he Iran-US confrontation is becoming increasingly difficult to contain as disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, growing Houthi activity around the Bab el-Mandeb and attacks linked to Iraqi militias sympathetic to Iran create new risks.

For Washington, the challenge is to maintain pressure on Tehran without allowing a calibrated confrontation to escalate into a wider regional war.

While the US claims to have facilitated the passage of over 1 billion barrels of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz in two months, independent tracking has shown that only about 330 million barrels of non-Iranian oil has exited the region since July 8. The flow recovered to nearly 8 million barrels per day by early September (versus ~18 million bpd pre-war).

Alternative pipeline routes, including Fujairah and Yanbu, have provided some relief, but their capacity is under growing pressure. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which carries almost four percent of global oil through Yanbu, has come under attack from Iran-backed Iraqi militias, disrupting significant oil flows to Asia and Europe. The vulnerability of these alternatives is further compounded by developments around another critical maritime chokepoint: the Bab el-Mandeb.

The situation has been further complicated by Ansarullah (Houthis), who had initially stayed out of the Iran-US conflict, but have of late expanded their operations along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including Mocha and Perim Island near the Bab el-Mandeb, strengthening their ability to threaten Saudi shipping between Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Houthi factor also brings Iran into the calculation, although the group is not under Iranian control. Iran has supplied some drones and missiles to the Ansarullah and provided training and other support.

According to Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran, Asif Durrani, “Despite their close contacts, Iranian assistance does not necessarily mean that Tehran exercises control over the Houthis. The Houthis retain considerable operational autonomy. Iran’s support serves its strategic interests, but this does not mean that every Houthi action is directed or approved by Tehran.”

Pakistan is seeking to persuade Tehran to encourage the Houthis towards peace-building and provide assurances regarding the opening and security of the Bab el-Mandeb. There is also scope for Iran to engage Saudi Arabia. “These possibilities form part of the broad strategic-level discussions.”

The restraint, however, should not be taken for granted. A major concern is that carefully calibrated escalation could get out of hand. Since the initial attacks on February 28, both sides have avoided military actions that could trigger a wider conflict. US forces have mostly targeted Iranian military and naval assets but avoided major energy infrastructure and ports. Iran’s retaliation has imposed costs without triggering a broader US assault. The pattern suggests that both sides have sought to contain escalation. Israel has been kept out of the second round amid concerns that its involvement could push the conflict beyond Washington’s control.

A Saudi action against the Houthis or direct US involvement could open escalatory pathways, “while potential involvement of Iraqi militias or instability in Bahrain and Kuwait could alter the regional political landscape in ways that no party could control.” Iran-backed Iraqi militias have also launched drone attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain, widening the conflict beyond Iran’s borders. Attribution remains difficult in some cases, but the attacks have heightened Gulf concerns over the reach of armed groups allied to Iran.

President Donald Trump ordered the Pentagon to prepare airstrikes against the Houthis after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman urged intervention, but later aborted the operation. US officials said targets had been approved and aircraft were being loaded when the US president reversed course, amid concerns that opening another front would stretch US resources and widen the conflict.

If President Trump loses the mid-terms, his lame-duck status could give him greater latitude to raise pressure on Iran if diplomacy fails. However, this may not necessarily mean a full-scale war.

“Calling off the operation also reflected the limits of military pressure: the Houthis control significant territory, enjoy strong geographic advantages and have repeatedly shown resilience. Further fighting risks choking the Bab el-Mandeb. Combined with Hormuz disruptions, this could severely damage international trade,” Durrani notes.

If US pressure and attacks on Iranian positions continue, the cycle of retaliation and escalation could continue. The crisis is increasingly threatening global maritime trade, with disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb putting around 35 percent of sea trade at risk and raising concerns over potential disruption to the Suez Canal and global supply chains, says Ambassador Durrani.

These developments require a collective international response, Durrani says. “Pakistan can continue using its diplomatic channels to facilitate dialogue, but broader action is needed at the United Nations level, including consideration of the crisis by the UN Security Council.” Any diplomatic breakthrough faces a fundamental obstacle: “Decades of mistrust remain a major obstacle to a breakthrough, complicating concessions and raising doubts over whether commitments will be honoured. Nevertheless, intense diplomacy continues, with Pakistan and Qatar facilitating contacts. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Iran ahead of the UNGA session. Iranian officials have since confirmed a three-hour meeting with US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, later denied by President Trump.

