In a sifarish system, the rewards go to networking, flattery and loyalty, not superior skills.
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very Pakistani family knows the phone call. A son has applied for a job. A niece needs admission to a medical college. A file has been sitting on a desk for three months. Someone at the dinner table says, “Let me call someone I know.” By the next morning, sometimes within the hour, the problem has gone away.
We rarely think of this as a cost. We think of it as help, even as kindness. A relative helped a relative, a friend helped a friend; and nobody seemed to lose anything.
But somebody always loses. We simply never meet that person.
Think of a young woman from a small town in southern Punjab. Her father runs a tea stall. She studied by the light of a single bulb, topped her district, passed the written test for a government post and waited for the interview result. The job went to someone whose uncle made a call. She might not complain because she knows nobody will listen. She will just stop believing that effort matters. Multiply her by a few hundred thousand every year and you begin to see the cost of sifarish.
The first cost is to talent. When jobs, contracts and promotions go to the connected rather than the capable, the economy puts the wrong people in the wrong seats. A hospital gets a weaker doctor; a department gets a manager who cannot manage; a road is built by a contractor whose main skill is knowing the right people. Each of these choices looks small. Together they make the country less productive.
The second cost is to effort. If connections decide outcomes, why study hard? Why build a better product? Why train your staff? Rational people put their energy where the rewards are. In a sifarish system, the rewards go to networking, flattery and loyalty, not to superior skills. Over time, a society learns the lesson. Young people spend more time finding a reference than building a CV.
The third cost is to investment. A foreign investor does not only look at tax rates and labour costs. He asks a simpler question: will the rules apply to me the same way they apply to a well-connected local? If the answer is no, he either stays away or brings his own “fixer,” which adds cost and risk. Local investors think the same way. Capital prefers places where the outcome depends on the contract, not on the caller.
The fourth cost is people leaving. Many of the brightest young Pakistanis abroad did not leave for money alone. They left because they wanted to live in a system where their work would be judged on merit. Every such departure is a loss of talent that Pakistan paid to educate.
None of this is unique to Pakistan. Italy is a telling example. Economists studying Italian universities found that in some departments an unusually high share of professors shared the same surnames, a pattern hard to explain by chance and easy to explain by family hiring. The universities performed worse on research. Favouritism did not just hurt the people who were passed over. It lowered the quality of the institution itself.
The good news is that countries have beaten this problem. The way they did it is instructive.
Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s was poor; corruption was common. Lee Kuan Yew’s government made merit the foundation of the state. Civil servants were recruited through competitive processes, paid well enough to reduce temptation and watched by a powerful anti-corruption agency that pursued even senior officials. Singapore did not become clean because its people were naturally different. It became clean because the system made favouritism risky and merit rewarding.
The first cost is to talent. When jobs, contracts and promotions go to the connected rather than the capable, the economy puts the wrong people in the wrong seats. A hospital gets a weaker worker. A department gets a manager who cannot manage.
Georgia is a more dramatic case. In 2004, its traffic police were so corrupt that paying bribes on the road was routine. The new government dismissed the entire traffic police force and rebuilt it with new recruits, better pay and clear rules. Within a few years, Georgians went from expecting to pay bribes to trusting the police more than most institutions. The lesson is that culture changes faster than we think once incentives change.
South Korea took on a quieter form of favouritism. In 2016 it brought in the Kim Young-ran Act, which placed strict limits on the gifts, meals and favours that public officials, journalists and teachers could accept. Restaurants complained at first. Some people mocked it. But the law changed everyday behaviour. The dinner invitation that once came with an expectation now came with a legal risk. Many simply stopped.
Estonia’s approach was still different. It moved almost all government services online. When you apply for a licence, file taxes or register a company through a digital system, there is no officer across the desk to call. Removing the counter removed much of the opportunity for sifarish.
What should Pakistan take from these examples? First, reduce discretion wherever possible. Every decision that depends on one officer’s judgment is vulnerable to a phone call. Recruitment through independent testing, with merit lists published online, makes sifarish harder and easier to detect. The same applies to admissions, licences and procurement.
Second, make processes digital and traceable. When an application has a tracking number and a deadline, and every step is recorded, it becomes harder to move a file on the strength of a phone call. The Punjab has already moved many services online. The goal should be that no ordinary citizen ever needs to know anyone to get what the law gives them.
Third, protect the people who say no. The officer who refuses a powerful caller often pays for it with a transfer. Until honest refusal is safe, most will not refuse.
Fourth, leaders must set the example. Anyone who has run a public office knows the pressure of such calls. When the person at the top declines them openly, the message travels down the institution faster than any circular.
There is a difficult truth here for all of us. Sifarish survives not only because officials allow it, but because citizens ask for it. Most of us have made or received such a call. We condemn the system in general and use it in particular. That habit has to change at home before it changes in government offices.
Pakistan does not lack talent. It loses talent, quietly, one phone call at a time. The girl who topped her district deserved that job. The country deserved her in it.
A nation that rewards connections will always have plenty of connections. A nation that rewards merit will have something far more valuable: people who believe that working hard is worth it.
The writer is a chartered accountant and a business analyst.