ounded 25 years ago by Russia, China and four Central Asian states to counter separatism, terrorism and religious extremism; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has evolved from a security grouping into an economic cooperation platform. Its membership now includes India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. Mongolia, Afghanistan and Türkiye engage as observers and partners in the SCO Plus format.

For the SCO, the most important elements today are connectivity, commerce and trade conducted in national currencies across Eurasia. At the Bishkek summit, leaders from Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan discussed building an economic architecture less dependent on Western banks and currencies.

Amid Western sanctions and the weaponisation of the dollar system, Russia and China have accelerated efforts to build alternative settlement mechanisms, expand national-currency trade and create a parallel financial architecture independent of the SWIFT.

Former ambassador Zamir Akram thinks “the proposed SCO Development Bank and Energy Consortium are promising institutional steps in this de-dollarisation drive.”

Genuine economic integration requires alternative payment systems, substantial de-dollarisation and energy and transportation corridors independent of US control. Washington views such cooperation as a direct challenge to its hegemony and seeks to obstruct it. Russia already settles over 97-98 percent of its SCO trade in national currencies. China continues to expand CIPS. These bilateral and pluri-lateral advances signify immediate practical gains.

In the context of the Energy Consortium, Russia and Iran rank as the leading producers, with Kazakhstan in third place. All three share a direct stake in price stability. According to Akram, “the realisation of the SCO Bank and the Energy Consortium are strategically sound, long-term objectives for a multipolar order; individual member countries will continue to develop parallel, bilateral mechanisms in national-currency settlements offering nearer-term results as the multilateral institutions mature.”

This will be underpinned by the deepening strategic convergence between China and Russia. Bound by a shared vision of a multipolar world order, they are not only close neighbours but also anchors of Eurasian integration.

Eurasia has long been the centre of global power. Mackinder’s 1904 warning still shapes Anglo-American strategy: the core fear is a Russia-China peer coalition, potentially joined by Iran. That process is already under way. The Russia-China strategic partnership forms the core of an emerging Eurasian framework, reinforced by additional regional participants. Its consolidation, however, also depends on the five Central Asian Republics. Their membership in the SCO and the BRICS provides them with diverse strategic interdependencies. China, Russia and Türkiye increasingly offer alternatives to Western powers.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have drawn renewed US and Western attention. In 2025, US Ambassador to India and Special Envoy Sergio Gor played a role in bringing the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the White House after helping achieve a ceasefire. Washington is also cooperating with Kazakhstan on the Middle Corridor—the trans-Caspian route through Azerbaijan, Armenia and Türkiye to Europe. At the recent SCO summit, Gor met the presidents of all five Central Asian republics and is seeking a further White House summit with them. Russia and China recognise that their influence in Central Asia now rests less on historical or strategic ties than on economic opportunity, connectivity and development. The SCO’s planned 10-year development strategy, with its focus on the Central Asian republics, reflects this shift. “Like their South Asian counterparts, the Central Asian Republics will seek to balance relations with major powers rather than align exclusively with one camp,” says Akram. “Geography, however, remains decisive: proximity and deepening economic interdependence will continue to draw them towards China and Russia. The scale and nature of what China can offer the region—particularly in infrastructure, financing and market access—cannot be matched by the United States.”

Central Asia is emerging as a strategic arena of competition among Russia, China and the West. This contest reflects a defining feature of the emerging Eurasian order: Russia and China are deepening integration without forming a conventional military alliance or bloc. “While seeking to reduce US leverage, it advances a broad vision of international order—one that China, in particular, seeks to institutionalise around the United Nations, multilateralism, mutual respect and a greater voice for the Global South,” says Akram.

The emerging order lacks a uniform strategic outlook. China, Russia and Iran face growing US pressure. India maintains a deep strategic partnership with Washington, making New Delhi cautious about anti-American rhetoric. Its discomfort was evident at the SCO summit.

“The summit produced striking political optics when Modi was photographed holding the hands of Xi and Putin. The image suggested closer coordination among India, China and Russia, potentially a message to the United States,” says former ambassador Abdul Basit. “Modi appeared to be signalling that the United States remained a strategic partner, but India also had other options. Yet the symbolism of closer engagement with China and Russia should not be mistaken for a strategic realignment. India’s foreign-policy choices continue to point towards a strong alignment with the United States and its partners.”

One positive aspect of the summit was Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s speech. He highlighted trans-boundary water disputes without specifically mentioning the Indus Waters Treaty and warned against the weaponisation of water.

Russia and China want India in their Eurasian framework, but New Delhi is pursuing a strict balancing act—retaining Russian defence ties while deepening trade and strategic cooperation with the US and the QUAD, and engaging in BRICS and the SCO on its own terms without embracing China.

