The joint defence agreement among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye marks a significant shift in the Middle East’s security landscape, bringing three strategically important Muslim-majority states into a framework of collective defence and deterrence. The development reflects a growing push by regional powers to assume greater responsibility for their security.

At its core is a collective-defence commitment: “An armed attack against any one of the three countries shall be considered an attack against all three.” This gives the partnership a clear deterrent dimension at a time when the reliability of the US security umbrella for its Gulf allies has been called into question by the Iran-US-Israel war. American bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan became targets of Iranian drones and missiles because they were used to launch attacks, prompting regional countries to move towards multilateral security arrangements.

Talking to The News on Sunday, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran and the United Arab Emirates Asif Durrani says: “The US-Israeli attacks provided a significant impetus to the conclusion of this agreement.” The time has come for regional countries to take their defence and security into their own hands. This is precisely what is happening now, he says.

Pakistan’s role in Gulf security is not new. In June 1954, King Saud bin Abdulaziz told Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad: “Pakistan’s strength is our strength.” The relationship acquired an institutional military dimension through the 1967 agreement for defence cooperation and a December 14, 1982, protocol. In the 1980s, more than 15,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia. Pakistani personnel also trained forces in other Arab states. Several PAF pilots participated in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Thousands of Arab officers and cadets continue to be trained at Pakistani military academies. These decades of cooperation form the foundation of the defence relationship today, including the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and the 2026 Makkah Joint Defence Agreement.

Pakistan and Turkey had also formed the northern tier alliance—later known as CENTO—in 1955 to guard against Soviet communist expansion. But despite that goal, Islamabad never sent troops to the Middle East under CENTO’s flag; the alliance had no standing force or command structures and failed to support Pakistan during its wars with India in 1965. The alliance was a broad Cold War framework for containing Soviet expansion.

The balancing role is part of the evolution in Pakistan’s regional security posture. Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a net security provider, extending its role beyond self-defence through exports, military training, operational experience and diplomatic engagement. Its ties with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, alongside working relationships with Iran, China and the United States, give Islamabad a unique position to bridge competing strategic interests.

The trilateral pact brings together three of the most powerful Muslim-majority countries.

According to Durrani, “Saudi Arabia needed defence partners such as Türkiye and Pakistan, with whom the United States maintains strong relationships. Over time, such an alliance could provide greater regional burden-sharing, allowing the US to rely more on capable regional partners to contribute to deterrence while reducing demands on its own forces.”

The agreement will likely establish clear institutional mechanisms. A committee of ministers — similar to the NATO — will be formed as part of the alliance, along with a secretariat based in Saudi Arabia. Operational details will be settled at the first committee meeting. The pact adopts a consultative approach to collective defence: in the event of an attack, the allies will decide through consultations the degree, form and format of support they will provide. This structure keeps the agreement flexible while establishing an institutional framework for cooperation. No country will be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked. This underscores the defensive nature of the arrangement.

Pakistan’s role in Gulf security is not new. In June 1954, King Saud bin Abdulaziz told Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad: “Pakistan’s strength is our strength.” The relationship acquired an institutional military dimension through the 1967 agreement on defence cooperation and a 1982 protocol. In the 1980s, more than 15,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia. Pakistani personnel also trained forces in other Arab states.

The agreement is not directed against any country, particularly Iran. As such it does not compromise Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the Middle East,” says Durrani. Since the agreement is not directed against Iran, he argues, Pakistan’s role as an honest broker remains intact. “Pakistan concluded its Strategic Military Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia on September 17 last year. Following that Islamabad ran the entire Iran-US diplomacy to defuse the crisis. How could that have been possible if ties were estranged?” he says.

Tehran’s initial reaction has been measured. Iran’s foreign ministry has said there is no reason to fear the pact. It has described it as part of a broad regional move towards greater security self-reliance.

Reactions from outside the three-member framework, however, have been more complicated. India has expressed concern over the arrangement. Although its Ministry of External Affairs has responded cautiously, analysts like Kabir Taneja and former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal have warned that the pact could have implications beyond the Middle East, particularly for Pakistan’s rivalry with India.

Yet, the alliance’s strategic rationale extends well beyond Pakistan’s rivalry with India. Pakistan demonstrated during the May 2025 conflict that its own capabilities and full-spectrum deterrence are sufficient to deal with India. The partnership can instead help the three countries complement one another and address financial, technological and operational gaps.

