August 2027 will mark the 80th anniversary of Pakistan’s independence. The occasion should prompt national stocktaking.
In eight decades, Pakistan survived wars, dismemberment, political upheavals, terrorism and repeated economic crises. Yet it has failed to build a state that consistently educates its children, dispenses timely justice, collects taxes fairly, protects the vulnerable or enables businesses to compete internationally.
The anniversary comes at a potentially important moment. Pakistan’s geostrategic relevance has improved. Its location connects China, Central Asia, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Its military capabilities matter in an unstable region, while its mineral resources have attracted fresh attention. China wants to move CPEC from infrastructure towards industry; others are exploring critical-mineral partnerships; Gulf states increasingly view Pakistan through security, food, minerals and investment.
This creates an opening, but also a familiar danger. Pakistan has often turned strategic importance into external assistance but not internal capability. Geography can attract attention, loans, deposits and diplomatic support. It cannot guarantee investment, exports or development. Countries invest at scale where contracts are enforced, law and order prevails, policies remain predictable and institutions deliver.
Pakistan should therefore launch a ten-year constitutional reform programme with clear milestones: credible elections, civilian control of policy, faster justice, universal foundational learning, a broader tax base, empowered local governments and an unequivocal monopoly of the state over organised force.
Pakistan needs strong, professional defence. And national policy must ultimately rest under constitutional civilian authority. The army should protect the borders; elected governments should govern; courts should uphold the constitution; businesses should create wealth; schools should build human capital; and citizens should choose – and remove – their leaders.
The starting point must be a national political settlement. Political parties, the military, judiciary and provinces need not agree on every policy. They must commit to enforceable rules: elections determine governments; transfers of power are respected; defence institutions focus on defence; courts adjudicate rather than manage politics; and accountability applies to all, not selectively to opponents.
Without such a settlement, governments remain preoccupied with survival. Policies change with personalities, task forces fail in their tasks, projects are undertaken and abandoned and administrations dismantle predecessors’ legacies. Investors can endure difficult conditions more readily than permanent uncertainty. Stability, however, must not become a licence for elected autocracy; civilian supremacy must include parliamentary scrutiny, independent courts, transparent public finances, credible elections and empowered local government.
Rule of law should be treated as economic infrastructure. Pakistan should set time limits for commercial disputes, digitise case management, professionalise prosecution and policing, and complete reliable land records. Roads and power plants cannot sustain growth if citizens and businesses cannot enforce contracts, protect property rights or resolve disputes predictably. The poor suffer most when justice must be purchased.
Education must similarly be redefined as national security. Pakistan should guarantee foundational literacy and numeracy by age ten, keep girls in school through secondary level, link teacher pay and promotion to classroom performance, and align vocational training with industry demand. Higher allocations matter only if they buy measurable learning.
An educated girl is more likely to join the workforce, marry later, slow down population growth and raise a healthier, better-educated family. A technically skilled young population can attract investment, adopt technology and raise productivity. Without this, Pakistan’s demographic dividend will become a demographic burden.
Economic restructuring must shift burdens from compliant taxpayers. Pakistan should cut wasteful expenditure, reduce losses in state-owned enterprises, simplify regulation, broaden taxation to agriculture, real estate, retail and transport and then lower excessive rates on the formal sector. Reform should reward compliance, investment and exports – not access to influence.
Energy reform must move beyond tariff increases to cut transmission losses, theft and circular debt through better governance and competitive procurement. Agriculture needs better seeds, water pricing, mechanisation, storage, finance and market access. Industrial policy should support firms that export, raise productivity and adopt technology – not those seeking permanent protection at the cost of consumers.
The purpose is not simply faster growth. It is growth that creates employment, spreads opportunity across regions and enables citizens to improve their lives without political patronage.
Corruption must be attacked through systems rather than slogans. Digital procurement, electronic government payments, verifiable asset declarations, beneficial-ownership disclosure and transparent land records can reduce discretion and make wrongdoing harder to conceal. Accountability institutions should themselves be accountable and prevented from becoming instruments of political engineering.
Devolution is equally important. Provincial autonomy cannot end at provincial capitals. Pakistan should hold regular local elections, give municipal governments predictable revenues, professional staff and published service standards and make them responsible for transport, water, sanitation, building regulation and primary service delivery.
A citizen-centred state must also establish an unequivocal monopoly over organised force. Armed non-state groups may appear to provide tactical leverage but ultimately weaken sovereignty, damage international standing, deter investment and threaten domestic security. Only the constitutional state can legitimately use force.
Relations with India require a similar recalibration. Pakistan must maintain credible defence while pursuing managed competition through trade, visas, crisis communications, confidence-building measures and structured negotiations. Engagement does not require abandoning disputes. It recognises that permanent confrontation imposes economic and human costs, especially on the smaller economy.
None of this will be easy because the present system protects privilege while separating authority from accountability. A new settlement should define the bargain plainly: the military receives the resources, autonomy and respect needed for defence, while elected governments control policy; political parties receive constitutional security, while accepting internal democracy, transparent financing and impartial accountability; provinces retain autonomy, while raising revenue, improving services and devolving power locally; businesses receive stability, competitive tax rates and a level playing field, while investing, exporting and paying their fair share. Citizens, in turn, should receive better education, justice, security and services and a meaningful vote to reward or remove leaders.
By its 90th anniversary, Pakistan should measure national power differently: literacy, female workforce participation, productivity, exports, judicial efficiency, energy reliability, municipal services and declining poverty. These are not alternatives to national security. They are its foundations. While those who helped save the country from default must be recognised, we should move to celebrating the success of those who address the deep underlying flaws that affect the citizens, especially the less privileged.
Renewed geostrategic importance has given Pakistan another opportunity. But strategic rents are temporary; institutional capability is enduring. The question is whether we will again use our location to ‘manage’ the next crisis or use this opening to ‘build’ the republic our citizens deserve.
The writer is a former CEO of Unilever Pakistan and of the Pakistan Business Council.