Ahead of the looming November elections, President Trump may prefer to demonstrate that he can end the conflict on terms favourable to the US while containing its economic costs.

Ambassador Durrani says, “Trump may have an incentive to seek a diplomatic resolution now because a prolonged conflict, particularly if it keeps energy prices elevated, could carry political costs.”

If President Trump loses the mid-term polls, his lame-duck status could give him greater latitude to raise pressure on Iran if diplomacy fails, although this does not necessarily mean a full-scale war. “The objective could be to inflict sufficient additional damage on Iran’s military and strategic capabilities to create the conditions for negotiations and then declare that the US has achieved its principal objectives and withdraw or substantially reduce the forces.” Recent reporting has indicated that White House officials have considered expanding military action after the November elections, but this remains a possibility rather than settled policy.

The GCC states are deeply frustrated at having little control over a confrontation that directly threatens their security and economic interests. “For several GCC states, the prospect of further escalation carries the frightening possibility of becoming the next target or battlefield, with no guarantee that Washington can shield them from the consequences,” says Durrani.

This has intensified fears of both entrapment and abandonment. Prominent think tanks, including the RUSI and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, as well as some Arab media, have highlighted growing Gulf concerns about the reliability of US security commitments and the need to hedge against its possible disengagement. The dilemma is reminiscent of Afghanistan: Gulf states increasingly recognise that Washington could eventually decide that the costs of the conflict outweigh the benefits and leave them to deal with Tehran and the consequences of escalation on their own.

Their concerns extend beyond military escalation to the economic costs of a prolonged blockade. There is also apprehension that if US sanctions and the blockade continue to choke the Iranian economy, “Iran could respond by escalating pressure of its own, reinforcing the existing cycle of pressure and retaliation.” These concerns are compounded by perceptions that Washington is pursuing arrangements on Hormuz without adequately considering GCC interests.

The United States is seeking a limited reopening of the Strait of Hormuz covering only 30-40 per cent of oil flows, while excluding LNG and other cargoes, to ease pressure on global markets without ending pressure on Iran, potentially through the mid-term elections. Arab governments oppose the proposal, arguing that they need broader access, including LNG and other cargoes. They view the arrangement as unstable and warn that Iran could counter-escalate as the blockade bites. “They are upset that once again their core security and economic concerns have been ignored.”

Earlier, Washington’s shifting position on Hormuz served to reinforce these concerns. In April 2026, President Trump floated a US-Iran “joint venture” involving transit fees or tolls; by mid-June, the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding largely negotiated by Vice President JD Vance provided for 60 days of free commercial passage; but after Rubio’s June 23-25 GCC tour, a joint US-GCC statement rejected tolls, fees and any attempt to control the strait, reaffirming free, unconditional and unrestricted navigation.

Experts wonder whether these shifts represented policy evolution or whiplash. The conflicting positions also frustrated regional governments, leaving uncertainty over which voices Trump would heed and raising the prospect of abrupt policy reversals, including the collapse of the MOU. This policy uncertainty raises a broader question about how decisions are being reached at the highest level in Washington.

President Trump’s information environment is also a critical risk factor. In January, he received (mainly Israeli) assessments portraying Iran as weak leading him to believe that Iran would collapse in four days. This time around, the White House has banned the CNN, the MSNBC and Politico. “When inputs are restricted or combined with a preference for information that confirms existing beliefs, it risks creating a false consensus and major misjudgments.”

The immediate challenge is to preserve avenues for de-escalation before the conflict develops too many independent fronts. Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb remain critical pressure points, while Houthi activity, Iraqi militia attacks and Iranian mobilisation could create escalation dynamics beyond Washington’s control. For the GCC states, the deeper concern is that they could be left to bear the economic and security costs of decisions made elsewhere. The longer the confrontation continues without a diplomatic pathway, the harder it may become to contain its consequences.

The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi.