t the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek and the BRICS summit in New Delhi, India has openly engaged Russia, China and Iran while maintaining its close strategic ties with Washington.

The tension captures the central question in India’s foreign policy: is New Delhi prepared to move beyond the US strategic orbit, or is it using its ties with rival power centres to preserve room for manoeuvre without abandoning Washington?

At Bishkek, Prime Minister Modi’s unusually warm interaction with Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping — including the widely noted three-way handshake — underscored how important India considers maintaining ties with competing power centres.

That positioning was particularly significant over Iran. India’s endorsement of the Bishkek Declaration allowed New Delhi to align with Russia, China and other SCO members on the issue. It resisted pressure to support Washington’s policy of secondary sanctions against countries trading with Tehran. The move, however, did not necessarily signal a deep recalibration of India’s policy towards Iran.

The significance of the move lies precisely in this distinction: India can resist specific US demands without necessarily challenging its broad strategic relationship with Washington.

The contours of that option become clearer when India’s wider strategic interests are considered. India still needs American cooperation to address potential threats from China. Its economic relationship with the United States remains important. Its engagement with Russia, China and Iran, therefore, does not necessarily signal a move away from the US strategic orbit; it may instead reflect an effort to widen its options within the existing balance of relationships.

The other side of India’s strategic positioning is visible in the partnerships it has built with the United States and its allies.

According to former ambassador Zamir Akram, “India’s strategic options are also complicated by its deepening involvement in the other side of the emerging regional architecture. New Delhi is a member of the I2U2 grouping - India, Israel, the United States and the UAE. It has worked with these partners on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, designed to connect India with the Gulf and Europe through transport, energy and digital links. The framework gives India a stake in a connectivity system closely associated with the United States, Israel and the Gulf states.”

These commitments complicate any interpretation of India’s BRICS and SCO diplomacy as a move away from Washington. New Delhi is simultaneously investing in a connectivity and security architecture closely associated with the United States, Israel and the Gulf.

Modi’s engagement with Benjamin Netanyahu has added another layer to this balancing act. His February 2026 visit to Israel, an his meeting with Netanyahu, came days before the US-Israeli military action against Iran. During the visit, the two sides talked of closer cooperation in defence, security, technology and innovation. India did not initially condemn the US-Israeli attacks on Iran. Later, however, New Delhi endorsed an SCO declaration condemning the military campaign. This positioning reflects India’s strategic choice of aligning with the US, Israel and the Gulf states through I2U2 and the IMEC and effectively shelving the Russia-Chabahar-INSTC project under US pressure.

India’s position, therefore, contains a clear tension. Its endorsement of the SCO declaration allowed it to distance itself from the US-Israeli campaign diplomatically, but its security and economic partnerships tied it to them.

The contradiction highlights New Delhi’s effort to preserve room for manoeuvre without abandoning its established strategic partnerships.

According to former ambassador Abdul Basit, “Modi’s participation in the SCO and the New Delhi BRICS summit represented a tactical show of resistance. It was met with a clear US response. US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor visited Manipur during the BRICS summit. This points to the asymmetry underlying India’s balancing strategy: Washington also has instruments through which it can signal displeasure or exert pressure on New Delhi.”

As summit host, securing a joint BRICS declaration despite deep divisions over West Asia was an achievement for New Delhi. The declaration reaffirmed opposition to unilateral trade restrictions and called for restraint and diplomatic solutions. It did not name the United States.

The episode showed that India’s efforts to cultivate alternative partnerships do not place it beyond Washington’s reach. The broad picture is one of tactical manoeuvring within the constraints of its strategic dependence. “When push comes to shove, India has little choice but to side with the United States,” Basit argues.

Yet the constraints do not prevent New Delhi from using its wider network of relationships to expand its diplomatic space. As summit host, India demonstrated the diplomatic value of this approach.

As summit host, securing a joint BRICS declaration despite deep divisions over West Asia was an achievement for News Delhi. The declaration reaffirmed opposition to unilateral trade restrictions and called for restraint and diplomatic solutions without naming the United States. It followed the BRICS foreign ministers’ failure to agree on a joint declaration in May. Iran had sought language condemning the military action against it, similar to last year’s Brazil summit. Saudi Arabia and the UAE wanted the declaration to condemn Iranian attacks on Gulf states. The final text avoided directly naming either side and instead called for preventing conflicts and addressing their “root causes.”

Ambassador Basit says that the BRICS emphasis on addressing the underlying causes of conflict is also relevant to Pakistan-India relations. Pakistan has consistently maintained that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is the underlying issue between the two countries. “If India calls on other countries to address the underlying causes of conflicts, the same principle should also be applied to South Asia and the Pakistan-India dispute,” he argues.

The BRICS summit in New Delhi was particularly significant because of the participation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. His attendance had remained uncertain in the run-up to the summit, “his decision to travel to India was an important diplomatic development.”

President Xi’s participation offered another indication that India and China were willing to manage their rivalry on multilateral forums. However, it did not remove the strategic contradiction at the heart of India’s position.

Ambassador Akram says, “The summit may have produced useful optics for India and China, but should not be interpreted as evidence of a fundamental improvement in India-China relations. Relations between China and India remain strained, but BRICS is an important forum for China and India is a major market for Beijing. China-India trade is worth $130-140 billion, with a nearly $112 billion deficit in China’s favour.”

Their relations have remained strained, particularly over their unresolved border dispute, but they have sought to separate their differences from the question of regional development. That approach dates back to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China, when he met Deng Xiaoping and the two sides agreed to work towards the idea of an Asian century, treating the border as an outstanding issue while prioritising mutual development.

According to Ambassador Akram, the idea of an Asian century is gaining renewed relevance as economic, technological and geopolitical power shifts towards Asia. In the emerging multipolar order, China wants India and China, two major Asian powers, yo manage their differences, support each other’s development and work together on issues affecting the Global South.

“While India seeks Chinese acceptance of a ‘multipolar Asia,’ its longstanding disputes have led it to oppose Pakistan’s BRICS membership. This reflects the tension between India’s regional ambitions and its competing strategic interests. Its emphasis on strategic competition with China sits uneasily with the idea of an Asian century.”

The Modi-Xi Jinping bilateral exchange unfolded against a backdrop of competing geopolitical priorities. The post-meeting statements exposed a sharp divide over bilateral ties.

Diplomatic speculation grew later when President Xi skipped the BRICS gala dinner hosted by Prime Minister Modi at Bharat Mandapam. International media quoting sources familiar with the arrangement clarified that “he gave the dinner a miss due to exhaustion after flying into New Delhi earlier that morning for a packed schedule of meetings.”

Ambassador Basit says China may have taken umbrage at a breach of diplomatic protocol. “In the context of the summit, Xi’s absence carried diplomatic significance and invited speculation about the state of India-China relations.”

That tension goes to the heart of India’s strategic dilemma. China is central to this dynamic because rivalry with Beijing reinforces India’s reliance on Washington as a counterweight. That dependence limits how far New Delhi can widen its room for manoeuvre through ties with Russia and China.

BRICS, the SCO and its Global South ties give New Delhi leverage with Washington by demonstrating that it has alternatives. The deeper its rivalry with China and reliance on US security support become, however, the harder it may be to sustain that balance.

The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi.