ndian violations of the Indus Waters Treaty have raised existential concerns for Pakistan’s economic stability and food security of more than 250 million people.

India is pursuing a three-pronged water-denial strategy: using tunnels, diversions and large dams to control the flow of shared rivers to Pakistan. This could cause or aggravate drought-like conditions as well as raise the risk of floods.

Among the most recent developments raising concern in Pakistan is the plan to divert a portion of Chenab waters through the proposed Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel.

Talking to The News on Sunday, Pakistan’s former ambassador to India, Abdul Basit says, “In a significant and potentially dangerous new development, India has reportedly sought tenders for the 113-kilometre Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel to divert water from the River Chenab to the River Beas. This will take away up to 1.9 million acre-feet of Chenab water.”

This will seriously impact water availability in Pakistan and is a stark violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. “While the Indus Waters Treaty allows India limited non-consumptive use of the western rivers for hydroelectric projects, it does not permit the storage or transfer of water to deprive Pakistan of its rightful share,” Basit says.

Fast-tracking of construction on the controversial projects has followed India’s unilateral announcement last year to ‘suspend’ the treaty. India is fast-tracking at least four major hydro projects in the upper reaches of the Chenab: Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwar (540 MW) and Ratle (850 MW). It also plans to raise the height of the Kishanganga Dam and to build the Sawalkote Hydropower Project and expand the Ranbir Canal.

The Indian approach is consistent with its broader posture towards neighbouring countries. India and Bangladesh share 54 rivers. Bangladesh, the lower riparian, has frequently complained of India’s inconsiderate water management. The Teesta River dispute has emerged as a key flashpoint. Dhaka has complained of reduced dry-season flows due to upstream use and irrigation projects in India’s Sikkim and West Bengal, affecting agriculture, fisheries and livelihoods. More than a decade after a draft agreement was reached in 2011, the Teesta water-sharing issues remain unresolved amid India’s reluctance to sign an interim arrangement.

Bangladesh is also seeking assurances from India over the renewal of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, which is set to expire in December 2026. The agreement had helped manage the dispute over the Farakka Barrage, built by India in 1975 on the Ganges near the Bangladesh border to divert water into the Hooghly River.

Of late, Bangladesh has internationalised its water concerns by acceding to the UN Water Convention to push for stronger legal mechanisms as a lower riparian state. Bangladesh, with China’s support, is also pursuing a Teesta River management project aimed at dredging, flood control, irrigation and water management.

These developments underline how water disputes in South Asia have moved beyond bilateral disagreements and become part of wide debates over rights, obligations and regional water security — a challenge that also informs Pakistan’s concerns.

Ambassador Basit says the Indus Waters Treaty has long been subject of political debate in India, long before the BJP framed it in terms of the alleged cross-border terrorism in 2014. “The core of this internal critique is the argument that the treaty, signed under then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, granted Pakistan significant control over the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum and Chenab—which they consider an overly generous allocation.” They also argue that Nehru conceded too much by preventing India from desilting its dams.

India has never fully complied with the treaty obligations. Pakistan’s concerns include limited data transparency, insufficient flood forecasting cooperation, irregular engagement at commissioner-level meetings and critically inadequate consultation on new hydroelectric and diversion projects particularly the Ratle and Kishanganga hydroelectric projects that have the potential to reduce water flows to Pakistan.

After India placed the IWT in abeyance Pakistan approached the Permanent Court of Arbitration and UN Special Rapporteurs who ruled in its favour. “The PCA upheld Islamabad’s position that India could not unilaterally hold the treaty in abeyance and that it must allow the unrestricted flow of the western rivers to Pakistan.”

The PCA also issued a supplemental award focusing on “maximum reservoir size,” placing substantive limits on Ratle Hydroelectric Plant and the Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project. It said that installed capacities must be justified by actual operational necessities.

The UN Special Rapporteurs have also raised concerns that India’s actions may constitute violations of international obligations. India has, however, disputed the PCA’s jurisdiction saying it does not recognise the court or its rulings. “India objected that these dispute resolution mechanisms cannot operate simultaneously and must proceed sequentially. However, the World Bank does not consider this argument tenable as these are inherent parts of the IWT’s dispute addressing mechanisms.”

