The debate over creating new provinces has resurfaced with considerable force. The main argument is that Pakistan’s existing provinces are too large to be governed effectively and that smaller provinces would bring government closer to the people and improve governance.
The argument sounds plausible. But before undertaking such a fundamental constitutional restructuring, we need to ask a basic question: what evidence do we have that the size of our provinces is the principal cause of poor governance? Has any serious government study or empirical assessment established this? If so, its findings should be made public. Otherwise, we risk prescribing a constitutional remedy without first establishing the disease.
There is no doubt that geographical size can pose administrative challenges. But size alone cannot explain governance failure. If smaller administrative units automatically produced better government, other countries’ experience would be far more compelling. It is not. India provides an instructive comparison. Uttar Pradesh has a population almost equal to that of Pakistan as a whole, yet remains a single state within the Indian Union. Its size has not made India ungovernable. Nor has the creation of smaller Indian states automatically produced better governance.
The history of Indian state reorganisation is equally instructive. The major reorganisation of 1956 was driven principally by linguistic and cultural identities and sustained regional movements. The later creation of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Telangana reflected varying combinations of regional identity, political mobilisation and perceptions of economic or political neglect. Administrative convenience was a consideration, but ‘smaller is better governed’ was not the central principle.
This raises the more important question for Pakistan: what exactly are we trying to achieve by creating new provinces? The first consideration should be democratic legitimacy. Any fundamental restructuring of the federation should be preceded by genuinely elected governments and representative institutions capable of determining whether there is a real, sustained and broad-based public demand for such change.
This does not mean that genuine provincial demands should be dismissed. Where a region has demonstrated a clear and sustained popular aspiration for provincial status, it deserves serious consideration. Bahawalpur, southern Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan, for example, have distinctive claims that merit examination of their individual circumstances, history and public sentiment.
But even a legitimate demand for a new province should not be confused with a solution to Pakistan’s broader governance problem. The immediate priority should be to make government genuinely representative and responsive. The next should be to empower elected local government. Article 140A already provides the constitutional basis for devolving political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to elected local representatives. Yet this provision has never been implemented with the consistency and constitutional protection its spirit envisaged.
This is where the debate should begin. Local governments are closest to citizens and should be responsible for many of the services that determine everyday quality of life, schools, basic health facilities, water supply, sanitation, waste management, local roads, parks, building permissions and other municipal functions. Giving them real authority, predictable finances, administrative capacity and security of tenure would bring government much closer to the citizen than merely creating another provincial capital. Dr Farrukh Saleem has made a similar argument in these pages, pointing out that structural change alone does not cure institutional failure and that the real test is whether ordinary citizens receive better services.
Alongside meaningful local government, provincial institutions themselves need greater capacity and professionalism. This includes an impartial, capable and professionally trained police service, free from political interference and enjoying the confidence of the public. Without effective and trusted law enforcement, neither decentralisation nor administrative reform can translate into a secure environment or effective governance.
The wider reform agenda should therefore focus on building institutional capacity and improving actual service delivery rather than simply redrawing administrative boundaries. The objective should be to make existing institutions work better before creating new ones. There is also a compelling reason for particular caution at this moment. Pakistan is already confronting serious internal security challenges, including terrorism and insurgency. At a time when the state needs political cohesion and administrative focus, should we voluntarily open another major front of constitutional, political and administrative contestation?
Creating provinces is not a routine administrative exercise. It involves constitutional amendments, provincial boundaries, representation, distribution of resources and assets, institutional restructuring and inevitably competing political interests. The process could generate prolonged political friction. Why invite another source of instability when the country is already dealing with serious security and economic challenges?
This is not an argument for freezing Pakistan’s provincial structure forever. If, after genuine democratic consultation and a comprehensive assessment, a region demonstrates sustained public demand and a compelling case that provincial status would improve representation, governance and development, the constitutional process should be available to consider it. To start this process requires a sequence.
First, ensure genuinely representative government. Then establish meaningful and constitutionally protected local government under a strengthened Article 140A. Build provincial institutional capacity, including an impartial and politically neutral police service that commands public confidence. Improve service delivery and address the actual causes of governance failure. And where a clear and sustained popular demand for a new province nevertheless remains, consider it through the constitutional process. In this context, Bahawalpur, southern Punjab or ‘Panjnad’, as veteran political leader Javed Hashmi has suggested, and Gilgit-Baltistan could provide a reasonable starting point. These cases have the advantage of reflecting established regional aspirations and, in varying degrees, the support of major political parties. Gilgit-Baltistan could be considered initially on a provisional basis, subject to final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
The debate should therefore not begin with the question, ‘How many provinces should Pakistan have?’ It should begin with a more fundamental question: why are the governments we already have unable to govern effectively? If we do not answer that question, changing provincial boundaries may simply reproduce the same failures under different names. Pakistan may not have a problem of too few provinces. It may have a problem of too little democracy, too little devolution and too little accountability. Let us establish the cause before prescribing the cure.
The writer is a former inspector general of police (Punjab) and a former Punjab caretaker home minister.
