he Indus Waters Treaty, signed by India and Pakistan in 1960 under the auspices of the World Bank, has survived wars, military crises and prolonged diplomatic hostility. Its endurance has made it one of South Asia’s most significant examples of functional cooperation between two adversarial states. The current dispute over India’s unilateral decision to hold the treaty in ‘abeyance’ therefore raises a question that extends far beyond India and Pakistan. Can a state suspend a binding international agreement simply because political and security relations have deteriorated?

An article carried by Newsweek, - A Treaty Pakistan Destroyed Long Before India Set It Aside by India’s Ambassador to the United States Vinay Mohan Kwatra – represents a political defence of New Delhi’s position. However, the central issue here is not whether the political narrative advanced by either side is persuasive. It is whether unilateral “abeyance” has a legal basis under the treaty or international law.

The IWT provides a starting point. Article XII (4) states that the treaty continues in force until terminated through a duly ratified treaty between the two governments. There is no express provision authorising either country to unilaterally place the agreement in abeyance. This makes India’s action a matter of considerable significance for the wider principle of treaty stability.

The treaty was structured to function even when relations between the two countries were strained. Its continued operation during wars and periods of intense hostility demonstrated the importance attached to separating water cooperation from political disagreements. If political or security disputes could suspend treaty obligations, the very purpose of such an agreement would be defeated.

India’s justification of its unilateral actions has been based on allegations of sponsored terrorism, particularly the Pahalgam attack. Terrorism is a grave issue. Pakistan has repeatedly condemned terrorism. It has suffered enormous human and economic losses from terrorist violence. However, allegations and legal consequences are separate questions.

If a state possesses conclusive evidence concerning an international incident, the appropriate course is to present that evidence through credible and impartial investigative or judicial mechanisms. Politically charged allegations cannot automatically become legal grounds for suspending an international treaty. Competing claims about the circumstances surrounding an incident require independent investigation rather than determination through political narratives.

The IWT contains its own dispute-resolution architecture. Disagreements can be addressed through mechanisms including the permanent Indus Commission, a neutral expert and, where applicable, a court of arbitration. Resorting to these mechanisms is not obstructionism; it is the exercise of rights created by the treaty.

This point is particularly important because India’s rejection of treaty-based adjudicatory mechanisms does not extinguish those mechanisms. The Hague-based Court of Arbitration proceedings have continued despite India’s refusal to participate. The broad lesson is straightforward: a state cannot terminate an international legal process simply by refusing to join it.

The dispute cannot be reduced either to suggestions that Pakistan eventually receives more water than it should. The IWT is not merely an annual water-volume calculation. For a downstream country, water security includes predictable flows.

Agriculture is especially sensitive to timing. A disruption at a critical stage of the agricultural cycle can have consequences that an annual water account cannot adequately capture. The same applies to hydropower generation, food security, rural livelihoods and economic stability. Pakistan’s water security is not simply a question of how much water flows through the river system over an entire year.

The treaty was deliberately structured to function even when relations between the two countries were deeply strained. Its continued operation during wars and periods of intense hostility demonstrated the importance attached to separating water cooperation from political disagreements.

This is where the principles of international water law become relevant. The international legal framework rests on principles such as pacta sunt servanda—the obligation to perform treaties in good faith—and respect for the stability of international agreements. Political disagreements cannot casually transform binding obligations into optional commitments.

Domestic water management is, of course, an important responsibility of every state. India has legitimate interests in developing its water resources within the framework of applicable law. But domestic water management and compliance with an international treaty are distinct issues. Infrastructure development, water utilisation and technical disagreements should be addressed through the treaty’s institutional mechanisms rather than through unilateral political declarations.

The significance of the issue was highlighted at the Islamabad International Seminar held on June 30, where legal, technical, environmental and strategic dimensions of the IWT were discussed. Questions concerning treaty continuity, dispute resolution, climate resilience and transboundary water governance deserve objective examination rather than being reduced to political messaging.

Climate change makes the stability of transboundary water arrangements even more important. Changing rainfall patterns, glacial conditions, floods, droughts and growing water demand are creating new pressures across the region. These challenges require stronger cooperation, better data-sharing and effective dispute-resolution mechanisms, not the weakening of existing legal frameworks.

The IWT has been a confidence-builder in one of the world’s most politically volatile regions. Its erosion can have consequences beyond the immediate dispute. If states treat international agreements as instruments that can be suspended when bilateral relations deteriorate, the reliability of treaties everywhere will weaken.

The principle at stake is not whether India or Pakistan has a stronger political argument. It is whether international commitments remain binding when circumstances become difficult. A rules-based international order has meaning only when states accept obligations even when compliance is politically inconvenient.

India’s decision to distance itself from treaty-based adjudicatory processes, while simultaneously defending the international rules-based order in other contexts, creates an obvious contradiction. The credibility of international law depends on consistent application, not selective acceptance.

The sustainable way forward is neither political rhetoric nor unilateral action. India and Pakistan must return to the treaty framework and use the mechanisms that the IWT provides for resolving technical and legal disagreements. Neutral Experts, the Permanent Indus Commission and the Court of Arbitration exist precisely because disputes are inevitable in complex transboundary water systems.

The Indus Waters Treaty was designed to withstand political storms. Its value lies precisely in maintaining a legal framework when relations between the parties are at their worst. Its future should not be determined by accusations, political narratives or unilateral declarations.

For South Asia, full implementation of the IWT and resolution of outstanding disputes through its institutional framework remain the most sustainable route towards regional stability and water security. For the international community, the larger lesson is equally important: if treaty obligations can be unilaterally suspended whenever political circumstances change, the credibility of international law will be at risk.

The author works for The News. He can be contacted at [email protected]