In 1866, the US Supreme Court sat in judgment on the trial of a civilian by military commission as an emergency measure. It held that the constitution “is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace”, and went on: “No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism”.
Our own Supreme Court arrived at the same conclusion. In Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari v Federation of Pakistan, it reckoned that by the fall of Dhaka, Pakistanis had enjoyed their fundamental rights for only seven years, six months and 14 days of the country’s 24 years, four months and two days. It tied the fall of Dhaka to emergencies and fundamental rights held in suspension.
Today, after the president proclaimed emergency in 12 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under Article 232 and placed the entire province under governor’s rule under Article 234, this is where we stand: the elected head of a province of 40.86 million people is the subject of a habeas corpus petition filed by his own family.
What the moment demands is a return to the fundamental principles. Why does the constitution matter and what becomes of a state whose rulers cease to believe that it does?
Political Science offers a familiar account of how societies escaped anarchy. Individuals surrendered their liberty to a sovereign in exchange for security. American constitutional experience illustrates the other half of the bargain. A sovereign that retains every power entrusted to it becomes an agent of disorder. Anarchy can arise from below, and it can descend from above, through the unchecked exercise of power, which we call tyranny.
A constitution that separates powers, as Pakistan’s, is the instrument the prudent part of the world devised to guard against both. James Madison perfectly captured it: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary”. And since men are not angels, we have constitutions. Without one, we are left with tyranny and anarchy, each feeding the other. No institution and no citizen is safe without it, for the constitution is what keeps the worst human instincts of tyranny and anarchy in check.
Article 234 has an unflattering ancestry. Its predecessor was Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935, through which colonial governors assumed control of provinces whose politics displeased the Raj. The Congress and the Muslim League both denounced it, even on the eve of Partition. India retained it nonetheless; its framers assured the Constituent Assembly that it would remain a “dead letter”.
Our own framers were conflicted about it. When the 1935 Act was adapted as Pakistan’s interim constitution, Section 93 was omitted; within a year, Section 92A was inserted to perform much the same function. Commenting on Section 92A in Dwarkadas v The State, Justice Cornelius hoped it would not necessarily yield purely authoritarian rule, since the province’s will would remain represented in the central cabinet and the central legislature.
That hope rested on an assumption that the centre would itself be a creature of the people’s will and therefore a genuine check on the emergency power. After February 2024, one of the most disputed elections in the country’s recent history, few could entertain this assumption. The federal check on which J Cornelius relied now rests with the very parliament whose mandate is most in doubt. The hopes were belied.
Madison also identified the same dilemma our framers faced when omitting and reinstating section 93: “you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself”. Emergency powers test the second obligation. Our order has discharged the first well enough. What it has never achieved is the discipline to keep that power from encroaching.
Every era since Pakistan’s inception has produced its own ingenious schemes to circumvent the constitution: the doctrine of necessity, martial law, presidents dissolving assemblies at will. Each actor sought a loophole to concentrate power in one hand. General Zia dismissed the constitution as a booklet he could tear up. General Musharraf, in the same spirit, called it a piece of paper fit for the dustbin and when the time came to set it aside, he was careful to hold it “in abeyance”, a choice of words calculated to keep Article 6 at bay. Interestingly, the booklet outlived them both. History owed them a lesson and it delivered one in 2024, when the Supreme Court upheld that Musharraf had committed high treason.
Today’s ingenious scheme is the emergency clause, a power reserved for genuine crises such as the one in 1998, now deployed against a party KP has returned to power three times since 2013.
As much as one might be tempted to dress it in verbose and complex arguments, the case is painfully simple. A constitution exists because people distrust those who wield power, and it bridges that distrust. Erode it and the distrust returns.
During the war on terror, the chasm between the people of KP and the government made militancy harder to defeat, because militants fed on grievances the state refused to hear. An elected chief minister held for days, and an entire province’s chosen representatives branded as sympathisers and facilitators of terrorism, reopens that space.
With the executive having acted and parliament having acquiesced, all eyes turn to the courts. The common law world long ago abandoned the maxim that the ‘laws fall silent when the canons roar’, preferring Lord Atkin’s dissent: “amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent’.
After 9/11, in cases concerning detainees at Guantanamo, the US Supreme Court held that even those the government branded enemy combatants could seek habeas corpus. American scholars have criticised those judgments for being toothless.
Measured against our own precedents, I would say they were a considerable feat. Pakistan is still waiting to learn whether a habeas petition for the elected chief minister of 40 million people will evenbe entertained.
Emergency powers must exist. The question is whether a state can be trusted to wield them.
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.