audi Arabia has initiated efforts to establish a Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance to safeguard freedom of navigation and protect shipping through the strategic chokepoints of the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and the wider maritime corridor connecting the Middle East with Europe and Asia.

The alliance has emerged from the convergence of multiple strategic pressures rather than a single security incident. Rising tensions between Washington and Tehran have heightened uncertainty over regional energy corridors and Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have exposed the vulnerability of global supply chains and maritime trade.

The contours of the alliance, including its charter, operational mechanisms and the role of participating countries are still taking shape.

With some of the region’s most capable navies among its founding members, the emerging alliance now faces a defining question: will it evolve into an active mechanism to counter Houthi capabilities or serves primarily as a long-term deterrent, signalling that disruption of critical maritime routes will trigger a coordinated regional response?

On July 20, the Houthi movement announced a maritime navigation ban targeting Saudi vessels in response to what it described as “long-running restrictions and air strikes.” The Houthis also threatened Saudi-linked oil transport infrastructure and tankers, raising concerns over regional energy exports. In the meantime, a drone strike caused fires on two gas vessels at Egypt’s Mediterranean port of Damietta and attacks and threats near Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu increased concerns over the safety of global oil shipping routes.

These developments unfolded amid growing tensions between the United States and Iran, which have heightened concerns over the security of regional energy corridors. The Saudis, who cannot rely solely on the Strait of Hormuz for oil exports, are increasingly depending on the East-West Pipeline, which transports crude oil overland to the port of Yanbu. From there, tankers move through the Suez Canal towards Mediterranean destinations and European markets, or through Bab-el-Mandeb towards Asia and the Far East that face heightened disruption risks.

These attacks prompted Saudi Arabia to seek the creation of a Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance to protect freedom of navigation, commercial shipping and global energy supplies in the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. The 14 founding members of the alliance include Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Comoros, underscoring the Red Sea’s shared security burden. Other signatories include Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Yemen, Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

This is not the first such effort. In 2024, the European Union had created a coalition to protect shipping in the Red Sea under the code name Operation Aspides. Its term is set to expire next year.

Talking to The News on Sunday, Pakistan’s former ambassador Abdul Basit said: “This initiative signals Saudi Arabia’s transition from reactive crisis management to the proactive design of durable regional security frameworks, grounded in the principle that protecting the Red Sea is a collective duty of the coastal states. This demonstrates the Kingdom’s capacity to build wide-ranging security consensus and to strengthen its role in defining the future of collective security across the Middle East.”

While the alliance brings together key regional players, its effectiveness will depend on operational coordination, political consensus and the ability of member states to translate diplomatic commitments into maritime capabily. The initial objective is to focus on the Red Sea. However, there is also an indication of a larger post-conflict security architecture that many Islamic countries appear to be considering. The naval component may only be the beginning of a wider regional security arrangement.

The 14 founding members of the alliance include Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Comoros, underscoring the Red Sea’s shared security burden. Other signatories include Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Yemen, Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

“The naval alliance can deliver results if its all 14 members and other Muslim countries coordinate effectively and create synergies between their capabilities. If that happens, then there is no reason why they cannot ensure that shipping remains uninterrupted in the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. The Houthis will also have to consider how far they can go.”

Notably, the UAE, India and Oman are not among the signatories. Oman’s long-standing neutrality — even within the GCC — and its special historical ties with Iran explain its stance. During the 1965-1976 Dhofar rebellion, Iranian forces played a key role in helping Oman suppress the insurgency, shaping Oman’s traditionally balanced relations with Tehran. As a result, Oman has not joined the Red Sea initiative, viewing the issue as distant from its primary strategic concern: the Strait of Hormuz, says Basit. “The UAE maintains close relations with Saudi Arabia, but it has not signed the charter so far. It may do so in the future.”

“India has also not signed the document. While it maintains good relations with Saudi Arabia, its ties with the UAE are particularly strong,” he said, adding, “India’s engagement with the UAE may be closer. It is possible that New Delhi is waiting to see how the UAE’s position evolves.”

Discussing the naval capabilities of the alliance’s founding members, Pakistan’s former naval attaché to Iran, Rear Admiral Faisal Shah (retired), says the navies of Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt possess significant maritime capabilities and could effectively achieve the alliance’s objectives.

Despite its long-standing policy of avoiding direct involvement in regional conflicts, Pakistan Navy’s experience with the Combined Maritime Forces and its service objectives place Pakistan among the key maritime security partners in the emerging framework.

Rear Admiral Shah says Pakistan Navy’s extensive experience with the Combined Maritime Forces, established in 2003, positions it among the best-suited regional navies for operations in West Asia. “Over the past 23 years, we have participated in and commanded multinational maritime task forces several times. Our expertise, training and understanding of the region will be valuable for this coalition,” he says.

While Pakistan is not a part of the current conflict, it has “the greatest stakes in the region, given its proximity to Iran, defence pact with Saudi Arabia and reliance on maritime routes for over 90 percent of its trade and 80 percent of its oil and gas supplies. We stand for freedom of navigation and peace in this region.”

Explaining Pakistan Navy’s primary objectives, Rear Admiral Shah says the country’s territorial defence and protection of sea lanes of communication are the primary objectives. “The key maritime routes for Pakistan are the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Through our Regional Maritime Security Patrol, we maintain a 24/7 presence in these areas to ensure the safety and security of shipping to and from Pakistan,” he says.

There has been close cooperation between the navies of Pakistan and Türkiye. Both these navies, he says, could play a major role if the maritime security architecture develops further. “It appears that the Pakistan Navy and the Turkish Navy will be the main players and the security guarantors,” he says.

Discussing the limits of maritime patrols, Rear Admiral Shah says that securing strategic waterways requires addressing threats at their source. “Whatever is happening at sea starts and finishes on land. If the Houthis remain entrenched on shore, they will continue to influence this waterway. Expanding on a possible escalation scenario, he says that any sustained military effort will likely require coordinated ground operations aimed at degrading Houthi capabilities and restricting access to ports, missile launch sites, surveillance facilities and other infrastructure used to target commercial shipping. “Such operations will complement maritime patrols by reducing the Houthis’ ability to project force against vessels transiting the Red Sea. During Operation Aspides, European, American and British forces targeted Houthi positions on land with missiles and rockets to weaken their capabilities,” he says.

In the absence of a formal alliance charter and amid growing Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping and oil exports, Rear Admiral Shah believes the proposed naval alliance should be viewed less as preparation for conflict and more as a strategic effort to demonstrate regional unity, coordination and maritime capability.

The initiative also conveys a message to the Houthis that attacks on commercial shipping will attract broad regional coordination. Its long-term significance, however, will depend on whether the participating states can transform political alignment into an effective and sustainable maritime security framework.

The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi.