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The missing reform

September 11, 2026
This representational image shows a gavel and scales of justice. — Reuters/File
This representational image shows a gavel and scales of justice. — Reuters/File

Pakistan has spent decades debating institutional reform – constitutional amendments, civil-service restructuring, police reform, judicial independence, decentralisation. Yet one question receives far less attention: what behaviour do our institutions actually produce, and what character do they reward?

In a recent article, Justice (r) Syed Mansoor Ali Shah argues that Pakistan’s incomplete transition from colonial rule is not merely a problem of laws or design but rather also a problem of mindset and character. That insight extends across nearly every state institution. A constitution can provide judicial independence but cannot produce courageous judges. Police laws can prescribe professionalism but cannot guarantee an officer resists unlawful pressure. Civil-service rules can require neutrality but cannot ensure an official chooses principle over advancement.

It is easy to blame individuals for corruption and expediency. But people respond to incentives. When a civil servant who refuses an improper instruction is transferred, while one who complies is rewarded, the system teaches everyone watching a powerful lesson. The same applies to policing, universities and business: wherever influence outperforms professionalism and merit, rational people learn to pursue influence. Bad incentives produce compromised behaviour; compromised behaviour weakens institutions; weak institutions breed public cynicism; and cynicism further lowers standards. The answer is not another law or authority but examining how institutions shape conduct.

Countries that transformed governance did not rely on moral sermons; they redesigned incentives. Singapore paired merit-based recruitment with competitive pay and strict anti-corruption enforcement, making integrity compatible with advancement rather than a sacrifice. South Korea linked bureaucratic performance to development goals. Estonia digitised public services to reduce petty corruption. Georgia’s post-2003 police reforms overhauled recruitment, pay, and patronage networks. None offer a ready-made model for Pakistan, but they share one principle: institutional character changes when incentives and protection for integrity are deliberately engineered.

Pakistan’s deeper problem is not a shortage of laws but the gap between law and implementation. We respond to institutional failure by creating another regulation or committee, but these cannot substitute for integrity. A judge must sometimes say no; a police officer must sometimes refuse an unlawful order; a civil servant must sometimes resist political pressure. These are questions of character, but it is unjust to demand integrity from individuals while designing institutions that punish those who practise it. The goal must be an environment that protects and rewards integrity, not merely preaches it.

A lasting colonial legacy is the relationship between authority and the individual: the state as something to be feared or negotiated through intermediaries, rather than owned by the citizen. Independence changed the flag and the government, but that relationship often survived. Many citizens still believe a legitimate service requires a reference, or that a police complaint moves faster with influence. The essential transition – from ‘who do you know’ to ‘what are you entitled to’ – is not merely administrative. It is a transformation in the character of the state, and it depends on whether institutions protect those who insist on rights and due process.

The most revealing test of an institution is what happens to the person who refuses an illegal instruction, corruption or nepotism. If that person is transferred, isolated or denied promotion, the institution teaches everyone else to stay silent. Pakistan needs stronger protection for principled dissent – not indiscipline, but the ability to lawfully object without fear of retaliation. That protection also depends on the values people carry into public life before facing such a test.

Justice Shah’s emphasis on history, philosophy and literature matters here. Our education system often rewards memorisation over judgment: students learn constitutional provisions without grasping why constitutionalism matters and rights without civic responsibility. Education should teach young people to wrestle with hard questions. Should an unlawful order be obeyed, does loyalty require concealing wrongdoing, what does honesty cost and is it still worth paying? Technical education produces professionals; the humanities help produce citizens. Pakistan needs both, but education alone cannot carry reform; institutions must ensure that acting on good judgment doesn’t end a career.

We often equate success with wealth, office and access; the person who can make one phone call to get something done is admired more than the one who insists on due process. That is a dangerous social signal. We need to restore respect for a different kind of success: competence without arrogance, authority without abuse, public service without personal enrichment. Culture changes when families celebrate the relative who refused an improper favour as much as the one who became powerful.

Successful countries didn’t wait for perfect citizens; they built systems that made wrongdoing difficult and rewarded good behaviour: reduced discretion, traceable decisions, independent complaint mechanisms, transparent appointments. The ombudsman model illustrates this: a citizen without money or access can seek redress through an independent institution, shifting the relationship with the state from patronage to rights.

Pakistan needs a practical programme, not another slogan-driven campaign: educate for character through ethics and civic history; reward integrity in recruitment and promotion; protect principled dissent; and design for accountability by reducing arbitrary discretion. The ultimate test of a state is not how elegantly its laws are written, but what happens when a powerful person wants something the law does not permit. Does the institution bend, or does it say no?

Pakistan has repeatedly tried to reform institutions from the outside, through new laws and structures. The next stage must go deeper – reforming the incentives, education, and culture that shape the people who operate those institutions. Because institutions ultimately reflect the behaviour they reward. And if independence means citizens, not rulers, are sovereign, completing it requires changing the state’s character itself.


The writer is a former AJK IGP and former Karachi police chief.