The US has been pulled into a war with Iran based on a massive deception – Trump was convinced by the Israeli lobby close to him that it would be a walk-over, as happened in Venezuela. Is it in it for Israel?
What began as an Iran–US confrontation could ultimately meet Israeli objectives of the Greater Israel spreading from the Nile in the west/southwest to the Euphrates River in the east/northeast. The objectives of the US and Israel are not actually identical. Washington seeks to preserve American power, its military position in the Persian Gulf, the security structure surrounding the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and ultimately the dollar-based international financial system.
Israel has a different and much more ambitious strategic objective: the transformation of the Middle East in a manner that establishes Israel as the dominant regional power. To implement the Greater Israel Project, the destruction or severe weakening of existing regional powers becomes critically important for Israel. Iran is an obvious adversary, but Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and potentially Turkiye, Pakistan and Egypt are also important elements in the future regional balance. A war that progressively destabilises these states creates conditions in which Israel could reshape the entire region around its own power.
Paradoxically, the greatest obstacle to this Israeli objective is not Iran but the US itself. The recent attacks by Israel on Lebanon, Syria and Gaza in defiance of American wishes show that Israel cares little for US policies if they conflict with its own designs. American military guarantees protect Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE and the wider Gulf system. As long as the US remains the dominant external military power in the Middle East, Israel cannot become the uncontested regional hegemon. The strategic value of the Iran war therefore lies partly in drawing the US so deeply into an exhausting conflict that American military, economic and political power in the region is eventually undermined.
The Strait of Hormuz is consequently the economic fulcrum of the entire confrontation. Prolonged disruption would drive energy prices upward and place enormous pressure on Asian and European economies dependent upon Gulf oil and gas. Iran’s ability to retain influence over Hormuz would give it leverage even while its own infrastructure and economy were being devastated. Israel’s attacks on Iranian energy and civil infrastructure, combined with Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy installations, could transform a military war into a global economic war. The consequences would then move far beyond the Middle East. If America ultimately withdrew and Iran emerged with effective strategic control over Hormuz, the Gulf states could be compelled to accommodate Tehran.
A chain reaction would follow. Japan and South Korea could conclude that American security guarantees were no longer sufficient and begin much more substantial remilitarisation. South Korea could be forced to reconsider its relationship with North Korea, while Japan might develop a far more independent military posture. The eventual outcome would therefore be a movement away from a single American-centred security system towards several independent regional power centres. The recent defence pact between Pakistan, Turkiye and Saudi Arabia is a step in this direction.
The Gulf states emerge as particularly vulnerable. Their extraordinary development has depended upon energy revenues, imported labour, desalinated water, sophisticated infrastructure and – most importantly – American military protection. Even limited missile and drone attacks can damage the perception of absolute security upon which investment and international finance depend. Thus, whether Iran or America ultimately claims military victory, the GCC system could be among the greatest strategic losers.
Israel’s immediate requirement is to keep the US engaged strongly enough to weaken Iran and the surrounding regional order. Its longer-term strategic interest, however, is served if that same war exhausts American power and eventually removes the US as the dominant Middle Eastern protector. Iran meanwhile seeks to survive, retain leverage over Hormuz and impose economic costs severe enough to undermine America’s willingness to remain.
These competing strategies point not towards a quick settlement but towards escalation, American imperial overstretch, weakening of the Gulf states, disruption of the petrodollar, Asian remilitarisation, possible American ground intervention, and the emergence of Israel as the principal military power in a reconstructed Middle East. The regional war can escalate into a much wider global confrontation.
The consequences of an eventual American withdrawal from the Middle East would become even more far-reaching if Iran were first decisively weakened or effectively destroyed as a regional military power. The next major barriers to further Israeli expansion would be Turkiye, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Yet these states are involved in their own local conflicts that could be magnified by Israel-supported covert interventions to weaken them – the support of Israel to India as an anti-Pakistan strategy may be viewed in that context. The Drishti-10 Starliner, the Indian version of Israel’s Elbit Systems Hermes 900 medium-altitude drone system, is now manufactured by Adani Defence & Aerospace at Hyderabad under its partnership with an Israeli company. Turkiye too has its own externally created problems.
Israel possesses not only its own highly developed defence, cyber, intelligence, missile, drone and nuclear capabilities, but also decades of access to, and integration with, the technological advances arising from the enormous American military-industrial and research establishment. By contrast, Turkiye, Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face varying combinations of economic vulnerability, political pressures, dependence on foreign military systems, internal security concerns and competing strategic priorities. Israel could exploit the weaknesses and create the conditions for the territorial and political ambitions associated with the concept of a Greater Israel.
In light of the above, what should Pakistan’s strategy be? First, we need to transform Pakistan into a technology-driven knowledge economy with a razor-sharp focus on manufacturing and exporting high-value-added, high-tech goods. The foundations of national security must be based on economic security.
Second, we must make education, science, technology and innovation the highest national priorities by appropriate changes in the constitution. Future wars will be won and lost in research labs and not on battlefields. Third, we need peace with India so we can focus on equitable and sustainable socio-economic development instead of getting caught up in local conflicts.
The writer is a former federal minister, Unesco science laureate and founding chairperson of the Higher Education Commission (HEC). He can be reached at: [email protected]
