The Trump Administration’s US National Security Strategy (NSS), released last month, has made overt what had long remained covert: America’s ongoing dialectic between its desire to assert its imperialism on the one hand and its desire to show the world its belief in democracy and humanity.
This was reflected in the manner in which the US hesitatingly and reluctantly entered both world wars; its push to have the League of Nations tied to an unjust Versailles Peace Treaty and then refusal to become a part of the League; its selectivity in choosing which international agreements it would accept as part of the post-WWII international order (accepted IMF and IBRD but refused a proposal for a global trade regime proposed in the Havana Charter accepting instead temporary trade arrangements through multiple GATT) – the list of this US dialectical struggle is endless.
However, Trump’s new NSS has now clarified where the US stands – and it is not with a global, rules-based order governed by international law and treaties. Instead, the US now supports a state-centric, power-based system premised on US military prowess and efforts to revamp a decaying US economy through tariffs and sanctions.
The rejection of international norms and international organisations is made clear: “We stand for the sovereign rights of nations, against the sovereign-sapping incursions of the most intrusive transnational organisations, and for reforming those institutions so that they assist rather than hinder individual sovereignty and further American interests”. So international laws and organisations are only acceptable as long as they bolster state sovereignty and especially American interests.
Beyond the usual Trump-style grandiose rhetoric that highlights the continuing conflicts within the US of its self-image, three major assertions stand out in the entire NSS. First, an admission that the US does not have unlimited resources and power to dominate the entire world. So, “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests”. There is to be no global commitment to democracy or human rights. Instead, the US “must not overlook governments with different outlooks with whom we nonetheless share interests and who want to work with us”. This is made clearer when the NSS states the US “should encourage and applaud reform when and where it emerges organically, without trying to impose it from without”. So, dictators can breathe a sigh of relief.
This new approach impacts US policy on the Middle East: “The key to successful relations with the Middle East is accepting the region, its leaders, and its nations as they are while working together on areas of common interest”. The NSS declares that the problems in that region have eased, one, because “energy supplies have diversified greatly” and, two, as a result of changes in dynamics between Arab states and Israel and the weakening of Iran, which is seen as the “chief destabilising force” in the region. US support for and commitment to Israel continue to remain pivotal.
India remains a strategic partner in the NSS. It is named as one of the Asian partners with whom the US must seek to “cement and improve our joint positions in the Western Hemisphere, and with regard to critical minerals, in Africa”. More crucial perhaps, the NSS seeks “to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through” the Quad. Pakistan is missing entirely, so pats on the back and sale of F16S do not see Pakistan as a critical strategic player for the US. But at least, unlike in earlier US NSS papers, Pakistan is also not mentioned within the context of terrorism.
Regarding China, the NSS addresses erroneous past assumptions that allowed China to become economically powerful and seeks to rebalance the US economic relationship with China. It also makes clear that it will bolster its military strength against China, including defending the First Island Chain, which prevents China from gaining open access to the Pacific. However, this would require greater support from regional allies, including greater military access to their ports and facilities for the US.
In the context of Europe, the NSS is extremely disparaging, including showing a clear US lack of support for Europe going to war with Russia over Ukraine. The NSS views Europe as a declining power unless it reverses the trend, but it sees Europe as strategically important to the US – or at least to some European countries. So, the NSS seeks “to work with aligned countries that want to restore their former greatness” – imperialist revival, perhaps.
Second, the NSS identifies the region that takes precedence: the Western Hemisphere – Latin America and the Caribbean primarily, with Mexico and even Canada included within the broader definition. Here, Trump seeks not only “to reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine” of 1823 when the US declared the Western Hemisphere as the US’s exclusive sphere of influence, but to also “assert and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine” – which means more direct interventions and linkages to migration, drug cartels and other US domestic agendas.
This is the unabashed revival of US imperialism and has already been operationalised, including in the military targeting of Venezuela. It is also here that the US makes veiled references to ‘hostile powers’ making inroads into this region, which the US will now not allow. The reference is to China, which has, over the years, made economic inroads into this region.
Third, while admitting the US has limited power, the NSS reasserts a focus on US military strength, including effectively rejecting arms control agreements to limit ABM and other missile and lethal weapons systems. Instead, the NSS states the US intent of building a “Golden Dome for the American Homeland”. So, while seeking to ostensibly avoid wars, the US will focus on building up its armed forces and modern weapons systems.
Overall, the message to the rest of the world is clear. International law, multilateral conventions and even international organisations are going to be increasingly irrelevant in the Trump era, where state-centric inter-state relations will dominate. Unless an effective counter-Trump coalition is built to reassert the primacy of international law and international regimes governing a broad spectrum of global inter-state and intra-state relations, we will return to an era of imperialism and rule by power, reflected not just in international relations but also within states.
The writer is a defence and security analyst.