According to Ambassador Akram, “India’s strategic contradiction is that it has historically leaned on Russia for arms and diplomatic cover while pursuing regional dominance in South Asia and a forward, territorial-revisionist policy towards China.”

In the 1960s, the Forward Policy was viewed by China as an attempt to encroach on its territory and alter the status quo. Buoyed by the US, India tried to convert American strategic backing into local coercive leverage. Washington elevated India as a “net security provider” in the Indo-Pacific, deepened Quad cooperation, signed logistics and intelligence agreements and provided diplomatic cover. India tried this again in Galwan in 2020, but China met it with decisive counter-pressure. “India suffered casualties, could not alter the Line of Actual Control and could not compel China and disengaged on terms short of its maximal aims. For China, territorial integrity is a red line, so India’s regional ambitions and border assertiveness inevitably put it at odds with China.”

The US learnt that India was not strong enough to serve as a frontline balancer against China; its capabilities did not match its rhetoric. “China does not treat India as a peer competitor. It treats India as a manageable regional rival and a large market, following a strategy of pragmatism on economic engagement,” says Akram.

“In light of new realities, the Trump administration levied hefty tariffs on India. This has not gone down very well with New Delhi. It remains to be seen what new policy contours a new US administration will employ with India. The US has opted to cut its losses. Following the recent Trump-Xi summit, the US has largely contained any further rupture by agreeing to a US-China Cooperative Strategic Partnership.” This US-China stabilization leaves India’s position less certain—an opening Russia is eager to exploit. Russia continues to see strategic value in keeping India engaged with Eurasian institutions. Russia has also sought the revival of the Russia-India-China format. “India has not pursued RIC despite the potential benefits to the country. The underlying reason is that India does not want to normalise relations with China,” says Ambassador Basit.

President Putin is also keen for India to participate in the International North-South Transport Corridor, but the Iranian Chabahar Port remains a sticking point. India is reluctant to proceed because of US sanctions on Iran. Before the US-Iran war, India had invested heavily in the project.

China is likely to frown on such a development if India proceeds with Chabahar, since Beijing has signed a $20 billion agreement with Iran to build ports under its Belt and Road Initiative. Iran, meanwhile, is bitter over Indian backing for US-Israeli attacks on Iran and Modi’s engagement with Israel shortly before the war. At the SCO, Modi’s meeting with President Pezeshkian reflected the tension between India’s economic interests in Iran and its strategic dependence on Washington. “Iran, naturally, has no strategic confidence in India.”

The SCO declaration contained an important reference to Iran. The declaration condemned attacks against Iran by the United States. According to Ambassador Basit, “India’s signing of the declaration was significant because it placed New Delhi alongside the position and its criticism of the United States and Israel. The decision is likely to require explanation to the US administration.”

The vision of a new world order that China and Russia developed and have worked towards since 2013 is increasingly a reality. The war in West Asia and Iran’s military successes against the United States and Israel have produced significant developments. Against this backdrop, the Makkah Defence Alliance was signed between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. These developments place Pakistan at the intersection of emerging regional frameworks—the SCO, the China-Russia-led Eurasian system and the evolving Islamic security architecture.

According to Ambassador Akram, “the Makkah Accord is essentially a Middle East and West Asian arrangement directed against Israeli hegemony, serving as their credible deterrence.”

More Middle Eastern states such as Qatar and Kuwait, alongside Bangladesh, may also join it. “Extension of the agreement to Eurasia is possible in terms of counterterrorism, intelligence and other defensive mechanisms, but not as a full-fledged security replication of the Middle East template. It will essentially retain its primary focus on the Middle East and South Asia.”

Against this backdrop, Ambassador Basit offers a measured assessment of the summit’s value for Pakistan: “Overall, the summit was reasonably positive for Pakistan. Pakistan participated and highlighted its concerns in the Eurasian forum.”

One positive aspect of the summit was Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s speech. He highlighted trans-boundary water disputes without specifically mentioning the Indus Waters Treaty and warned against the weaponisation of water without naming India. The PM also raised terrorism and Balochistan, bringing Pakistan’s key concerns to the forum.

India’s positioning stood in contrast to Pakistan’s more prominent role at the summit.

The next SCO chairmanship will be held by Pakistan. Against this backdrop, the absence of a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and President Vladimir Putin was particularly notable, says Basit. The two leaders held only a trilateral pull-aside with Turkish President Erdogan. Basit says that the absence of a bilateral Pakistan-Russia meeting was disappointing, given Russia’s importance to Pakistan and the need to overcome the longstanding psychological barrier. A Bishkek bilateral could have strengthened political engagement. Russia remains important, making sustained, effective diplomacy essential to advance ties.

The writer is a senior The News International staffer in Karachi.