India has recently fast-tracked construction work on at least four major hydro projects in the upper reaches of the Chenab: Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Kiru (624 MW), Kwar (540 MW) and Ratle (850 MW). It also plans to raise the height of the Kishanganga Dam and to build the Sawalkote Hydropower Project and expand the Ranbir Canal.

The legal battle over the treaty is complicated by its unique design. Journalist Fahd Hussain says: “Most water treaties divide water by percentage. The Indus Waters Treaty is unique as it divides the rivers themselves rather than sharing their waters.” This has created complexity because “while the treaty gave Pakistan rights over certain rivers, it also created a strategic vulnerability because the rivers originate upstream and regulation and flow data availability are influenced by developments in India.”

Pointing out Indian manipulation of river flows, Fahd highlighted that prolonged dry spells last year were followed by the release of water that contributed to flooding in parts of south Punjab and Lahore in August and September.

After approaching the Court of Arbitration and UN Special Rapporteurs, Pakistan is considering taking India to the International Court of Justice. It is also lobbying at the UN and through other diplomatic channels.

Basit says that reliance on law alone is insufficient. India’s lack of full compliance has limited the effectiveness of the treaty and the international law. He says a broader and more integrated strategy is required, combining international legal expertise with diplomatic engagement and technical hydrological analysis.

Basit says Pakistan should also “expand its negotiating agenda beyond the western rivers. This includes negotiating water allocations from the Ravi and Beas rivers. This issue was overlooked at the time of signing the treaty. Ravi is critical for recharging aquifers for Lahore and adjoining areas,” he says.

Basit says India is unlikely to return to substantive treaty negotiations until it has completed major ongoing hydropower and infrastructure projects that it is undertaking now. “Only after these projects become operational is India expected to approach talks so that it can present its enhanced infrastructure and capabilities as fait accompli.”

India maintains that its water use despite through new projects, remains within the limits set under the Indus Waters Treaty. Fahd disputes the claim. According to Pakistan’s assessment, “the Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel project is designed to divert about 1.9 million acre-feet of water from the Chenab into the Beas basin. This alone is significant and should be viewed together with India’s other storage, diversion and hydroelectric projects. Pakistan must strengthen its factual and statistical arguments to demonstrate that India’s cumulative withdrawals, diversions and storage have exceeded treaty limits and cannot be ignored, he says.

Fahd says deep mutual mistrust persists between the two sides. He says it is rooted in unresolved disputes that have accumulated over decades. Given the current level of distrust, he doubts the prospects of meaningful engagement.

Recently, some Indian ministers vowed publicly to stop all river water flowing into Pakistan. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, as well as the ministers for home and water resources said that India would use its position as the upper riparian state to ‘punish’ its neighbour.

Calling these statements as illegal and immoral, Fahd says Islamabad must ask the global community to take note. “New Delhi is weaponising water in a clear violation of international norms,” he says. Fahd warns that any disruption of river flows will threaten farmers’ livelihoods from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to Sindh. “Any serious threat to the flow of these waters will represent a strategic challenge for Pakistan.”

Highlighting that Pakistan’s National Security Committee has already declared India’s proposed water diversion an act of war, Fahd says the gravity of the situation could force Pakistan to consider kinetic options. He acknowledges that a military option would be undesirable and should remain a last resort, but argues that Pakistan needs to urgently assess its options to persuade India to restore the treaty and ensure the continued flow of water essential to the lives and livelihoods of millions of Pakistanis.

For now, an early agreement appears unlikely. Basit cautions: “public positions on both sides may further narrow the space for dialogue. Effective diplomacy often requires patience, discretion and sustained engagement to find common ground. Serious negotiations can create openings for both sides.”

Despite the growing tensions, he argues that a lasting solution to the water dispute will ultimately require a balance between legal, diplomatic and technical approaches rather than escalation.

The writer is a senior The News staffer in Karachi.