Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signed a joint defence pact on August 7. The Makkah Joint Deterrence Agreement aims to provide collective deterrence against any act of aggression.

What makes the agreement significant is its timing. The three countries signed it amid heightened regional instability, including a months-long conflict between the United States and Iran and instability involving Israel and Lebanon. The alliance brings together three countries with distinctive and complementary strategic capabilities. Turkiye brings the second-largest NATO military and an indigenous defence industry; Pakistan contributes strategic defence capabilities; and Saudi Arabia provides financial and energy resources along with strategic geography.

The agreement is not merely the beginning of a trilateral relationship. Questions are being raised about the regional security architecture, the possibility of its expansion and its long-term sustainability.

Dr Aziz Alghashian, senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum, sees the agreement “as something that was bound to happen” given the recent trajectory of events in the Gulf region.

“I think this agreement says much more than we initially think, particularly because its significance extends beyond military and defence dimensions. This trilateral relationship has different resonance but interconnected aims. The first is diplomatic. This is extremely important because it creates a diplomatic front for responding to threats in the region.

“The second is capacity to work together. The third - the often overlooked one - is the defence economy sector. Hence, the ability of these countries to cooperate in the defence sector will give this alliance greater longevity and strategic value for all three states.”

United States remains the most important external security actor in West Asia. Various Gulf countries, including Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, host US military bases and naval assets. The defence agreement is seen as an attempt by Saudi Arabia to diversify its partnerships while reducing its security-related dependence on the US.

Dr Mujtaba Isani, DAAD professor of political science at Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan, sees this pact as “a step towards more interdependence within the region and less reliance on America.”

According to Naade Ali, Policy Center research assistant at the Middle East Institute, “the timing of the Makkah Agreement suggests that we may be witnessing the early stages of a new regional security architecture.”

“The Gulf states remain dependent on the United States as their principal security provider. I don’t think an independent, Middle Eastern security architecture led from within the region is realistic in the long term, unless the US withdraws from the region. Short of that, the conditions simply aren’t there,” Ali says.

“It will be more accurate to call this a genuinely new regional security architecture only once a wider set of countries joins the pact and it evolves from a trilateral arrangement into a multilateral one.”

Alghashian describes the development differently, arguing that the term ‘regional security architecture’ has often been associated with ‘normalisation’ of relations with Israel.

The trilateral pact is based on a premise of collective security: an attack on one of the countries is to be considered an attack on all three. Some analysts have compared this provision with NATO’s Article 5.

“The situation looks different when we consider Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye. Here, you can see an architecture emerging. It does not have to be a massive or region-wide structure. It can be a trilateral architecture that is far more organic in nature.”

He does not believe that the trilateral relationship negates or replaces other regional dynamics. Rather, he sees it as a form of security architecture whose purpose is to facilitate domestic deterrence. He proposes that the idea is to indigenize deterrence.

The Iran-Israel-US war demonstrated that Saudi Arabia can no longer afford to be collateral damage or a target. It needs to indigenize its deterrence capabilities.

“This cannot be done without forming alliances. Turkiye and Pakistan can offer what the United States cannot: speed, strategic proximity and shared urgency,” Alghashian says.

The trilateral defence pact is based on the collective security premise; an attack on one country is to be considered an attack on all three. Some analysts have compared this with NATO’s Article 5. Alghashian, however, calls this interpretation a misunderstanding. He notes that Article 5 does not automatically trigger a military response.

“Ultimately, the decision to use force is political. What this does is unify the position. It says: ‘Your security is my security, and our security is that of the other party’s security.’ Therefore, we have to figure out how to respond—whether diplomatically, militarily or economically.”

Mujtaba Isani agrees that the pact does not replicate Article 5.

Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has stated that the agreement remains open to any country in the region willing to uphold mutual respect, peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional cooperation. The signatories have said that the alliance is not meant to target any country.

Alghashian sees a possibility of expansion, but acknowledges that Gulf countries are hesitant. Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman may take more time because they do not want to be seen as being on the front line of a regional confrontation. Their decisions will depend on Iran’s response and on whether the alliance is ultimately perceived as a front against a particular country.

Mujtaba Isani says Bahrain appears to be tilting towards the UAE. Kuwait is probably the most likely country to join in. Egypt has also been mentioned as a potential member, although signals suggest that it is tilting towards the UAE.

According to Ali, the pact rests on differentiated capabilities rather than parity: Turkiye brings advanced arms production and defence-industrial capacity, Saudi Arabia financial resources and regional standing and Pakistan battle-hardened manpower and strategic deterrence.

Balancing the security posture will be the real test. Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan do not face the same enemies. Turkey’s threat calculus is driven by Syria, Kurdish militias and its NATO and Mediterranean commitments; Saudi Arabia’s by the Houthis; and Pakistan’s by India and unrest on its western border.

Ali also points to ambiguity over financing and burden-sharing, collective decision-making and the thresholds for activating the pact. Until these issues are clarified, he says, its deterrence value rests more on political signalling than on a specified operational structure.

For now, the pact is likely best understood as the foundation for an emerging security framework.

The writer is a journalist. She can be reached at [email protected]