The more contentious interpretation concerns Israel and the regional balance. Some experts view the pact as directed primarily against what they describe as Israel’s regional expansionism, extending beyond Gaza and the West Bank to its territorial and military presence in Lebanon and Syria. They argue that the alliance could provide a stronger layer of institutionalised deterrence.

Notably, former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett has warned against Türkiye seeking a “hostile axis” with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities to “surround Israel.”

The alliance could, some experts argue, act as a significant check on Israel through institutionalised deterrence. The previous perception of Israel’s military invincibility has already been challenged by Iran, they say.

The question then is whether the framework could eventually become broader. Can, for instance, Iran join the alliance? “Certainly, it can. But that will take time,” says Durrani. “The existing mistrust needs to subside. There is also the issue of proxies. Until those issues are settled, Iran is unlikely to join in the near future.”

Egypt, a member of the R4 alliance comprising Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, could accede once certain technical matters are resolved. “Qatar and Kuwait are also potential future members. Kuwait has also recently ratified a defence agreement with Pakistan,” says Durrani.

The three countries bring a substantial pool of complementary defence and technological resources, says Air Marshal Arshad Malik (retired). Saudi Arabia has access to advanced US and European technologies; Pakistan brings extensive Chinese-origin technology and equipment alongside US systems; Türkiye combines indigenous capabilities with Russian- and US-origin systems. “This diversity will broaden the alliance’s technological base, reduce reliance on a single supplier and create opportunities for technology sharing and joint development,” he says.

Beyond technology, Pakistan brings another equally important asset: extensive operational experience and a battle-hardened military capability. Its strategic location gives the partnership added depth across South Asia, the Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean.

According to Air Marshal Malik, Türkiye’s military and strategic influence across Libya, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon gives the partnership an additional regional footprint. Its NATO membership provides access to established defence networks, interoperability standards and military expertise. “For Saudi Arabia, this could expand the alliance’s strategic reach, improve its ability to coordinate across multiple theatres and strengthen its regional deterrence posture.”

That regional reach is complemented by Türkiye’s growing defence-industrial strength. Türkiye has a strong defence industrial base, with advanced capabilities in drones and submarines and the development of its fifth-generation KAAN fighter.

According to Air Marshal Malik, “The Turkish aviation industry is excellent in ‘design and development’ of technology and aircraft.” PAF’s Kamra facilities, meanwhile, have developed strong capabilities at the final stages of the aerospace production cycle, including aircraft assembly, systems integration, weapons-system integration and simulation, avionics and electronic-systems integration — capabilities that could complement Türkiye’s aerospace industry. The two countries are also deepening defence-technology cooperation through joint research, development and the sharing of expertise in unmanned aerial systems.

Together, they could also help strengthen Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Military Industries and Saudi Arabian Military Industries and help them develop jets, drones and other defence equipment, says Air Marshal Malik.

The benefits could extend beyond defence production to intelligence cooperation. Saudi Arabia has traditionally relied heavily on intelligence coordination with its GCC neighbours. It could now gain access to a broader pool of intelligence from Pakistan and Türkiye.

The same logic of burden-sharing could also extend to maritime security. Saudi Arabia has announced a 14-nation Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance to secure Red Sea shipping and counter Houthi threats around Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez approaches.

The new alliance needs to develop robust command-and-control and joint command structures, Air Marshal Malik argues. These will help translate political commitments into coordinated military action. Beyond that, the three countries will need regular military staff interactions, common training programmes, wargames and joint exercises to improve interoperability, operational readiness and mutual understanding.

These mechanisms could help the three countries develop a coordinated regional military posture, expand their collective reach and strengthen deterrence. They can also enable coordinated strategic signalling, reinforce collective resolve, communicate a unified position on regional security issues and deter potential adversaries, Air Marshal Malik says.

The Middle East security architecture is changing. Regional powers are taking greater responsibility for their security and strengthening partnerships with trusted regional allies. Pakistan is not watching this transformation from the sidelines.

If this trajectory continues with strategic restraint, credible diplomacy and responsible leadership, Pakistan’s influence in the evolving Middle East security architecture is likely to grow further in the years ahead.

The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi.