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The United Nations Security Council’s structure has essentially remained the same since 1965, when the number of non-permanent seats increased to 10, bringing the total membership to 15. The permanent members have retained their veto power under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter.
Since 2008, UNSC members have been engaged in Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN), focused on a more equitable representation of all members, while increasing the overall membership. It is structured around five clusters: categories of membership, veto, representation of all regions, size of council and working method.
The central question in the UNSC debate is whether increasing the number of permanent members strengthens or weakens the council. The current number of member states is a body that still represents the victors of 1945 and cannot claim legitimacy while excluding entire continents from its decision-making. Africa lacks permanent seats, while Latin America, South Asia and parts of the Muslim world remain underrepresented.
Proponents argue that the UNSC’s deadlock will not be cured by adding more veto-holding members, since a single veto can nullify a resolution, no matter how much support it has. Recent US vetoes of the Gaza ceasefire resolution illustrate how a single veto can override near-unanimous consensus.
To prevent this, experts propose that in an expanded council, a resolution backed by three-quarters of members should be immune to a single veto. This logic runs parallel to the 2022 ‘Veto Initiative’, the General Assembly resolution 76/262, which now obliges the assembly to hold mandatory debate whenever a P5 member casts a veto, and the French-led political declaration on voluntary veto restraint that calls on the five permanent UNSC members (P5) to voluntarily refrain from using their veto power in situations involving mass atrocities and large-scale war crimes.
Experts on the subject caution against the outright abolition of the veto power, as removing it entirely may cause the P5 members to lose interest in the UN as a sought-after forum entirely. A more realistic path would be to introduce accountability mechanisms, such as the mandatory-debate model, to make the P5 more responsible in how they use the veto, rather than eliminating it outright. One recent proposal suggests that adding new ‘associate permanent member’ seats without individual veto power, together with existing permanent members, could collectively override a unilateral veto if two-thirds of an expanded council and two-thirds of the General Assembly agreed.
Beyond the question of which states hold power, the reform debate also intersects with the changing nature of security threats themselves. Threats like terrorism and transnational crime increasingly exceed the council’s interstate framework, prompting calls for procedural adaptation and greater civil society input, currently limited to informal Arria-formula meetings.
The UNSC reform debate is defined by different schools of thought, championed by four primary blocs. The G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) campaign for individual permanent seats, citing their economic weight, population and financial contributions.
The African Group, made up of 54 African Union (AU) Member states, demands a distinct package: no fewer than two permanent seats with full prerogatives, including the veto as it exists, and five non-permanent seats in an expanded Council, as the correction of a historical injustice. The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, including Pakistan, Italy, Mexico, Argentina, Canada and South Korea, rejects any expansion of the permanent category outright, whether or not veto power is attached, instead favouring a longer-term, re-electable non-permanent category.
The L69 Group of developing countries, including India, Brazil, and most of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), broadly supports expansion in both categories, aligning loosely with G4 and African aspirations.
China, a P5 member state, supports the council’s permanent membership in principle but opposes the inclusion of Japan and India individually. Beijing fears Japan would diminish its own regional standing as Asia’s sole permanent member, while India’s candidacy is seen as a result of its alignment with Washington, a strategic outcome China is unwilling to reward.
Pakistan is one of the most consistent opponents of increasing the permanent seats. As a leading member of the UfC, it opposes expanding the council’s permanent membership, with or without a veto, and views the G4’s efforts to secure individual permanent seats as a hurdle to progress. Reforms in the UNSC must address all the different clusters of debate rather than just favouring a few. Pakistan also rejects non-veto permanent seats, as such seats might ingrain the status quo and undermine accountability for some, which will be against the spirit of reform.
Pakistan is a supporter of the slogan ‘Reforms for all, privilege for none’. This idea supports expanding the elected non-permanent seats, as reiterated in the Italy-Colombia paper, a compromise proposal on UNSC reform. Experts offer a formula: allotting seats to regions rather than individual states, with rotation every two to four years.
Pakistan’s opposition to India’s candidacy was also linked directly to India’s record on Occupied Kashmir, which shows a pattern of non-compliance with UNSC resolutions that a new permanent seat would effectively reward rather than correct. Pakistan itself calls for the veto’s abolition or severe restriction, arguing that a larger, more representative Council offers a more honest path to curbing it than extending it further. Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan’s former permanent representative to the UN, has previously floated the idea that adding non-permanent members to the existing 15 would ensure greater representation of small and medium states.
Conclusively, UNSC reform is not heading towards a single dramatic breakthrough but towards slow movement on the issues that are easiest to agree on. The P5 show no real willingness to give up their veto, and the G4 and Uniting for Consensus remain stuck in the standoff over new permanent seats. Since even a single veto by any P5 member can sink the reform, the P5’s willingness to limit their privileges is essential for change. The most likely outcome is that the core power imbalance at the heart of the UN will remain untouched, even as everything around it continues to evolve.
The writer is a freelance contributor. She can be reached at: [email protected]
