-Pakistan relationship is inexhaustible. It is perhaps the most talked-about, but arguably the least understood, relationship. We keep writing about it and finding new meanings. I, for one, am still learning.
This article is not a history of the relationship, a review of its current state or a look into the future. It is a series of personal observations on how the two governments have conducted the relationship, explained it to the public and how the public perceived it in the past. This is certainly not the last word on the subject. Just one person’s observations, for what they are worth.
Pakistan has remained relevant, if not important, to US interests in South Asia for one reason or another ever since the two countries began their on-again, off-again alliance in the early fifties. The alliance provided Pakistan with invaluable help in its early years to stabilise, build a platform for economic development, and strengthen its defence capability. But this was the last time the US really helped Pakistan.
In subsequent decades, Washington engaged primarily with the government, which happened to be military or military-dominated. And the relationship was war-related. While the ruling establishment benefited, Pakistan’s gain was doubtful. Arguably, the country lost more than it gained from the American connection, even though it involved significant economic aid and security assistance. America’s failing wars always leave behind consequences for its partners which no amount of aid can compensate.
One reason the relationship challenges average understanding is American domestic politics. If the US had pursued such an extraordinary aid relationship with Pakistan from time to time, where it saw no lasting economic or strategic interests, then more than a critical foreign policy issue was at play. The specific task given to Pakistan was important not only strategically but also politically, especially during the 80s Afghan war, the post 9/11 Afghanistan war and the ‘war on terror’.
Domestic politics always weighs heavily on wars. This has been especially true in America, where wars have always had many stakeholders and served many interests. The poorly informed general public, which influenced electoral politics, looked for victory in the wars and the allies’ submission to US demands and interests, even at the cost of their own national interest.
Because of all that, Pakistan, which was an important partner in these wars, came to be handled by the successive administrations in the US through a relationship that was far out of proportion to the country’s normal importance. Given the nature of the relationship, focusing largely on military intelligence cooperation and its importance to American electoral politics, the White House drove it, aided by the Pentagon and the CIA.
So the relationship had an underworld the two sides could not discuss openly. You could talk about the differences but not the cooperation, at least not the full extent of it. Ironically, America’s failure often made even valuable cooperation from an ally inconsequential. The same calculus applied on the Pakistan side, where even valuable help from Washington was often inconsequential because of the country’s poor governance. So the public in both countries focused only on the negatives. This was another reason why the relationship was not fully understood.
The relationship operated at several levels, and it has been riddled with contradictions. It was not a strategic relationship, but ironically, it was never truly transactional either. It was transactional, but it dealt with strategic issues, some of which were contentious. The two countries’ interests did not always coincide. Pakistan’s own poor policy choices, especially the support for the Taliban, also contributed to its misfortunes. Pakistan cannot only blame Washington.
Pakistan, however, became addicted to US economic support and strategic patronage, and the relationship became a birthmark of its foreign policy. Islamabad convinced itself that, given its geopolitical location, it was of fixed, unchanging importance to Washington. Pakistan wanted a strategic relationship, but with no strategic reason for a long-term commitment to Pakistan, the US could not stay in the relationship for long and exited as soon as its needs were met.
Washington needed Islamabad’s cooperation in the short term to serve its critical security and strategic interests, while Pakistan needed long-term US support. Not only that, their policies, perceptions and interests contradicted each other, as did their relations with other countries. Neither side understood this dilemma; their needs were only partially met and their expectations largely unfulfilled, setting them up for disappointment and cries of betrayal.
Other contradictions also marked the relationship. In Pakistan, successive governments made the relationship with the US part of Pakistan’s organising idea, giving Washington the impression that the country, especially its political leadership, could not survive without American help. And in times of dire need, Washington overindulged Pakistan, which left a lingering feeling among the establishment that the US cannot walk away from Pakistan.
The US did not share Pakistan’s expectations for the relationship and did not want to commit to it long term, especially against India. But through hyperbole, a hallmark of US public policy, and agreements that offered vague commitments, Washington kept Pakistan under the illusion of a strategic alliance, because it did not want to lose its support.
In time, Pakistan discovered the reality. Pakistan too misrepresented its policies to satisfy Washington, as it did not want to lose American support. The truth is, neither side was honest with the other.
The Pakistan government, especially a military one, had to remain mindful not to go entirely against public sentiment. It tried to maintain a careful balance between meeting US demands and accommodating public pressure. But Washington kept upsetting that balance by demanding more from Pakistan. As the government got squeezed between America’s demand to do more and public pressure to do less, it sometimes ended up supporting the US with half-hearted, weak policies that satisfied neither Washington nor the Pakistani public. This contributed to the tensions in the relationship.
As for the future: it has been a need-based relationship in which Pakistan qualified for both positive and negative reasons, and as its previous highs and lows show, you never know when that need will arise. If the past is any guide, this need will arise. Pakistan, a populous country and a nuclear power, occupies an important geo-strategic position between the Subcontinent, Iran, Arabia, Central Asia, Russia and China. It has a professional military and an acclaimed diplomatic history.
The US wants to limit China’s political and economic influence in Pakistan, and it also wants Islamabad not to undermine India’s place in its South Asia strategy. Pakistan is also relevant to Afghanistan’s stability, which affects broader regional security, including Pakistan’s. There is also a direct US interest in Pakistan, focused on its economic vulnerabilities, potential for political instability, and the threat of extremism and regional insurgency to internal security, from which emerges America’s ultimate concern about the safety of its nuclear assets.
And then there is the counterterrorism factor. Here, Pakistan is seen in many different roles: partner, target or victim. Washington needs Islamabad’s cooperation to act against the transnational terrorists who endanger the US and global security. It would also like Islamabad to deal with any militant threat against India and Pakistan’s own stability. Washington is willing to help where possible.
Lastly, one may mention the developing US-Pakistan economic cooperation, principally in energy, IT and agriculture, and critical minerals. Pakistan has attracted significant attention because of its critical minerals. Investment sentiment remains cautiously hopeful. The US remains the top destination for Pakistan’s exports.
Pakistan’s rising military capability and diplomatic profile, changes in the Middle East and the renewal of Pakistan-US ties have together opened opportunities for strategic diversification and boosted Pakistan’s regional influence. This gives Islamabad an opportunity to expand, maximise and prioritise its external alignments.
Bottom line: it is a necessary relationship, but Pakistan should not overcommit itself to it. A strategic relationship with the US is neither possible nor desirable. And Pakistan should not try to seek it. Pakistan should aim for a sustainable working relationship with the US based on realistic expectations. It is in both countries’ interest.
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor at Georgetown University.
